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Abstract
2
This thesis provides an empirical investigation of the causes and consequences 
of shifting asset ownership patterns.
Chapter 1 analyses the dynamics of the ownership structure of risky asset port­
folios. The results show that household portfolio behaviour is better explained by 
infrequent decisions on their portfolio, rather than continuous adjustments as stan­
dard theory predicts. The model shows that there is strong persistence in both risky 
and safe asset holding decisions since households develop a taste for the assets that 
they hold and do not change portfolios frequently.
Chapter 2 evaluates the increasing exposure of households to risky financial as­
sets in Europe and the impact of holdings and revaluations of risky assets on con­
sumption, particularly as these are becoming increasingly widely held. The analysis 
provides evidence of wealth effects in two countries that differ dramatically in their 
financial structure and capital markets, unlike high frequency studies which have 
found little such effect.
Chapter 3 considers another main household asset, real estate. The chapter looks 
in depth into the United States housing market and tests the importance of wealth 
effects resulting from house price movements. I find evidence of strong housing 
wealth effects that is robust over three different estimation methods that allow for 
heterogeneity among states.
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Introduction
M otivation
One of the more surprising characteristics of financial markets is the low proportion 
of households holding risky assets. In 2000, less than half of households in the United 
States (US) owned risky assets, with the percentage of risky asset owners in Europe 
even lower. For instance, only 21 percent of households owned risky assets in Italy in 
the same year (see Table below). This is at odds with the classical theory pioneered 
by Merton (1969) and Samuelson (1969) that implies that, when risk aversion is 
finite, it is always optimal to take on some risk via financial markets. To explain 
this puzzle, it is necessary to deviate from the standard theory of complete markets. 
A factor that may explain such a deviation, and that has received much attention, in 
addition to the specific characteristics of households, is the existence of transaction 
costs. Since households have to incur a fixed cost to own risky assets, it might 
be optimal for some of them (the poorest and least well informed) not to invest 
at all under decreasing absolute risk aversion. In this respect, once a household 
has actually purchased the asset, and thereby met the associated transaction cost, 
there is a higher likelihood that the household will hold the same asset in the next 
period. This is often referred to as structural state dependence. There are also 
interindividual variations in behaviour which cannot be explained by their observed 
experiences, but can have an effect on portfolio choices. These factors, however, do 
not fully explain the stockholding puzzle.
13
INTRODUCTION 14
1991 1995 2000
United States 31.81 40.1 48.63
United Kingdom 22.12 27.5 26.1
Italy 8.5 12.3 21.0
Note: Percentage of households owning risky assets (risky bonds or/and equity).
The set of risky assets is defined on Table 2.2 and 2.3.
11989.21988. Only equity. Family Expenditure Survey. 31998.
Sources: Survey of Consumer Finances, British Household Panel 
Survey, and Bank of Italy Survey of Household Income 
and Wealth, respectively.
An interesting, but less studied, feature of household portfolio behaviour is the 
infrequency of portfolio allocation changes. Most households do not make frequent 
changes to their portfolio allocations. Instead, they appear to acquire a taste for 
certain assets and then retain them regardless of the optimal portfolio choice. This 
implies that incentives to switch to a different asset may not be sufficient to shift 
a household from its habitual asset mix, and the individual will keep the same 
portfolio for a long time. This persistence will fade away only slowly. Modelling 
dynamic choice (state dependence, habit persistence and unobserved heterogeneity) 
in a manageable framework is still a challenge for researchers. It is however essential 
for a better understanding of portfolio behaviour and to resolve the stockholding 
puzzle.
Large movements in risky asset prices in industrialized countries, coinciding with 
large swings in growth rates, have led to renewed interest in the question of why 
the speed and magnitude of a monetary impulse on economic activity differs from 
country to country. These differences seem to depend in part on dissimilarities in
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financial structure and on the portfolio composition of households and firms, as well 
as liquidity constraints affecting consumption directly. Capital markets in Europe, 
for example, are rather heterogeneous. Stock markets and privately issued debt 
markets are well developed in some European countries like the United Kingdom 
(UK), while in Italy and Germany these markets are still emerging. Developments in 
financial structure have differed over recent years, with a rapid growth of non-bank 
intermediaries in some countries, leading to changes in the composition of assets and 
liabilities of households and firms. Moreover, risky asset ownership has broadened 
in general, but at different rates across countries. While 27 percent of households in 
the UK held risky assets in 1995, only 12 percent did in Italy. These percentages, 
however, have been converging and in 2000 they were 26 and 21 respectively. These 
developments have led to renewed interest in the role of risky assets in helping to 
explain consumption behaviour. A growing body of research, both at the macro and 
micro level, supports the view that increases in wealth should boost consumption 
and investment. Yet our understanding of the empirical relationship between these 
variables still seems incomplete.
There has also been considerable attention in both the UK and US, on the role 
of housing prices and the effect of rising housing prices in sustaining consumption 
following the US stock market crash. The apparent strength of housing prices has 
been explained by the drop in mortgage interest rates and by a combination of a 
strong housing demand and the low elasticity of housing supply. Moreover, home 
equity remains the cornerstone of household wealth, even among the majority of 
homeowners who also hold risky assets. Around 50 percent of homeowners hold at 
least 50 percent of their wealth in home equity. Interestingly, property prices are 
much less volatile than share prices, leading to less uncertainty surrounding gains 
and losses in property wealth. It is, therefore, not surprising that shifts in housing 
prices cause strong reactions among the general public. It is still unclear, however,
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how fax house price developments feed back into aggregate spending. Determining 
the relative magnitude of wealth effects is difficult, since different forces go in op­
posite directions. Downsizers are better off when housing prices increase relative to 
other prices and can therefore increase their consumption. At the same, first-time 
buyers and upsizers might respond to the increase of housing prices by reducing 
their consumption.
R elated Literature
The stockholding puzzle has been well studied in the literature following King and 
Leape (1998). Two recent books, Guiso, Haliassos and Jappelli (2002, 2003), summa­
rize theoretical and empirical knowledge on household portfolio behaviour. Guiso, 
Haliassos and Jappelli (2002) examine (1) the status of theoretical knowledge on 
the structure of household portfolios, (2) the main tools of analytical, numerical 
and econometric analysis, and (3) a comparative analysis of household portfolios in 
the United States, United Kingdom, Italy, Germany and the Netherlands. Building 
on this framework, Guiso, Haliassos and Jappelli (2003) compare stockholding in 
Europe, adding France to the list of European countries studied. The econometric 
framework used in that book is the binomial probit model, accounting for unob­
served heterogeneity with panel data. Chapter 1 of this thesis builds upon this 
literature, adding two dimensions to this framework: (i) the household portfolio 
decision is treated as a multinomial problem, in keeping with its nature and (ii) 
state dependence, habit persistence and unobserved heterogeneity are all included 
in a manageable framework based on the Borsch-Supan and Hajivassiliou (1993) 
model1.
Alongside this literature, an active area of research has studied the existence of 
wealth effects from risky assets. Poterba and Samwick (1995) and Ludvingson and
1Perraudin and Sorensen (2000) use a multinomial framework but do not allow any time-varying 
correlation.
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Steindel (1999) are examples at the aggregate level, and Parker (1999), Attanasio, 
Banks and Tanner (2002) and Attanasio (1998) at a micro level. As an empirical 
matter, a consensus has emerged to use microdata in order to understand how risky 
assets affect consumption. Yet, this evidence has yielded mixed results and no com­
parative studies have been undertaken to draw strong conclusions about wealth effect 
similarities and differences among countries. Chapter 2, to my knowledge, is the only 
microeconomic comparison done for two different countries using relatively similar 
datasets and the same microeconometric methodology. The econometric model of 
this chapter also nests two puzzles, the excess sensitivity puzzle (see Zeldes (1989)) 
and the stockholding puzzle, that have been always studied separately. Partly as a 
result, I can show that there is evidence of wealth effects in both countries (Italy 
and the UK).
Chapter 3 borrows from the dynamic heterogeneous cointegrated panel data lit­
erature (Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999), Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003), Mark, Ogaki 
and Sul (2003), and Pedroni (1999)) and focuses on the real effects of housing prices 
on consumption. Previous analyses of housing prices in the US have either focused 
on microdata (for instance, McFadden (1994a, 1994b)) or on specifications omitting 
long-run relationships (for instance, Case et. al. (2001)), leading to opposite results 
and leaving some ambiguity in the interpretation of their statistical results. The 
chapter uses three different estimation methods that allow for heterogeneity among 
states and calculates an elasticity of consumption to housing prices ranging from
0.15 to 0.23. Although this result is not surprising in itself, it is at least obtained 
using efficient ways of modelling state variables such as consumption and housing 
prices.
INTRODUCTION 18
O verview  an d  m ain  resu lts
This thesis provides an empirical investigation of some international changes in asset 
ownership patterns and focuses on their microeconomic aspects and macroeconomic 
consequences. Consumer attitudes towards saving, risk bearing and uncertainty 
are crucial to understanding the behaviour of financial markets and therefore the 
monetary transmission mechanism. In this fashion, I explore the dynamics of the 
ownership structure of risky asset portfolios in the last decade. I then ask whether 
holdings and revaluations of risky assets affect consumption, particularly as these 
are becoming increasingly widely held, and how such effects appear in two countries 
that differ dramatically in their financial structure and capital markets. Finally, 
I consider another asset, real estate, that seems to have played an important role 
in smoothing the recent downturns in countries such as the US and UK. I explore 
whether house price developments feed back into consumption and how important 
this effect is.
I address these questions in three chapters.
C h ap te r  1 addresses, and answers, a question that lies at the heart of the 
stockholding puzzle: the infrequency of portfolio allocation changes. The paper uses 
six waves of the Bank of Italy Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) panel 
data to analyse the decision to hold safe and risky assets and its dynamics in the 
last decade in Italy. The household portfolio decision whether to hold risky financial 
assets is treated as a multinomial problem by applying the method of maximum 
smoothly simulated likelihood for a multinomial probit with autocorrelated errors. 
The results can be summarized as follows:
1. There is strong persistence in both risky and safe asset holding decisions. 
The results show that household portfolio behaviour is better explained by 
infrequent decisions on their portfolio, rather than continuous adjustment as 
standard theory predicts. Households develop a taste for the assets that they
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hold and do not change portfolios frequently.
2. The model mainly works through time-varying components rather than through 
time-invariant ones, suggesting that habit formation is driving the behaviour 
of households.
3. I find both ’’true” state dependence and taste persistence in the decision to 
hold risky and safe assets.
4. Ignoring intertemporal linkages biases some estimation coefficients, leading to 
an underestimate of the effects of education and to an overestimate of the true 
state dependence of holding no financial assets.
5. Education levels, labour income, age and wealth turn out to be more important 
for holding stocks than for risky bonds. The larger the family, the less diversi­
fied the portfolio is. Finally, a high unemployment rate strongly decreases the 
likelihood of holding risky bonds.
The contribution of the chapter is the inclusion of intertemporal correlations be­
tween unobserved determinants of the portfolio allocation decision in a multinomial 
model of household portfolio participation.
C h ap te r  2 evaluates the increasing exposure of households to risky financial 
assets in Europe and the impact of these assets on consumption. The paper employs 
an endogenous switching model with bivariate switching2 -where the switch depends 
on two criterion functions controlling for the endogeneous process that is responsible 
for liquidity constraints and risky asset ownership - to estimate wealth effects in two
2 An endogenous switching model with univariate switching was used by the author to analyse the 
effects of a banking crisis on bank credit to the private sector for a panel of developing, developed, 
and transition economies for the period 1970-1998. The model illustrates how the behaviour of 
the bank credit function changes during a banking crisis, reflecting a generalized disruption in the 
stability of behavioural parameters (Munoz, S. (2000), “The Breakdown of Credit Relations under 
Conditions of a Banking Crisis: A Switching Regime Approach”, IMF Working Paper No. 135.). 
This paper was prepared during the author’s PhD at the London School of Economics, but it is not 
included in this thesis since the topic is not directly linked to the main theme of the thesis. The 
econometric methodology is in the same spirit as the one used in Chapter 2.
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countries with a different financial structure, Italy and the UK. The basic model is 
divided into a discrete and a continuous part that characterizes consumption demand 
and corrects for selectivity bias.
The first part is modelled using bivariate probit estimation and shows that there 
is a negative relationship between the errors in the equations to explain holdings 
of risky assets and liquidity constraints. The model suggests that households ex­
posed to liquidity constraints and facing uncertain liquidity needs will tend to hold 
relatively liquid and safe assets. There are some differences in consumer behaviour 
in these two countries: employment of the spouse seems to be a critical factor in 
avoiding liquidity constraints and holding risky assets in Italy, while homeownership 
(with or without a mortgage) plays a major role in the UK.
I then ask how consumption responds to holdings of risky assets in the second 
part of the model. I use the life-cycle model as a conceptual framework throughout 
the chapter, stressing the role played by wealth following Modigliani and Ando 
(1963). The analysis of consumption functions presents a variety of problems that 
range from the availability and reliability of consumption data, to some more subtle 
econometric problems. Consequently, I use household data for each country for 
the same period and, when studying wealth effects, follow two approaches: (1) 
Euler equations to estimate structural parameters and test the life-cycle model and 
(2) consumption functions to assess the importance of wealth effects. The chapter 
provides evidence of wealth effects in both countries, unlike high frequency studies 
which find little effect, with a marginal propensity to consume out of financial assets 
of 0.04. Results are mixed with respect to liquidity constraints. Findings from 
Euler equations do not show excess sensitivity to current labour income in any of the 
countries, but consumption function equations show evidence of liquidity constraints 
in Italy and habit formation in the UK.
C h ap te r  3 looks in depth at the US housing market and tests the importance of
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wealth effects resulting from house price movements. Increases in home prices have 
outpaced overall inflation for the last decade, so widespread home price inflation 
has lifted household net worth. Since housing prices are locally driven, I study the 
housing wealth effect using state level quarterly data for the 50 US states and the 
District of Columbia. Due to the considerable heterogeneity in state level behaviour, 
fixed effects estimators that constrain intercepts, short-run coefficients and error 
variances lead to misleading inferences. Consequently, I use a recently developed 
methodology for dynamic heterogeneous cointegrated models for panel data, to study 
housing wealth effects from the 1970s to the 1990s.
The results of this chapter are three-fold: First, the study supports the existence 
of unit roots in housing prices and a cointegrating relationship between consumption, 
income and housing wealth at the state level. Secondly, I find evidence of a strong 
housing wealth effect. More importantly, this finding is robust over three different 
estimation methods that allow for heterogeneity among states. Thirdly, I show 
that differences in the age of population and homeownership play a role in the fink 
between consumption and housing prices, although they do not satisfactorily explain 
all, or even a large proportion, of the different responses of consumption to housing 
prices among states.
Chapter 1
Habit Formation and 
Persistence in Individual Asset 
Portfolio Holdings
This chapter uses six waves of the Bank of Italy Survey of Household Income and 
Wealth (SHIW) to explore the dynamics of asset portfolio ownership. The household 
asset portfolio decision is a choice among discrete alternatives, and I  model the 
problem in a multinomial framework. I  discuss the well-known stockholding puzzle 
and focus on a particularly important feature of household portfolio behaviour: the 
infrequency of portfolio allocation changes.
I  find evidence of strong unobserved heterogeneity through time-varying error 
components, which I  interpret as taste persistence in both the risky and safe asset 
participation decisions. I  estimate the model using the method of maximum smoothly 
simulated likelihood.
22
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1.1 Introduction
In most developed countries a large fraction of households do not own risky financial 
assets. This fraction is, however, decreasing slowly over time. In Italy for instance, 
89 percent of households did not hold any risky financial asset in 1991 but this 
fraction had decreased to 73 percent in 2000. Since there was previously strong 
persistence in portfolio decisions, some analysts have even suggested that the shift 
from safe assets to risky assets could be destabilizing to the economy and financial 
markets.
The stockholding puzzle has been widely studied in the literature, although no 
study has focused on the role of habit formation on household portfolio decisions in 
a multinomial context. I believe that it is important to model the choice this way 
because households may stay inside or outside of the stock market even if it is not 
appropriate at that point in time. In addition, since households may get a taste for 
certain investments and keep them, habit formation introduces state dependence. 
The contribution of this chapter is to show that habit formation plays a role in 
the decision to shift from zero financial assets to safe financial assets (checking 
accounts, savings accounts, certificates of deposits, postal deposits, postal bonds, 
treasury bonds and treasury certificates) and to risky financial assets (long-term 
government bonds, corporate bonds, investment funds and equities). To estimate 
the model, I first aggregate assets into two categories: risky and safe. Since a high 
level of aggregation is problematic - important differences exist among assets - I 
also consider a more disaggregated model where I differentiate between risky bonds, 
stocks and safe assets. In doing so, I am able to investigate the dynamics of the 
interaction between these kind of assets.
To this end, maximum smoothly simulated likelihood estimation is used for a 
multinomial probit with autocorrelated errors, as developed by Borsch-Supan and 
Hajivassiliou (1993). The autocorrelated errors - unobserved heterogeneity through
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time-varying error components - allow for the habit formation or taste persistence 
that households exhibit when deciding whether to buy safe assets or risky assets. 
The model allows us to distinguish taste persistence from time-invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity.
In order to study this dynamic participation problem panel data is required. 
Because the existence of incomplete markets and heterogeneity of preferences af­
fects portfolio choices directly, household data are necessary for this analysis of the 
dynamics of portfolio choice behaviour. The Bank of Italy Survey of Household In­
come and Wealth (SHIW) has complete information on portfolio decisions over time 
through six waves for the period 1989 to 2000. The panel is unbalanced with 22,591 
observations and 7,588 households who participate in at least two waves. To the best 
of my knowledge, there is only one other panel dataset with detailed information on 
ownership of assets over time, the Dutch CenTER Savings Survey.1
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews those papers that model 
household asset portfolio decisions, including the limited participation in financial 
markets. It also introduces the importance of habit formation in household financial 
decisions. Section 3 presents the estimation procedure and section 4 describes the 
data and reports the results. I start with a simple benchmark model before moving 
to the multiperiod multinomial probit model with heterogeneous and autoregressive 
unobservables. Section 5 presents conclusions.
1.2 Habit Formation in Household Portfolios
The financial asset allocation decision of households has been extensively studied in 
the last two decades. While some of the studies discuss the rapid increase in the
1 Ameriks and Zeldes (2001) use the TIAA-CREF (Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association- 
College Retirement Equities Fund) panel dataset. This data has the drawback that the sample 
is endogenous and unrepresentative. In addition, it does not contain information on household 
characteristics, so it would not allow the current analysis to be undertaken.
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fraction of households owning equities (US and UK), others analyse the stockhold­
ing puzzle (for example Mankiw and Zeldes (1991), Poterba and Samwick (1995), 
Haliassos and Bertaut (1995), Vissing-Joergersen (2002), and Bertaut and Starr- 
McCluer (2002)). However, these studies are based on cross sectional data, ruling 
out dynamic considerations.
An interesting feature of household portfolio choice is the infrequency of portfolio 
allocation changes. This trend is in contrast with the standard portfolio choice 
model (without transaction costs) inherited from Samuelson (1969) and Merton 
(1969, 1971), which implies that individuals rebalance their portfolios each period. 
This rebalancing can be done by changing the allocation of the asset holdings or by 
changing the allocation of the flow of new contributions. A recent study of the US 
by Ameriks and Zeldes (2001) finds that almost one half of their sample made no 
active changes to their portfolio allocations for a period of 10 years. They show that 
households make few changes in either the allocation of stocks or flows, which they 
interpret as owing to the presence of transactions costs or inertia. They consider 
different types of transactions costs: minimum balance requirements, per-trade fees 
and information costs (costs of purchasing assets and monitoring costs).
The reluctancy of households to switch from holding one basket of assets to 
another may be associated with household specific historical characteristics. For 
example, the probability that a household holds safe assets may depend on the 
probability that it had already held safe assets in the previous period, the current 
realization being a function of the past one. The same type of state dependence 
may apply to the holdings of risky assets. These intertemporal linkages can be of 
two types: True (observable) state dependence and (unobservable) taste persistence, 
which can be confused with spurious state dependence. The former can happen as a 
consequence of an event that has marked the behaviour of a specific household and 
makes it allocate holdings in a certain way. Another household in the same position
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but not having experienced such an event will behave differently. The latter is related 
to household tastes for certain assets, hence may be interpreted as habit formation 
or taste persistence.
In order to relate the above intertemporal linkages to the portfolio allocation de­
cision it might be helpful to go back to the standard model of lifetime consumption 
and portfolio choice of Samuelson (1969) and Merton (1969, 1971). In this model 
agents live off income generated by their invested wealth, and thus non-participation 
in the stock market, or entry or exit into that market, over time is not observed. 
The optimal portfolio of risky assets, and the split between risky and riskless assets, 
will vary across agents with different preferences, wealth and investment horizon. 
Conditions on return distribution/utility functions were derived, under which differ­
ences in investment horizon and wealth across agents should not lead to differences 
in portfolio choice. As shown by Samuelson (1969) investment horizons are irrel­
evant if agents face a constant investment opportunity set (i.i.d returns). CRRA 
preferences are sufficient for wealth not to matter. While return unpredictability 
and deviations from CRRA utility could explain some of the heterogeneity in the 
share of financial wealth invested in stocks across households and time, it is unlikely 
that these features can explain all such differences. While return predictability can 
generate large changes in the optimal share of financial wealth invested in equities 
over time, such changes would affect all households, in contrast to the considerable 
idiosyncratic (household specific) movements in equity portfolio shares.
So differences in risk aversion and transactions costs can help explain the remain­
ing heterogeneity in observed portfolio choices. It is well-known that the parameter 
a  in the standard CRRA utility function: u(c) =  controls both the relative risk 
aversion and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS), which are different 
aspects of individuals’ tastes. Much evidence documents significant heterogeneity 
in the EIS across the population. It has been argued that the non-participation
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phenomenon, due to transaction cost, should be considered part of the solution 
to the equity premium puzzle because the consumption growth of nonstockholders 
covaries substantially less with the stock return than the consumption growth of 
stockholders (see Mankiw and Zeldes (1991), Vissing-Jorgensen (2002), Attanasio, 
Banks and Tanner (2002)). However, heterogeneity in relative risk aversion has been 
not studied. The number of households who choose to enter the stock market or to 
change the number of stocks held in response to a shock to nonfinancial income, will 
depend on how many households are close to the point where it becomes worthwhile 
to adjust according to their taste preferences.
Miniaci and Weber (2002) review the methodological issues surrounding esti­
mation of portfolio choice models from survey data. They point out that a panel 
structure is necessary to estimate portfolio choice models, propose the use of bi­
nomial probit models, and state the different mechanisms that can lead to limited 
participation. These are state dependence, unobserved heterogeneity, serial correla­
tion in shocks, and time-varying observable characteristics including demographics. 
They then illustrate the significance of the second, third and fourth reasons for lim­
ited participation by estimating a binomial probit/logit with random effects/fixed 
effects for three waves of the SHIW. Guiso and Jappelli (2002) also estimate a binary 
probit model with random effects to study participation in risky financial assets us­
ing three waves of the SHIW. However, they ignore any state dependence in their 
analysis.
Vissing-Joergense (2002) estimates the first type of state dependence, namely 
true state dependence. In this sense, Vissing-Joergense (2002) introduces four dif­
ferent costs of stock market participation in the model: an entry cost, a fixed trans­
action cost, a proportional transaction cost, and a per period participation cost. 
The first three costs lead to true state dependence in the stock market participation 
decision and in the proportion of financial wealth invested in stocks. In the empir­
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ical part she uses the two waves of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) 
with portfolio data (1984, 1989), adds the lag of participation in 1984 in a simple 
probit regression for 1989 and finds a significant positive coefficient for true state 
dependence. In other words, she finds that the likelihood of participation in the 
stock market in one period is strongly correlated with participation in the previous 
one. When she accounts for unobserved individual effects, the covariance of the 
error term for participation in 1984 and 1989 is not significant. The problem with 
her estimation is that she imposes a binary choice model and uses only two points 
of observation. The panel structure is too short to allow for taste persistence, which 
is well known to suggest state dependence when it is in fact absent.
Alessie, Hochguertel and van Soest (2001) also estimate the first type of state 
dependence using the Dutch CentER Saving panel survey. They use dynamic bi­
nary choice panel data models to explain the dynamics of mutual fund and stock 
ownership. In their model, correlated random effects account for unobserved hetero­
geneity, and dummies for lagged ownership of each asset type capture genuine state 
dependence. Errors, however, are assumed to be independent over time (the authors 
point out that first order autocorrelation was allowed for in some specifications but 
turned out to be insignificant).
Miniaci and Ruberti (2001) estimate a model of random effects suggested by 
Arellano and Carrasco (2003) using Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), where 
the assumption of strict exogeneity of income is relaxed. They find very strong true 
state dependence.
One drawback of these studies is that they treat household portfolio choices as 
a binomial problem when they are by nature multinomial. In contrast, Perraudin 
and Sorensen (2000) implement a multinomial logit model in order to study the 
demand of risky assets. They assume that all households hold some quantity of 
money and that households choose to hold either money alone, money and bonds,
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or stocks, bonds and money. The logistic model does not allow for some portfolios 
to be closer substitutes than others; and this property is justified on the grounds 
of the computational complexity of the multinomial probits. Moreover, since US 
cross-sectional data are used, the existence of time-varying correlation is ruled out.
Consequently, none of these approaches include both time-invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity (household effects) and time-varying unobserved heterogeneity (habit 
formation). Both features can explain why ownership of assets in period t is cor­
related with ownership of assets in period t +  1  and a less restrictive model could 
suggest the extent to which this correlation is due to one or the other. In addition, 
the previous literature has imposed the assumption of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) 
-zero correlation among alternatives- when it often seems unlikely. Modelling these 
features is the purpose of what follows.
1.3 The model: M ultiperiod M ultinom ial Probit w ith  
Autocorrelated Errors and Unobserved H eterogene­
ity
This section of the chapter starts with a benchmark model similar in spirit to Per- 
raundin and Soerensen (2000) and uses cross-sectional data multinomial logit with 
three alternatives to estimate a model of asset holdings. I then proceed to relax key 
assumptions that have been made in the literature. One can think of the decision of 
holding assets as a discrete choice problem in which households see some choices as 
closer substitutes than others (see Borsh-Supan et al. (1992) for a similar discussion 
of elderly living arrangements). Hence correlation among unobserved determinants 
of financial asset holding at a point in time is likely. The existence of intratemporal 
correlation between unobserved determinants is a violation of the assumption of the 
independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA).
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Another assumption that has been imposed in papers on household portfolio 
choices is that of no intertemporal correlation of unobserved determinants. The 
decision of whether to hold assets or not is clearly an intertemporal choice. Because 
of transaction and information costs, households hold or do not hold assets even if 
it is not appropriate at that point of time. That is, households may be substantially 
out of long-run equilibrium if a survey interview occurs shortly before or after the 
switch between asset holdings. In addition, households may get a taste for certain 
investments and keep them. This kind of habit formation may introduce taste 
dependence.
Borsh-Supan et al. (1992) distinguish between two components of intertemporal 
linkages: First, linkages through unobserved person-specific attributes: that is, un­
observed heterogeneity through time-invariant error components. Second, unobserved 
heterogeneity through time-varying error components, for example, an autoregressive 
error structure. The focus of this paper will be the second, since my interest is in 
habit formation or taste persistence.
To my knowledge, all studies of household portfolio allocation that use multi­
nomial probit or logit models have assumed no intertemporal correlation between 
unobserved determinants of the portfolio allocation decision. In my first model, 
households face a choice of three alternatives: holding risky financial assets; safe 
financial assets; or no assets. In order to cope with aggregation problems, my sec­
ond model features households choosing between five alternatives: stocks and risky 
bonds; stocks; risky bonds; safe assets; or no assets.
1.3.1 C ross-Sectional M ultinom ial L ogit (M N L )
In order to describe the dynamic nature of the participation decision I start from a 
static multinomial model and build up to a multiperiod multinomial model.
The multinomial logit model can be derived from the theory of random utility
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maximization. We assume that consumers are rational, so that they make choices 
that maximize their perceived utility subject to constraints on expenditures. Let us 
suppose that the consumer faces Mi choices and define yjit as the level of indirect 
utility associated with the jth  choice. The underlying response variable yjit is defined 
by the regression relationship:
Vjit ^jit ( 1 *1 )
where xju  is the vector of individual characteristics for individual i and eju is a 
residual that captures unobserved variations in attributes of alternatives and errors 
in the optimization strategy of the consumer.
The maximization vector in this case is:
yi =  argmaxk{yti, . . . , 2 /JmJ, ( 1 -2 )
In other words, I observe the index of which ever alternative gives the highest 
utility for individual i.
For full efficiency maximum likelihood methods need to be used. The probability 
density function (PDF) for an individual i choosing alternative A; is as follows:
f(Vi\xi) = prob(yi = k\xi), (1.3)
Since this means that the utility of the k’th  option was the highest, I can express 
the probability of a choice sequence in terms of integrals over the differences between 
the unobserved utility components and the chosen alternative:
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y*i -  i/St <  o N
Xi (1.4)
^ ViMi ~  y*k — 0 )
=  [  f{y*i\xi,P,<r)dy*i-
JD (yi)
where D{Vi) =  {y?\y^ -  y*k < 0 , y*M. -  y*k < 0}.
To overcome the problem of high-dimensional integrals in limited dependent 
variable (LDV) models, McFadden (1974) showed that under the assumption that 
ejn is distributed iid, “extreme-value of Type II” implies a closed form expression 
for equation 1.4:
exp(xj/3k) 
E j£ i  exp(xiPj)
prob(yi =  k\xi) =  (1-5)
which is the probability that an individual with characteristics i will choose the k’th  
alternative with some normalization (such as (3M. = 0 ).
The MNL model generalizes the McFadden (1974) logit model and allows agent- 
specific characteristics to determine the choice probabilities. To prevent terms that 
do not vary across alternatives from falling out of the choice probability, I will create 
a set of dummy variables for the choices and then allow the coefficients to vary across 
the choices rather than the characteristics.
The main shortcoming of the MNL model is that it possesses the IIA assumption 
(zero correlation among alternatives). It predicts “too high a joint probability of 
selection for two alternatives that are in fact perceived as similar rather than in­
dependent by the individual” . 2  This is inappropriate for modelling the household
2Maddala (1983), p. 62.
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portfolio allocation problem.
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1.3 .2  A llow ing  for a ltern atives across different branches to  have dif­
ferent su b stitu tab ilities: N ested  M u ltin om ia l L ogit (N M N L )  
m od el
The nested multinomial logit (NMNL) model developed by McFadden (1981) par­
tially solves the problem stated above since it allows for alternatives across different 
branches to have different substitutabilites by involving the sequential combination 
of the multinomial logit model. In order to clarify terms, Figure 1.1 shows the choice 
problem that households face in the model. 3  This tree has two branches, financial 
assets and no financial assets. The first branch has two elemental alternatives: risky 
assets and safe assets. The second branch has only one elemental alternative: no 
financial assets. Other trees were tried but this one gave the most consistent results. 
Therefore, the household may decide whether to hold financial assets or not, and 
then if he chooses to hold financial assets he may decide to buy only safe assets, or 
risky and safe assets.
Financial No
Assets Financial
Assets
Risky Safe
Financial Financial
Assets Assets
Figure 1.1: Choice Problem Tree
3Section 1.4.3. will analyse a more disaggregated model where a tree with five alternatives is 
modelled. The household faces the choice of holding stocks and risky bonds, stocks, risky bonds, 
safe financial assets and no financial assets.
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Let us suppose a household faces a portfolio problem, with the choice of being a 
financial assetholder or not (i= 1 ,...,C= 2 ) and the possibility of holding risky assets 
or safe assets (j= l,...,N =2) in the first case and no financial assets in the second 
case. A consumer will therefore have a utility Uij for alternative (i,j) , which is a 
function of the consumer’s characteristics (such as age, family size, and disposable 
income) and each consumer will choose the alternative that maximizes his utility.
The probability Pij that the ( ij) ’th  alternative will be chosen is as follows:
p._________ exp(xj/0)
I can write
Pij = Pj/% ■ P„ (1.7)
and define an inclusive value as follows:
Ni
exp(Ii) =  ^  exP (Xi/P) • (L 8 )
j =l
The two terms of equation 1.7 can then be written as follows:
exp{xjj(3) 
J/* exp(Ii) ’ (1.9)
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Pi =  = 2 2 ^ .  (i.io )
E m = i exp(Ift)
I will maximize Pij with respect to the two parameters /? and 9. The nested multi­
nomial logit model is obtained by allowing the inclusive values to have a coefficient 
9 in the unit interval.
McFadden (1978) showed that the nested multinomial logit model is also consis­
tent with stochastic utility maximization provided 0 < 9  < 1, and that the coefficient 
of the inclusive value gives an estimate of the similarity of the observed choices at 
the lower level of the tree structure.
The main advantage of the NMNL is that while being computationally no more 
involved than the MNL model, it allows for alternatives across different branches to 
have different substitutabilities, that is, the IIA property holds only for alternatives 
on the same branch.
1.3 .3  A llow ing  for differing su b stitu ta b ilitie s  b e tw een  a ltern a tiv es  
and  add ing in tertem p oral linkages: M u ltip eriod  M u ltin om ia l 
P rob it (M P M N P )
A natural alternative to the Nested Multinomial Logit is a Multinomial Probit 
(MNP) model. This allows differing substitutabilities between all asset holding 
alternatives faced by the household, rather than being constrained by hierarchical 
structures (like the NMNL model). It is computationally burdensome, however, 
both because of the difficulty of computing the multinomial integral and the dif­
ficulties involved in estimating the covariance matrix caused by the fact that the 
likelihood function is often found to be ‘flat’ in the region around the maximum 
likelihood estimates. In addition, extending the household portfolio choice prob­
lem to a multiperiod context requires the estimation of a multinomial choice model
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with unobserved determinants that are correlated across alternatives and over time. 
This leads to an even higher dimensional integration of the associated likelihood 
functions. A simulation estimation method is then necessary to tackle the problem.
I follow Borsch-Supan et al. (1992) and assume in this case that the space of 
possible outcomes is the set of N T different choice sequences { it} , t =  1,..., T., and 
yit is the maximal element over the utilities in {yjt \ j  =  1,..., t } . As above, what will 
be important for the household portfolio decision is the difference in utility levels 
between the best choice and any other choice, since the optimal choice delivers 
maximum utility. Let us define D  error differences stacked in a vector z with joint 
cumulative distribution function F. Then:
Zjt = tjt ~  tit for i = i , j  ^  it . ( 1 .1 1 )
where D  =  (N  — 1) x T.
By comparing two indirect utilities (see equation 1.1), I obtain:
Vit Vjt 4 * %itP "b tit ^  %jt@ tj t ,
Xit/3 -  Xjt/3 > €jt -  eit <— ► Xit/3 -  Xjtfi > Zjt .
so that the maximum error differences can be as large as the difference in the 
deterministic utility components. The area of integration is
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Aj(i) = {zjt\ -  oo < zjt < xuP -  Xjt/3} fo r  j  ^  i, (1.12)
and the probability of choice sequence {it} is
I {X it};P ,F )  =
f x . . .x  f  dF(z), (1.13)
J { z j \  e  A j( i i ) \ j= l , . . . , lJ ^ i i}  J { z jT  € A j(iT ) \ j= l , .» j& T }
where the area of integration is Aj =  A j(i\)  x ... x Aj(iT), and where F  is the 
cumulative distribution function that is assumed to be multivariate normal.
The likelihood function is
N
£ (P ,M ) = \ [ P | {Xit,„}
n=l
where n  denotes an observation in a sample of N  individuals and M  is the covariance 
matrix.
The integral in 1.13 does not have a closed-form solution and its calculation will 
involve at least one D-dimensional integral for each observation and each iteration 
in the maximization process.
Moreover, I am assuming a multivariate normal distribution of the Zjt in equation 
1.11 with a covariance matrix M  that has up to (D + 1 ) x D /2 — 1 parameters 
to identify. 4  These covariance elements are the correlations among the Zjt and
4 Much fewer in practice due to the modelling of M.
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the variances . 5  Consequently, as noted above, I adopt the method of Smoothly 
Simulated Maximum Likelihood (SSML) estimation using the Geweke algorithm 
described in Borsch-Supan and Hajivassiliou (1993).6
The covariance matrix M  can be specified in different ways:
1. Af =  J
This specification leads to a pooled cross-sectional probit model, ignoring in­
tertemporal linkages and subject to IIA. The D = (I — 1) x T  dimensional integral 
of the choice probabilities factors into D  one-dimensional integrals and there are no 
unknown parameters in M .
2. Interalternative correlation
M  will be a block diagonal structure with T  x (I — 1) dimension blocks. In this 
case, (I  — 2) variances and (I —1) x (I — 2) /2  covariances can be identified in M .
3. Intertemporal linkages: Random Effects
M  will have a block-diagonal equicorrelation structure and (I  — 1) variances 
of the random effects can be identified. This one factor structure leads to a one- 
dimensional-factorization of the integral in equation 1.13, which can be approxi­
mated accurately through Gaussian Hermite Quadrature.
4. Intertemporal linkages: Autorregressive Errors
M  will be a block-diagonal structure where each block has the structure of an 
AR(1) process with ( /  — 1) parameters (pj) to be identified.
The combination of (2), (3) and (4) leads to the following error structure:
Ci,t =  oti +  rji,t> Vi,t =  P i ' %  t - i  +  " V ,  i  =  1, I -  1, (1-14)
5 With the exception of the restrictions due to the invariance of a discrete choice model to the scale 
of the indirect utilities (only differences of indirect utilities can be identified) and a single restriction 
due to the general non-identification of the scale of the vector /3 in discrete choice models.
6The Geweke algorithm is used to derive unbiased estimates of the choice probabilites.
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with
corr vj}S) = <
0  i f  t ^ s  
Uij i f  t = s
and
cov (oci, otj) =  aij,
which implies
cov (eu, €jtS) = Oij +  p\ ------------------------------Uij. (1.15)
All parameters in equation 1.15 are identified if /p*/ <  1, i = 1,..., I  — 1.
An interesting and important feature for my analysis are the two components 
of the covariance matrix. The first term is the random household effect component 
which reflects unobserved time-invariant individual heterogeneity or idiosyncracies. 
The second term can be interpreted as habit formation that slowly fades away.
1.4 Empirical Results
1.4.1 D a ta
In order to model the intertemporal linkages mentioned above panel data is needed. 
To this end, I use the SHIW dataset. This survey is run every 2 or 3 years and has 
complete information on household portfolios.
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For the remainder of the paper, and following Guiso et al. (1996)’s classification, 
I define three categories of financial asset holdings:
1. Safe financial assets (SF): checking accounts, savings deposits, certificates of 
deposit, postal deposits, postal bonds, treasury bills up to one year maturity 
(BOTs), and floating-rate Treasury credit certificates (CCTs).
2. Risky financial assets (RK): long-term government bonds (BTPs and CTZs, 
the latter of which refers to zero-coupon bonds), corporate bonds, foreign 
bonds, investment fund units, domestic and foreign stocks, shareholdings in 
limited companies and in partnerships . 7
3. No financial assets (NOA).
Few Italian households hold risky assets (see first two rows of Table 1.1), so 
I also show a broader definition of risky assets, following Guiso et al. (1996) by 
adding savings deposits, postal bonds, treasury bills to one year maturity (BOTs) 
and floating-rate treasury credit certificates (CCTs). For the econometric analysis 
that follows, however, I retain the narrow but more precise definition.
Tables 1.1 and 1.2 show the distribution of household portfolios of the imbalanced 
SHIW panel using the narrow (RISKO) and broad (RISK1) definition of risky assets 
respectively. Households are classified by their choice of assets: holdings of risky 
assets and safe assets (rksf), only risky assets (rknosf), only safe assets (sfhork) and 
no assets (noa).
Tables 1.3 and 1.4 show the total number of observations for the unbalanced and 
balanced panels. I have excluded from the following analysis the risky asset and no 
safe asset category (rknosf) from the narrow measure since it only represents 0.05 
percent of the population ( 1 1  observations). The big difference between the balanced
rLong-term government bonds are included due to the risk of default in Italy since public debt 
is substantial.
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riskO 1989 1991 1993 1995 1998 2000 Total
rksf 109 385 535 549 909 908 3395
rknosf 1 3 1 1 4 1 11
sfnork 1078 3279 3409 2925 3136 2422 16249
noa 158 489 591 543 613 542 2936
Total 1346 4156 4536 4018 4662 3873 22591
Note: Figures in the table give the count.
Table 1 .1 : Portfolio choice by year with a narrow measure of risky assets
riskl 1989 1991 1993 1995 1998 2000 Total
rksf 466 1563 1925 1773 2012 1539 9278
rknosf 200 615 579 447 370 162 2373
sfnork 522 1489 1441 1255 1667 1630 8004
noa 158 489 591 543 613 542 2936
Total 1346 4156 4536 4018 4662 3873 22591
Note: See Thble 1.1.
Table 1.2: Portfolio choice by year with a broad measure of risky assets
and imbalanced panel is that the latter contains between two and six waves and the 
former contains only households that were followed for six waves.
1989/91/93/95/98/00 
Financial assets? (narrow def.)
Unbalanced Panel Balanced Panel
freq percent cum freq percent cum
rksf 3395 15.04 15.04 294 18.92 18.92
sfnork 16249 71.96 87.00 1130 72.72 91.63
noa 2936 13.00 100.00 130 8.37 100.00
Total 22580 100.00 1554 100.00
Table 1.3: Portfolio choice with a narrow measure of risky assets
A notable feature of the data is that only 15 percent of households held risky 
assets in the narrow definition.
Tables 1.5, 1.6 and 1.7 illustrate the proportion of financial asset holders with 
different demographic characteristics: education, age and sex.
Table 1.5 classifies households depending on their degree of education in 2000. 
Forty-five percent of households that have a university degree held risky assets and 
only 1 percent did not hold any financial assets. By contrast, only 3 percent of
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1989/91/93/95/98/00 
Financial assets? (broad def.)
Unbalanced Panel Balanced Panel
freq percent cum freq percent cum
rksf 9278 41.09 41.09 790 50.84 50.84
rknosf 2362 10.46 51.55 137 8.82 59.65
sfnork 8004 35.45 87.00 497 31.98 91.63
noa 2936 13.00 100.00 130 8.37 100.00
Total 22580 100.00 1554 100.00
Table 1.4: Portfolio choice for a broad measure of risky assets
households with no schooling held risky assets and 44 percent held no assets. In 
general, the more years of education the larger the proportion of households holding 
risky assets. The majority of households held only safe assets.
riskO 2000 no schooling elementary school high school university
rksf 2.73 11.33 28.75 45.45
sfnork 53.52 67.63 62.37 53.29
noa 43.75 21.03 8.84 1.25
total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Note: Figures in the table give percentages.
Table 1.5: Portfolio choice by education
In the same fashion, Table 1.6 shows that at any age, the majority of households 
held only safe assets in 2000. However, households between 35 and 55 years old were 
more likely to hold risky assets. The highest proportion of households that held no 
assets are either below 35 years old or above 65 years old.
riskO 2000 <35 35-45 45-55 55-65 65+
rksf 21.94 28.69 27.99 25.27 15.46
sfnork 64.56 62.95 59.94 61.97 64.38
noa 13.50 8.36 12.07 12.64 20.16
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Note: See Table 1.5.
Table 1.6: Portfolio choice by age
Table 1.7 presents the distribution of financial asset holdings by the sex of the 
household head in 1989 and 2000. The proportion of both male and female heads
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that held risky assets increased from 9 percent to 26 percent for male heads and 
from 6  percent to 17 percent for female heads, so the gender difference remains.
riskO 1989 2000
Male Female Male Female
rksf 8.71 5.76 26.06 17.55
sfnork 80.71 77.70 62.08 63.56
noa 10.49 16.55 11.82 18.89
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Note: See Table 1.5.
Table 1.7: Portfolio choice by sex
In order to get a clearer picture of the determination of financial asset portfolios, 
the dynamics of participation in financial markets need to be analyzed. This is done 
in the next section.
1.4.2 C hanges in  P ortfo lio  A llocation s
This section aims to give a descriptive analysis of the transition frequencies between 
financial asset holding states. The SHIW panel contains portfolio choice observations 
for six years, which will allow us to analyze patterns of participation and changes 
in/out of the financial markets in the 1990s. Household portfolios exhibit dramatic 
variation. In 2000, 63 percent of household with safe assets did not hold stocks 
or risky bonds, 6  percent held stocks, risky bonds and safe assets, 18 percent held 
stocks and safe assets but no risky bonds, and 3 percent held risky bonds and safe 
assets but not stocks. Nobody is observed having no holdings of safe assets, and 
holding risky bonds, stocks or both. Finally, 10 percent held no safe assets, risky 
bonds or stocks (See Table 1.9). Similarly striking results were reported by Vissing- 
Joergense (2002) for the 1994 PSID dataset. She found that 42.4 percent of those 
with positive financial wealth held neither stocks nor bonds. An additional 29.1 
percent held stocks but not bonds, whereas 13.5 percent held bonds but not stocks. 
Only 15 percent held both stocks and bonds.
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Year riskO
rksf rknosf sfnork noa
1991 10.52 0.08 81.39 8.01
1993 13.75 0.00 77.35 8.90
1995 16.10 0.00 74.35 9.55
1998 24.92 0.00 65.94 9.14
2000 26.78 0.00 63.19 10.03
Note: Households are divided into 
those holding 4 categories of financial 
assets. Figures in the table give 
percentages per year.
Table 1.8: Portfolio choice per year using a balanced panel (1991-2000) for the 
narrow and broad measure of risky assets, respectively.
Table 1.8 illustrates the proportion of households in each of the four categories 
of the dependent variable “risk” for the narrow (riskO) definition of risky assets. 
Referring to the narrow definition of risky assets, during the 1990s the first category 
(people holding risky and safe assets) rose from 10 percent to 27 percent while the 
proportion of households that held safe assets but not risky assets - the majority - 
fell from 81 to 63 percent. Finally, the proportion of households that held no assets 
remained more or less constant.
Year risk4
rbstsf nrbstsf rbnstsf rbstnsf rbnstnsf nrbnstsf nrbstnsf nbnstnsf
1991 1.21 5.26 4.05 0.00 0.00 81.39 0.08 8.01
1993 3.48 7.36 2.91 0.00 0.00 77.35 0.00 8.90
1995 3.64 7.36 5.10 0.00 0.00 74.35 0.00 9.55
1998 6.07 14.32 4.53 0.00 0.00 65.94 0.00 9.14
2000 6.07 17.88 2.83 0.00 0.00 63.19 0.00 10.03
Note: Households are divided into those holding 8 categories of financial assets. 
Figures in the table give percentages per year.
Table 1.9: Portfolio choice per year using balanced panel (1991-2000), for narrow 
measure of risky assets
Table 1.9 gives additional insights into the portfolio structure by showing the 
behaviour of participation in risky bonds and stocks. RBSTSF refers to house­
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holds holding risky bonds, stocks and safe assets simultaneously, NRBSTSF refers 
to households holding stocks and safe assets (but not risky bonds). RBNSTSF refers 
to households holding risky bonds, no stocks and safe assets. RBSTNSF refers to 
households holding risky bonds, stocks but no safe assets. RBNSTNSF refers to 
households holding risky bonds alone. NRBNSTSF refers to households holding 
safe assets alone. NRBSTNSF refers to households holding stocks alone. Finally, 
NBNSTNSF refers to households holding no financial assets.
In 1991, only 1 percent of households held risky bonds, stocks and safe assets. 
However, the percentage rose to 6  percent by 2000. Interestingly, the proportion 
of households that held stocks (and safe assets) but not risky bonds rose from 5 
to 18 percent, but the proportion that held risky bonds and no stocks decreased 
slightly. The percentage of households holding only risky bonds fluctuated around 
4 per cent, increasing in 1995 but declining since then. The highest proportion 
remains households holding only safe assets, but it has decreased over time.
Tables 1.10 and 1.16 describe the dynamics of ownership patterns using unre­
stricted empirical transition probabilities. They illustrate a measure of persistence 
by showing the proportion of households that switch from holding one basket of 
assets to another during the five years available. This approach does not illustrate 
changes in amounts held or changes within each category, but focuses instead on 
transitions for households that switch to, or stay with one category of financial 
assets.
I consider two different discretizations of the “risk” variable, focusing here on a 
4-state model and leaving the 8 -state model for the appendix. In 1991, 10 percent of 
households held risky assets, 81 percent held only safe assets, and 8  percent held no 
assets. Table 1.10 presents estimates of the unrestricted transition probabilities for 
riskO. Each matrix describes the changes in household portfolio choice from 1991 to 
1993 1993), from 1991 to 1995 ( I I ^ 1995), from 1991 to 1998 1998),
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and from 1991 to 2000 ( ^ 9 9 1 ^ 2 0 0 0 ) respectively. For instance, looking at T 9^ 9 1 ^ 1 9 9 3 5  
for the one year horizon, 7 percent of households that were holding safe assets in 1991 
switched to risky assets in 1993. Overall, in both the 4-state and 8 -state models, the 
one-year horizon transition behaviour shows a tendency for households to remain in 
their original states (the diagonals are uniformly the highest entries in each row), 
with households holding only safe assets showing the highest persistence. Table 1.10 
effectively shows the existence of persistence. Households with no assets or risky 
assets show similar persistence. There is little mobility and the off-diagonal entries 
are very small. The largest move is from safe assets to risky assets, followed by a 
move from safe assets to no assets and from risky to safe assets, and finally the move 
from no assets to safe assets. Over the two- and three-year horizon, the persistence 
decreases for safe asset holders, but remains the same for risky asset holders.
CHAPTER 1. PERSISTENCE IN  ASSET PORTFOLIO HOLDINGS 47
TnriskO1991—>1993
nrrriskO■L 1 OQ1 _
rririskO -L 1QQ1 _
rpriskO  ■L 1QQ1_
=  t
1991—>1995 =  t
1991—>1998 =  t
1991—>2000
Note
=  t
r k s f
rknosf
sfnork
noa
r k s f
rknosf
sfnork
noa
r k s f  
rknos f  
sfnork
noa
r k s f
rknosf
sfnork
noa
r k s f  
(  0.06 
0.00 
0.07 
V 0 . 0 0
t+ a
rkn o sf sfnork
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.04
0.00
0.70
0.03
noa 
0.00 \  
0.00 
0.04 
0.05 )
r k s f  
(  0.06 
0.00 
0.09 
V 0 . 0 0
t+ a
rkn o sf sfnork
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.04
0.00
0.67
0.03
noa 
0.00 \ 
0.00 
0.05 
0.04 )
r k s f  
(  0.06 
0.00 
0.18 
V 0 . 0 0
t+ a
rknosf s fnork
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.04
0.00
0.57
0.04
noa 
0.00 \  
0.00 
0.05 
0.04 J
t+ a
rknosf s fnorkr k s f  
(  0.06 0 . 0 0  
0.00 0.00 
0.20 0.00 
\ 0.00 0.00
0.04
0.00
0.55
0.04
noa
0.00 N 
0.00 
0.06 
0.03
Entries may not add up to 1.00 due to rounding.
Table 1.10: Unrestricted Empirical Transition Probabilities in different horizons. 
Narrow definition
The above matrices describing households’ transition from one financial asset 
state to another suggest long-run stability with interim short-run changes. To see 
the latter, Table 1.11 classifies the mobility histories from one wave to the next. 
There is an increasing tendency for households to switch from holding only safe 
assets to holding risky and safe assets simultaneously. At the same time, there is a 
smaller but growing tendency for households to move from holding risky and safe 
assets to focus only on safe assets. The diagonal elements show very high persistence 
in holdings of safe and risky assets.
I therefore conclude that there is persistence in household portfolio decisions.
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See Table 1.10.
Table 1.11: Unrestricted Empirical Transition Probabilities for one wave to the next. 
Narrow definition
Whether this persistence is due to taste persistence or some other heterogeneity is 
the issue that I analyse in the next section. The same exercise for the 8 -state model 
is shown in the Appendix.
1.4.3 E stim ation  R esu lts
The presentation of results is organized according to the progressive relaxation of 
assumptions.
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N ested  M ultinom ial Logit Results
Table 1.12 presents the results of estimating a NMNL model. Notice first that the 
coefficient on theta is highly significant and below 1 , meaning that the model exhibits 
statistically significant nesting; that is, it violates the IIA property of the regular 
MNL model.
The R 2 of McFadden tests the model against the alternative of only a constant 
and no real explanatory variables on the right-hand-side. The relatively high value 
of 0.50 supports the joint significance of the explanatory variables. Hence when I 
apply a generalized approach to selectivity bias in a joint decision to hold risky and 
safe assets, I find a significant positive correlation. Ignoring the relationship between 
these two decisions would therefore lead to biased estimates.
I control for demographics (marital status: married (MS), gender (SEX), family 
size (FSIZE)) as proxies for observed heterogeneity; real labour income (WAGE) 
and real financial wealth (WEALTH) as measures of the initial endowment; and 
housing equity (HOUSEVALUE) as a measure of nontraded or illiquid asset. I also 
control for self-employment (SELF) and add the unemployment rate of the region 
in which the household fives (UNRT). EMPLH indicates the labour status of the 
head of the household, HOUSELOAN indicates whether the household is indebted, 
AGE is an indicator of planning horizon, and WEALTH and education (EDUC) are 
indicators of financial information.
The way to interpret the results is as follows. For each explanatory variable, 
(1 ) the relative influence on the likelihood of holding risky financial assets (and 
safe assets) relative to the likelihood of holding no assets (e.g. educl), and (2 ) the 
relative influence on the likelihood of holding safe assets to the likelihood of holding 
no assets (e.g. educ2 ), are measured.
Table 1 . 1 2  illustrates that the parameter estimates for EDUC are positive and 
significant. Education can be interpreted as a measure of the ability to process
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Dependent variable: int : 1: rksf, 2:sfnork, 3:noa
Variables Estimate1 t-Stat.
agel 0.000 0.00
age2 0.001 0.06
msl -0.217 -1.11
ms2 -0.094 -0.51
educl 0.713*** 7.20
educ2 0.391*** 4.22
emplhl 0.437** 2.53
emplh2 0.162 0.98
fsizel -0.258*** -4.42
fsize2 -0.213*** -3.89
sexl -0.346** -1.99
sex2 -0.322** -1.98
housevaluel 0.287*** 2.68
house value2 0.261* 1.76
wagel 0.628*** 8.23
wage2 0.525*** 6.81
wealthl 0.014** 2.22
wealth2 0.012** 1.95
houseloanl -0.277 -1.02
houseloan2 -0.441* -1.69
selfl -0.997*** -4.96
self2 -0.780*** -4.00
unrtl -0.836*** -9.40
unrt2 -0.577*** -7.11
in,t—l l -3.665*** -28.70
ln,t—12 -2.670*** -21.59
ctel 10.346*** 12.477
cte2 10.140*** 12.602
theta3 0.494*** 15.52
McFadden R2 0.50
Log Likelihood -714.9126
No. of observations4 1295
1 *, **, and *** correspond to the 10 , 5 and 1
percent significance levels, respectively.
2
Each explanatory variable is interacted with 
choice 1 (rksf) and choice 2 (sfnork), while 
choice 3 (noa) is the base category.
o
Coefficient of the inclusive value.
4 Balanced panel (1989/91/93/95/98/00)
Table 1.12: Nested Multinomial Logit
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information about the market and investment opportunities. More highly edu­
cated household heads are more likely to be assetholders because the information 
is cheaper. The coefficient on EDUC1 is larger than the one on EDUC2, meaning 
that for risky asset holders the probability of entering the market increases more 
with higher education. This builds on the King and Leape (1998) hypothesis that 
information about more sophisticated financial assets plays a role in participation. 
It reflects financial knowledge or interest in financial issues. Lack of participation 
can sometimes be explained in terms of unawareness of the existence of particular 
assets among certain households.
EMPLH1 is highly significant, meaning that having a job in the survey year 
increases the probability of holding risky assets and is not essential for holding 
safe assets. FSIZE turn out to be highly significant and important, indicating that 
larger families hold fewer assets. SEX is significant and negative, indicating that 
male household heads are more likely to hold no assets (the same result is achieved 
by Perraundin et Soerensen (2000)). HOME VALUE is particularly significant for 
risky asset holders, hinting that real estate could be used as collateral to invest in 
risky assets. The positive coefficient of WAGE (higher for WAGE1 than WAGE2) 
implies that the percentage of households that hold financial assets increases with 
the average of labour income because they are more willing to pay for the fixed 
information and transaction costs of risky assets. WEALTH gives the same result, 
implying that wealthier households will typically have more to invest, making the 
relatively large fixed costs of acquiring or holding individual stocks less important.
UNRT accounts for labour risk. When households are faced by unavoided risk 
such as unemployment, they are less willing to hold risky assets. UNRT is negative 
and highly significant even controlling for age, wealth, and demographics. Partici­
pation therefore depends on background risk.
Following Heckman (1981), I introduce in,t-i (lagged value of the dependent vari­
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able in,t)8 to account for the effect of past experience on choices made in period t  and 
to allow for the possibility of true state dependence. Since the three options on the 
choice variable are ordered in terms of risk, I decided to report only the results with 
the lagged ordered variable, though I experimented with entering separate dummy 
variables for each holding. Both versions for entering the lagged choice variable gave 
very similar results in terms of significance of lagged terms and the autocorrelation 
terms as well as the values of the other estimated coefficients and their t-statistics 
and standard errors . 9
The assumption that I use concerning the initial conditions is that those are truly 
exogenous. In this case, the ML estimator is consistent if N (or N and T) goes to 
infinity. Since are not serially independent, I assume that a new process is observed 
(with respect to the past) when we start to sample the individuals; otherwise the 
initial state is determined by the process generating the panel. With respect to the 
decision to invest in risky assets, individuals started to hold more risky assets at the 
beginning of the 1990s due to privatization, etc. when the sampling period starts, 
so we can treat initial conditions as exogenous. In any case, the impact of the exact 
way the initial conditions are treated loses importance the larger T is. In our case 
T is 5 which implies the econometric treatment of the initial conditions may not be 
critical.
By looking at the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable, I can infer some­
thing about the existence of state dependence among financial asset holdings. The 
coefficient is large and significant. The sign is negative, meaning that a household 
holding no financial assets in the previous period (choice 3) is less likely to hold
8I define the lagged dependent variable as the lagged value of the dependent variable coded 1, 
2, 3 where 1: risky assets and safe assets, 2: safe assets only, 3: no assets.
9 Even when the dependent variable is completely ordered, it may be preferable to model the 
whole setup as an ordered probit as opposed to a multinomial probit one. However, when using an 
ordered probit (as opposed to MNP) one cannot simply condition on the lagged value directly in 
case of serial correlation. The joint probability of choice (i,t) and choice(i,t-l) must be taken into 
account in the likelihood function calculation. I leave this alternative modeling approach to future 
research.
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risky financial assets in the current period (choice 1 ), while a household holding 
risky financial assets last period is more likely to hold them in the current period.
MS and SELF are insignificant as reported in other studies (See Perraudin and 
Soerensen (2000)). AGE turns out to be insignificant but, as is shown later, this 
is not necessarily the case. The initial idea was to test for non-linearity in age by 
including a squared term in age. Unfortunately the squared term in age was highly 
correlated with other variables and altered the specification. Therefore I chose to 
exclude it from the model. The same kind of problem is stated in Perraudin and 
Soerensen (2000). HOUSELOAN is only weakly significant for the case of holding 
safe assets.
M ultiperiod M ultinomial Probit R esults (three alternative model)
Our estimated Multiperiod-Multinomial Probit (MPMNP) model is
int =  argmax^yjnt =  xnt$ j + ejnt)
where
int: observed discrete choice by household n in time t, t =  =  l...T<
yjnt’ latent utility of alternative j  as perceived by household n  in time t 
x nt : agent-specific characteristics of household n  in time t 1 0  
€jnt ‘. multivariate normal error with covariance cov(cn) =  Q ^en =  (tjnt)j=i /  t=i 
where f2 is 7xTj, allowing interalternative and intertemporal correlation between 
ejnt and efcns for the same observation n.
I analyse the following covariance structures in the model:
10Note that there are not alternative specific attributes for each alternative (risky financial assets, 
safe financial assets and no financial assets). Hence the explanatory variables will be interacted with 
alternative dummy variables to achieve identification.
(1.16)
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•  Contemporaneous correlations and heteroscedasticity of en* =  (ejni) J = 1  7, 
therefore deviating from the i.i.d. assumption within a given period (see equa­
tion 1.14, I/, in Table 1.13).
• Intertemporal correlations between cn =  (ejnt ) J = 1  7  t=1 Ti
— Random effects which account for household effects (see equation 1.14, 
OLi in Table 1.13).
— First-order autoregressive errors which account for habit formation or 
taste persistence (see equation 1.14, in Table 1.13)
An incorrect specification of the covariance matrix of the errors biases the struc­
tural coefficients p  apart from the standard errors of the estimated coefficients. In 
what follows I explore combinations of these error processes. The parameters of the 
first model with three alternatives to be estimated are /3j and Cl and are shown in 
Table 1.13.
VII 111
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Dependent variable: int : 
1: rksf, 2:sfnork, 3:noa
(1) (2) (3)
Estimate1 t-Stat. Estimate1 t-Stat. Estimate1 t-Stat.
o
Household-specific variables
agel 0.626*** 4.82 0.626*** 4.82 0.663*** 4.63
age2 0.111 1.07 0.111 1.07 0.129 1.10
m sl -0.616 -1.30 -0.616 -1.30 -0.647 -1.30
ms2 -0.002 -0.01 -0.002 -0.01 -0.025 -0.06
educl 0.941*** 3.93 0.941*** 3.93 1.112*** 4.30
educ2 0.424*** 2.61 0.424*** 2.61 0.495*** 2.85
emplhl 0.058 0.14 0.058 0.14 0.114 0.30
emplh2 -0.374 -1.13 -0.374 -1.13 -0.360 -1.10
fsizel -0.253** -1.98 -0.253** -1.98 -0.275* -1.88
fsize2 -0.206** -1.96 -0.206** -1.96 -0.234** -2.00
sexl -0.266 -0.70 -0.266 -0.70 -0.112 -0.29
sex2 -0.269 -0.85 -0.269 -0.85 -0.135 -0.40
homevaluel 0.010 0.05 0.010 0.05 -0.083 -0.44
homevalue2 -0.087 -0.47 -0.087 -0.47 -0.148 -0.82
wagel 0.288** 2.11 0.288** 2.10 0.309** 2.35
wage2 0.137 1.17 0.137 1.17 0.174 1.48
wealthl 0.053*** 3.89 0.053*** 3.89 0.055*** 4.26
wealth2 0.053*** 4.00 0.053*** 4.00 0.055*** 4.28
houseloanl -0.337 -0.71 -0.337 -0.71 -0.509 -1.10
houseloan2 -0.482 -1.15 -0.482 -1.15 -0.530 -1.23
selfl -0.428 -1.15 -0.428 -1.15 -0.710** -1.96
self2 0.095 0.32 0.095 0.32 -0.103 -0.34
(continued on next page)
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unrtl -1.274*** -5.62 -1.274*** -5.62 -1.374*** -6.07
unrt2 -0.722*** -4.80 0.722*** -4.80 -0.771*** -4.65
in,t—l l -2.774*** -6.38 -2.774*** -6.38 -0.507* -1.89
in,i—12 -1.494*** -6.94 -1.494*** -6.94 -0.498** -2.30
ctel 1.620 0.91 1.619 0.91 -2.487 -1.30
cte2 1.779 1.18 1.779 1.18 -0.042 -0.03
Error structure
S D  ( i / i )  (Heteroskedasticity) 1.992*** 4.09 1.992*** 4.09 2.13*** 7.72
corr (yi, 1/ 2 ) (Interaltemative corr) 0.738*** 2.96 0.738*** 2.96 0.98*** 5.81
SD  ( a i )  (Household effects) - - 0.0001 0.99 0.00009 1.00
SD  (OL2 ) (Household effects) - - 0.0001 0.97 0.0001 .998
corr (at 1 ^ 2 ) (Household effects) - - -0.00001 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0.00
Pl (Habit formation) - - - - 0.731*** 13.66
P2 (Habit formation) - - - - 0.909*** 13.75
Log Likelihood4 -716.2914 -716.2914 -691.5662
No. of observations® 1295 1295 1295
*, **, and *** correspond to the 10, 5 and 1 percent signficance levels, respectively.
A
Each explanatory variable is interacted with choice 1 (rksf) and choice 2 (sfhork), 
while choice 3 (noa) is the base category.
® Three different specifications of correlations are employed: (1) c o rr  (l/*, l/j): 
unobserved time-specific utility components correlated, (2) COrr(cXitOij) : random 
effects correlated, and (3) P f  first-order autocorrelation.
4 Significance is measured by the likelihood ratio statistic.
5 Balanced panel (1989/91/93/95/98/00).
Table 1.13: Multiperiod Multinomial Probit with Autoregressive Errors
I present results of three specifications. Column (1) controls for contemporane­
ous correlations and heteroscedasticity. Column (2) also allows for random effects. 
Column (3) allows for autoregressive errors.
First, there are significant differences with respect to the NMNL model. AGE1 
is now highly significant, increasing the probability of holding risky assets. EMPL1 
is no longer significant while WAGE1 shows that high labour income is especially 
important for risky asset holders only. HOMEVALUE, HOUSELOAN2 and SEX 
lose their significance. Only SELF1 remains significant after controlling for the 
variability of the covariance matrix.
By looking at the components of the covariance matrix, the IIA assumption is
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clearly rejected since SD  (1/ 1 ) and corr (i/i, V2 ) are highly significant. The introduc­
tion of random effects (household effects) does not affect the model since they are 
not significant - the log likelihood value remains unchanged. The introduction of the 
autoregressive error component however dramatically lowers the log likelihood value. 
The autocorrelation coefficients are highly significant, implying strong persistence in 
both decisions of holding risky and safe assets. This is consistent with the negative 
coefficient found for the lagged variable. However, as in the case of Borsch-Supan 
(1992), the panel is too short to separate the two error structures precisely.
By looking at the difference between the three columns of the MPMNP, it is clear 
that in general coefficients are underestimated when the panel structure is ignored, 
especially EDUC. WEALTH is remarkably stable across the different specifications 
of the covariance matrix. SELF1 turns out to be negatively significant, decreasing 
the likelihood of holding risky assets. Most interestingly, the coefficient on in,t-i 
turns out to be overestimated by 1/7 when allowing for persistence, and is relatively 
less significant. This could be explained by the fact that the lagged financial holding 
variable was partially capturing the effect of the omitted pL
Final model: M ultiperiod M ultinomial Probit R esults (five alternative  
m odel)
In order to shed fight on the differences between holding risky bonds and stocks 
and to avoid aggregation problems, I consider a second discretization of the “risk” 
variable (risk2 ) as follows11:
1. Risky bonds, stocks and safe assets (rbstsf)
2. No risky bonds, stocks and safe assets (nrbstsf)
3. Risky bonds, no stocks and safe assets (rbnstsf)
11 Categories rbstnsf, rbnstnsf, and nrbstnsf are excluded since there were no households with 
these holdings in Table 1.9.
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4. No risky bonds, no stocks and safe assets (nrbnstsf)
5. No risky bonds, no stocks and no safe assets (nbnstnsf). This is the normalized 
category.
Table 1.14 provides the estimation results of the model. EDUC is more important 
for households who only hold stocks (EDUC2 has the highest coefficient). The same 
applies for WAGE and WEALTH. FSIZE is more a worry for households that hold 
a diversified portfolio with a combination of stocks, risky bonds and safe assets 
(FSIZE1 is highly significant). Highly indebted households tend to have fewer safe 
assets (HOUSELOAN4 is significant). AGE does not seem to matter as much for 
households holding risky bonds (AGE3 is insignificant). Interestingly, background 
risk (UNRT) strongly decreases the likelihood of holding risky bonds (UNRT3 has 
the highest coefficient).
Several alternative versions were rim in terms of lagged terms. All versions pro­
duced high significance of lagged terms and autocorrelation terms and very similar 
parameter estimates and t-statistics for the other coefficients. I do not present the 
individual lagged dependent variable dummies themselves since the results would 
have been too cluttered and messy for the 5-way classification.
1.5 Conclusion
This chapter analyses the household portfolio decision of shifting from no finan­
cial assets to safe financial assets, risky financial assets or both. To this end, I 
use the SHIW panel dataset for Italian households. The novelty of this chapter is 
the inclusion and modelling of habit formation in a multinomial model of house­
hold portfolio participation. The estimation requires maximum smoothly simulated 
likelihood techniques for a multiperiod multinomial probit model.
The results show that household portfolio behaviour is better explained by infre­
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quent decisions rather than the continuous adjustments that standard theory pre­
dicts. Moreover, the unobserved utilities determining the household portfolio choice 
clearly include significant time varying components. Since this model works mainly 
through time-varying components rather than time invariant ones, habit formation 
is driving the behaviour of households. In other words, households develop a taste 
for the assets that they hold and do not change portfolios very frequently. This 
result is essential for understanding the main reason for nonparticipation.
I also consider the existence of true state dependence in financial assets decisions 
and find true state dependence in the decision to hold risky and safe financial assets. 
More interestingly, holdings of risky and safe assets are also affected by persistence 
that fades away slowly. The finding of taste persistence in household portfolio choice 
is particularly relevant for policymakers, since household portfolios are an additional 
element to their social security systems.
In addition, it also appears that ignoring intertemporal linkages biases some 
estimation coefficients - for example, by underestimating the effects of education 
and overestimating true state dependence in holding no financial assets. Lastly, 
education levels, labour income, age and wealth turn out to be more important 
for holding stocks than risky bonds. The larger the family, the less diversified the 
portfolio is. A high unemployment rate strongly decreases the likelihood of holding 
risky bonds.
A caveat is that the panel is short, only six waves. However, the differences in 
goodness of fit (log likelihood values) indicate the importance of persistence in the 
model.
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1.6 Appendix
1.6 .1  D efin ition  o f  variables
The following variables were constructed from questions from the Bank of Italy 
Survey of Household Income and Wealth.
AGE: Age of the head of the household.
MS: Marital status:
1 = married
2 =single, separated/divorced or widowed/widow
EDUC: Highest education earned:
l=none
2 =elementary school
3=middle school or professional secondary school diploma (3 years of study) or 
high school or associate’s degree or other course university degree 
4=bachelor’s degree or post-graduate qualification
EMPLH: Whether or not the head of the household was employed for the greater 
part of the year: 
l=employed 
2 =  non-employed
FSIZE: Number of persons living in the household.
SEX: Gender:
l=male
2 =female
HOMEVALUE: The value of the household’s dwelling.
WAGE: Real labour income in millions of 1989 lira.
WEALTH: Real financial wealth in millions of 1989 lira.
HOUSELOAN: Debts for real state purchasing or renewal at the end of the year:
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l=yes
2 =no
SELF: Self-employed head of household:
l=member of the arts or professions, sole proprietor, freelance worker, owner 
or member of a family business, active shareholder/partner, contingent worker not 
employed on any account or other.
2 —employee or not employed
RISK: Participation variable. The empirical part of the paper uses two different 
discretizations of the dependent variable:
RiskO:
l=holdings of risky assets and safe assets (rksf)
2 =only safe assets (sfnork)
3=no financial asset (noa). This is the normalized category.
Risk2:
l=Risky bonds, stocks and safe assets (rbstsf)
2=No risky bonds, stocks and safe assets (nrbstsf)
3=Risky bonds, no stocks and safe assets (rbnstsf)
4=No risky bonds, no stocks and safe assets (nrbnstsf)
5=No risky bonds, no stocks and no safe assets (nbnstnsf). This the normalized 
category.
The survey reports participation in 20 financial assets:
1 . Current accounts.
2 . Savings accounts.
3. Certificates of deposit.
4. Repurchase agreements.
5. Postal accounts.
6 . Postal bonds.
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7. Treasury bills up to one year maturity (BOTs)
8 . Floating-rate treasury credit certificates (CCTs).
9. Long-term government bonds (BTPs).
10. Zero-coupon bonds (CTZs).
11. Other government bonds.
1 2 . Corporate bonds.
13. Mutual Funds.
14. Listed stocks.
15. Unlisted stocks (three categories).
16. Managed investment accounts (three categories).
17. Foreign corporate and government bonds.
18. Foreign stocks.
19. Other foreign assets.
20. Loans to cooperatives securities.
In each wave from 1991 the survey asks the respondent to report the amount 
held at the end of the year of each asset according to the following intervals:
- Up to 2 million lire.
- Between 2 and 4 million fire.
- Between 4 and 8  million fire.
- Between 8  and 12 million fire.
- Between 12 and 16 million fire.
- Between 16 and 24 million lire.
- Between 24 and 36 million lire.
- Between 36 and 70 million lire.
- Between 70 and 140 million fire.
- Between 140 and 300 million fire.
- Between 300 and 600 million fire.
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- Between 600 million and 1 billion lire.
- Between 1 and 2 billion lire.
- Above 2  billion lire.
In addition, the following external variable from REGIO (Eurostat’s harmonized 
regional statistical database) was linked to the survey data:
UNRT: Italian regional unemployment rate: Unemployment at NUTS (Nomen­
clature of Statistical Territorial Units) Level 3 over working population at NUTS 
Level 3.
1.6 .2  8 -S ta te  tran sition  probabilities
In the 8 -state model using the narrow definition of risky financial assets for 1991, 
only 1  percent of all households held simultaneously risky bonds, stocks and safe 
assets, 5 percent held stocks (and safe assets) but no risky bonds, 4 percent held risky 
bonds (and safe assets) but no stocks. A large majority (81 percent) were households 
that held only safe assets. The 8  percent remaining held no financial assets. Table 
1 . 1 0  shows that the highest persistence is observed in the behaviour of households 
holding only safe assets and then those holding only stocks and safe assets, or no 
financial assets. This persistence decreases slowly over time for households holding 
only safe assets. The very low persistence of the two extremes - holding risky bonds, 
stocks and safe assets and those holding no assets - do not change at all over time. 
The majority of the switchers from only safe assets went to stocks and safe assets 
(no risky bonds) and a smaller proportion to no financial assets. There was also an 
increase in the proportion of households switching from holding only safe assets to 
holding all financial assets. Table 1.15 confirms the above results.
CHAPTER 1. PERSISTENCE IN  ASSET PORTFOLIO HOLDINGS
Dependent variable: int : Estimate1 t-Stat.
1: rbstsf, 2:nrbstsf, 3:rbnstsf, 4:nrbnstsf, 5:nbnstnsf
o
Household-specific variables
agel 0.141** 2.41
age2 0 .120** 2.03
age3 0.031 0.41
age4 0 .111** 2.39
msl -0.196 -1.08
ms2 -0.282 -1.55
ms3 0.020 0.09
ms4 -0.087 -0.61
educl 0.816*** 6.70
educ2 0.852*** 7.52
educ3 0.773*** 5.32
educ4 0.458*** 6.15
emplhl 0.152 0.91
emplh2 0.150 0.93
emplh3 0.336 1.48
emplh4 -0.140 -1.07
£sizel -0.142** -2.38
fsize2 -0.112* -1.87
fsize3 -0.117 -1.51
fsize4 -0.079* -1.71
sexl -0.221 -1.39
sex2 -0.132 -0.82
sex3 -0.269 -1.29
sex4 -0.181 -1.41
wagel 0.411*** 7.14
(continued on next page)
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wage2 O.444*** 7.55
wage3 O.418*** 5.95
wage4 0.301*** 5.73
wealthl 0.031*** 2.90
wealth2 0.031*** 2.87
wealth3 0.019 1.42
wealth4 0.030*** 2.83
houseloanl -0.145 -0.66
houseloan2 -0.247 -1.19
houseloan3 -0.084 -0.34
houseloan4 -0.388** -2.09
unrtl -0.754*** -7.05
unrt2 -0.815*** -8.43
unrt3 -0.825*** -5.84
unrt4 -0.506*** -8.02
q
lagged terms interacted with choice _  3 _3
ctel 10.323*** 11.25
cte2 10.504*** 11.63
cte3 8.060*** 5.97
cte4 10.498*** 13.81
Error structure4
S D  ( i / i)  (Heteroskedasticity) 0 .886*** 5.16
S D  (1/2) (Heteroskedasticity) 0.723*** 3.37
S D  (1/ 3) (Heteroskedasticity) 1.570*** 3.34
corr (i'll V2) (Interaltemative correlation) -0.065 -0.18
corr (l^i, 1/3 ) (Interalternative correlation) -0.090 -0.38
corr (z /i, V4) (Interaltemative correlation) 0.564*** 3.43
corr {y2i ^3) (Interaltemative correlation) -0.084 -0.35
(continued on next page)
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corr {y2, ^5) (Interaltemative correlation) -0.087*** -2.03
corr (^3 , ^4) (Interaltemative correlation) 0.308*** 2.07
SD  ( « i )  (Household effects) 0.0001 1.00
SD  (012) (Household effects) 0.0001 1.00
SD  (0 :3) (Household effects) 0.0001 1.00
SD  (0 :4) (Household effects) 0.0001 1.00
corr (Household effects) -0.0002 0.00
corr (Household effects) 0.0001 0.00
corr (Household effects) -0.000003 0.00
corr (Household effects) -0.00001 0.00
corr (Household effects) 0.00001 0.00
corr (Household effects) -0.0001 0.00
Pl (Habit formation) 0.026 0.27
P2 (Habit formation) 0.595*** 5.30
P3 (Habit formation) 0.543*** 6.43
/?4 (Habit formation) -0.191** -2.40
Log Likelihood 
No. of observations5
-3655.5749
4940
*, **, and *** correspond to the 10, 5 and 1 percent significance levels. 
Each explanatory variable is interacted with choice 1 (rbstsf), 
choice 2 (nrbstsf), choice 3 (rbnstsf), choice 4 (nrbnstsf), while 
choice 5 (nbnstnsf) is the base category.
o
Several alternative versions were rim in terms of lagged terms. All versions 
produced high significance of lagged terms and very similar parameter 
estimates and t-statistics for the other coefficients. See page 57 for details.
4 Three different specifications of correlations are employed:
(1) corr (I'i, Vj): unobserved time-specific utility components 
correlated, (2) COrr(ai)Oij) : random effects correlated, and 
(3) p f  first-order autocorrelation.
5 Balanced panel (1991/93/95/98/00).
Table 1.14: Multiperiod Multinomial Probit with Autoregressive Errors
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TrriskA1991—>1993
TriskA1993—*1995
rrriakA 
1 1995—*1998
TriskA1998—*2000
Note
t+ 8
rbstsf /  0 . 0 1 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0  \
nrbstsf 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
rbnstsf 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
rbstnsf 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
rbnstnsf 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
nrbnstsf 0 . 0 1 0.04 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0.70 0 . 0 0 0.04
nrbstnsf 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
nbnstnsf V o.oo 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0.03 0 . 0 0 0.05 j
rb stsf /  0 . 0 2 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 0
t+8 
0 . 0 0  0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0  \
nrbstsf 0 . 0 1 0.03 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0.03 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
rbnstsf 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
rbstnsf 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
rbnstnsf 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
nrbnstsf 0 . 0 1 0.03 0.03 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 6 8 0 . 0 0 0.03
nrbstns f 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
nbnstnsf 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 0 0.07 j
rb stsf /  0 . 0 2 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 0
t+8 
0 . 0 0  0 . 0 0 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0  \
nrbstsf 0 . 0 1 0.04 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
rbnstsf 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
rbstnsf 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
rbnstnsf 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
nrbnstsf 0 . 0 2 0.09 0.03 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0.57 0 . 0 0 0.04
nrbstnsf 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
nbnstnsf ^ 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0.04 0 . 0 0 0.06 )
rbstsf /  0 . 0 2 0.03 0 . 0 0
t+8 
0 . 0 0  0 . 0 0 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0  \
nrbstsf 0 . 0 2 0.07 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0.05 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
rbnstsf 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0.03 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
rbstnsf 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
rbnstnsf 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
nrbnstsf 0 . 0 2 0.07 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0.50 0 . 0 0 0.04
nrbstnsf 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
nbnstnsf ^ 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0.04 0 . 0 0 0.05 j
See Figure 1.10.
Table 1.15: Unrestricted Empirical Transition Probabilities for one wave to the next. 
Narrow definition.
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t+ s
rrriskA  
1 1991—>1993
rpriskA  
1 1991—>2000
=  t
rrriskA  
1 1991—*1995 =  t
rpriakA 
1 1991—*1998 =  t
=  t
rbstsf /  0 . 0 1 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0  ^
nrbsts f 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
rbnstsf 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
rbstnsf 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
rbnstnsf 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
nrbnsts f 0 . 0 1 0.04 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0.70 0 . 0 0 0.04
nrbstnsf 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
nbnstnsf \  0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0.03 0 . 0 0 0.05 )
rbstsf /  0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
t+8 
0 . 0 0  0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0  \
nrbsts f 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
rbnsts f 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
rbstnsf 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
rbnstns f 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
nrbnsts f 0 . 0 2 0.04 0.03 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0.67 0 . 0 0 0.05
nrbstns f 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
nbnstnsf ^ 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0.03 0 . 0 0 0.04 )
rbstsf /  0 . 0 1 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
t+3 
0 . 0 0  0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0  \
nrbsts f 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
rbnstsf 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
rbstnsf 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
rbnstnsf 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
nrbnstsf 0.04 0 . 1 1 0.03 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0.57 0 . 0 0 0.05
nrbstns f 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
nbnstnsf ^ 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0.05 0 . 0 0 0.04 )
rbstsf /  0 . 0 0 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 0
t+8 
0 . 0 0  0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0  \
nrbstsf 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
rbnstsf 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
rbstnsf 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
rbnstnsf 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
nrbnstsf 0.04 0.13 0 . 0 2 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0.55 0 . 0 0 0.06
nrbstnsf 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0
nbnstnsf o © o 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 0.04 0 . 0 0 0.04 )
Note See Figure 1.10.
Table 1.16: Unrestricted Empirical Transition Probabilities in different horizons. 
Narrow definition.
Chapter 2
W ealth Effects in Europe: A  
Tale of Two Countries
This chapter investigates the increasing exposure of European households to risky 
financial assets and the consequent impact on the real economy. I  analyse house­
hold data for Italy and the UK, countries that differ dramatically in their financial 
structure and capital markets. I  estimate an endogenous switching model with bivari- 
ate switching in order to overcome two important obstacles in this line of research, 
namely, the consumption Capital Asset Pricing Model puzzle and the excess sensi­
tivity puzzle. By controlling for liquidity constraints, the results show that there are 
wealth effects in both countries. I  find some evidence of liquidity constraints only in 
Italy and habit formation exclusively in the UK.
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A common monetary policy for Euroland may have different macroeconomic conse­
quences from one country to another because of differences in the speed and magni­
tude of a monetary impulse into economic activity. These differences depend in part 
on dissimilarities in the financial structure and on households’ and firms’ portfolios’ 
composition. Different liquidity constraints will also affect consumption directly. In 
this context, national transmission mechanisms can differ and the implementation 
of a common monetary policy by the European Central Bank (ECB) could lead to 
varying results among different countries.
The differences between capital markets and portfolio composition across Eu­
ropean economies are marked. First, stock markets and privately issued debt are 
highly developed in some European countries (e.g., the UK), but not others (e.g., 
Italy and Germany). In addition, financial structures have evolved differently in re­
cent years, with growth of non-bank intermediaries in some countries but not others, 
and different evolution of stock markets and changes in household and firm asset 
and liabilities composition. For instance, in households’ portfolios there are relevant 
differences in the choice of fixed-income assets versus equity, which reflect differences 
in market capitalization. In particular, equity ownership has broadened in general, 
but to different degrees depending on the country. These trends have resulted in 
different ways of distributing liquidity among households and firms. Secondly, huge 
differences exist in the use of short term versus long term financing, in the share 
of fixed versus floating rates, and in the degree and composition of indebtedness of 
individuals.
At the same time, stock markets have experienced substantial fluctuations. These 
developments in the financial structure have increased the interest in the potential 
impact of major asset price movements on the real economy. In particular, the 
large swings in wealth induced by these movements might have effects on consump­
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tion. The logic goes as follows: an increase in the stock market makes households 
wealthier and that increases their spending. Concern about how to measure these 
wealth effects has increased following the changes in participation and volatility in 
securities.
Goodhart and Hofmann (2000) argue that due to the fact that some prices and 
wages are sticky, asset prices are likely to be the most flexible. Therefore, monetary 
policy shocks are likely to have their first effects via asset prices and the transmission 
mechanism will work through the effect of asset prices on output via wealth effects 
on consumption, exchange rates on net trade and Tobin’s q on investment. In this 
chapter I examine the wealth effect.
There may be several, possibly related, channels: causation can go from mone­
tary shocks to asset prices to output, or from asset price shocks to monetary and 
real variables (by raising the value of collateral and encouraging more borrowing 
from individuals, resulting in increased consumption). If part of the credit is used 
to buy more assets, a “financial accelerator” 1  effect is in place. In addition, in some 
cases expectations of capital gains appear to lead to increases in bank lending and 
expenditures.
Research on the transmission mechanism across countries using the same frame­
work, the same monetary policy reaction function and constraining exchange rate 
movements for Europe is still lacking2. The existing literature only contains par­
tial comparative studies, which are not adequate to draw strong conclusions about 
the dissimilarities among European countries. Consequently, as Guiso, Kashyap, 
Panetta and Terlizzesse (1999) point out, findings at the aggregate level should be 
supplemented by systematic comparisons at the micro level. There are various ratio­
nales for this: First, micro data offer a richer variety of information for each group 
of individuals in each country. This makes it easier to analyze the differences among
1See Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Bemanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999).
2 See Guiso, Kashyap, Panetta and Terlizzese (1999) for a review.
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them and to study differences among similar groups of agents in different countries. 
Second, they allow a better understanding of the causes and the persistence of those 
differences. Third, they eliminate the aggregation problems raised by the fact that 
similar households and firms in different countries can act differently but can be 
compensated at the aggregate level. And, finally, they might help to identify policy 
interventions that could help to modify micro-level behaviour in order to generate 
more uniform monetary policy effects. Nevertheless, although firm data has been 
used extensively to study the balance sheet channel, household data used for that 
purpose has been more limited.
The aim of this chapter is to evaluate whether structural differences in the fi­
nancial system lead to differences in the transmission mechanism. Specifically, the 
role of wealth effects, liquidity constraints and habit formation in two countries, the 
UK and Italy, will be studied. The comparison is particularly interesting since these 
countries’ household portfolios have a specific financial structure (i.e. high exposure 
of households to equities and bonds respectively). In the UK, 24 percent of house­
holds in 2 0 0 0  held shares either directly or in mutual funds or pension plans, while 
in Italy only 18 percent did. The effect of a monetary shock in these two countries 
could be different and have a bigger impact here than in the rest of Europe. This 
disparity might result from agents being subject to greater wealth volatility, different 
liquidity constraints and habit formation.
The model in this chapter brings together two key elements so far analyzed 
separately by a number of studies. The contribution of the chapter is in dealing 
simultaneously with two sample selection biases. Using only households -which 
either do or do not hold assets, and either are liquidity constrained or not- results in 
biased estimates of the consumption elasticities of labour income and risky financial 
assets.
I present results of an application to the stochastic life-cycle consumption model
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under rational expectations as developed by Hall (1978). Since his seminal paper, the 
model has been extended by several contributions such as Zeldes (1989) for the US 
and Attanasio and Weber (1993) for the UK. The major innovation of this chapter is 
to account for endogeneity in the choice of financial wealth and liquidity constraints. 
The empirical study is carried out using a generalized approach to selectivity bias 
for a joint decision of households with data from the UK and Italy. For the former, 
the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) is used, and for the latter, the Bank of 
Italy Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHTW).
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 describes briefly the 
available micro datasets on asset holdings and consumption in Europe. Section 3 
provides an overview on capital markets in Europe and in particular the financial 
structure of household portfolio compositions of risky assets for two countries of the 
European Union (UK and Italy). Section 4 develops the life-cycle model and illus­
trates its drawbacks. Section 5 outlines the basic model and describes the estimation 
procedure. Section 6  presents the results of the application of the stochastic life-cycle 
consumption model under rational expectations. Section 7 concludes and discusses 
the policy implications. Variable definitions and constructions are discussed in an 
Appendix.
2.2 Household D ata on W ealth and Consum ption
Household data are more appropriate than aggregate statistics to study wealth ef­
fects for various reasons.
First, due to the existence of incomplete markets, the standard separation theo­
rems do not apply because individuals are heterogenous and this fact affects portfolio 
composition. Sources of heterogeneity are nonparticipation and lack of diversifica­
tion. The former is clearly at odds with the simple two-asset portfolio model without 
transaction costs in which risky assets yield a higher expected return than the safe
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asset. The use of micro data avoids aggregation assumptions and representative 
agent frameworks.
Secondly, they allow us to study the distribution of wealth of the mass of the 
population, which has not been received much attention due to its small share in total 
wealth. Studies based on official statistics have little to say regarding the majority of 
the population, since they are concerned with those in the upper echelons of wealth 
distribution.
Finally, aggregate financial accounts do not allow us to disentangle whether the 
increase in asset shares in the data is due to a change in participation or in the 
amount invested. In addition, they cannot tell much about either portfolio mobility 
or how it is affected by wealth or demographic characteristics. European differences 
in household portfolios can be attributed to wealth, or to demographic characteristics 
such as age, education and family size, or to other differences.
An ideal dataset to study wealth effects, liquidity constraints and habit for­
mation would include consumption, income, household characteristics and wealth 
disaggregated into different types of assets by type of individual. In what follows, 
major European household surveys are described.
Household surveys in the UK contain reliable information on consumption and 
income, but limited wealth data. On the one hand, the Financial Research Survey 
(FRS) is a dataset privately compiled by National Opinion Polls for about 8000 
households per year. Unfortunately, the survey contains limited demographic data. 
In addition, it has not been collected on a comparable basis over a long period of time 
and lacks information on consumption. On the other hand, the Family Expenditure 
Survey (FES) is a cross-sectional dataset that has been mostly used in the UK to 
study consumption and savings behaviour. It contains information on demographic 
characteristics, income, and expenditure for 7000 households per year since 1968. 
However, wealth information in these datasets is limited.
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One exception is the BHPS, where, in wave 5 (1995) and 10 (2000), detailed 
questions on wealth were asked in addition to detailed demographic characteristics, 
income and consumption information. The BHPS from 1991-2001 is an important 
source of data on the experiences of the same households over time, and panel 
members are followed wherever they move in the UK. Each wave consists of some 
5,000 households drawn from 250 different areas of Great Britain. The only drawback 
of this dataset is that the consumption variables are not complete (for example, 
expenditure in clothes and shoes is not included).
The Italian SHIW is the only European panel which contains information on 
wealth, consumption, income and demographic characteristics in every wave. The 
SHIW is a biannual survey of about 8,000 households collected by the Bank of Italy. 
From 1989 it offers a rotating panel containing a set of portfolio data, demographic 
characteristics, expenditures and income information. The survey provides informal 
tion on 2 0  financial assets but they are only available for heads of households.
The Spanish Encuesta Continua de Presupuestos Familiares (ECPF) is a rotating- 
sample survey of consumption patterns of 3,200 households from 1985. The same 
household is interviewed for eight consecutive quarters (two years). It contains 
information on consumption, income and demographic characteristics but lacks in­
formation on wealth.
The Dutch Socio Economic Panel (SEP) of 5,000 households and since 1993 
the Dutch VSB-panel (VSBP) of 3000 households both contain wealth, income and 
demographic characteristics but lack information on consumption.
The Swedish National Survey of Living Conditions (ULF) began in 1979, and 
since 1986 a panel of 12,000 people has been followed as part of the ULF. The survey 
covers health, financial situation, education, working environment, and housing, but 
has no consumption information.
The German Income and Expenditure Survey (Einkommens-und Verbrauchsstich-
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proben, EVS) for the period 1978-1998 has detailed information on consumption by 
type, wealth by portfolio category and income by source. However, the EVS is re­
peated cross-section data -not panel data- and is collected every five years. Another 
source is the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), which has been collected since 
1984. However, this panel does not have information on consumption and contains 
few questions on wealth. The same applies to the Panel Study on Belgian House­
holds (PSBH) that started in 1990 and collects information from more than 4000 
households.
The French Budget des Families is a survey on household consumption collected 
every five years from 1979 but it is not a panel and the financial asset information is 
very poor. Detailed information on only financial assets can be found on L ’Enquete 
Patrimoine. The situation in Portugal is similar with information on consumption 
and wealth found in two different surveys.
The European Community Household Panel (ECHP) survey is a longitudinal 
coordinated social panel for European countries. The survey started in 1994 with 
a sample of some 60,500 nationally representative households in 12 member states. 
Wave 2 also includes Austria and wave 3 included Finland. Unfortunately, questions 
on quantitative values of consumption and financial assets were not included.
The data sources that I use in this chapter are the BHPS and the SHIW. These 
are the most comparable sources of information across the two countries that include 
detailed wealth and consumption information (see Appendix for some comparative 
statistics based on this data). Since both are panels, they allow us to follow the 
same household over time.
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2.3 Capital M arkets in Europe and H ousehold Portfo­
lios
The expansion of capital markets in Europe has been encouraged by both transi­
tory and permanent developments. On the one hand, the experience of high stock 
returns in the 1990s can be considered transitory. On the other hand, the last two 
decades have been characterized by several permanent changes in the financial sys­
tems s te m m ing  from deregulation, as well as capital liberalization, the introduction 
of the single market, and technological innovations. Deregulation has played a role 
both in the banking sector (abolition of interest-rate controls and abolition of direct 
controls on credit expansion) and in the capital markets (abolition of regulations on 
fees and commissions and on the establishment of foreign institutions). As a con­
sequence, an “equity culture” among households has emerged as a response to the 
proliferation of mutual funds and the systematic education of employees regarding 
retirement accounts.
Despite these changes, European capital markets are still heterogeneous. This 
section presents some stylized facts emphasizing both the differences in the degree 
of development of capital markets and portfolio compositions in Europe, especially 
in the UK and Italy, by presenting some statistics on asset ownership. In what 
follows, I will focus on household portfolios since I am interested in wealth effects 
on consumption, particularly those operating with risky financial assets such as 
stocks, long-term government bonds and mutual funds. Efficiency of the financial 
industry might imply differences in the level of entry costs. Equally, differences in 
participation may be explained by differences in average household wealth and in 
the distribution of wealth even where entry costs are similar.
Individuals can opt for two types of financing: direct financing, where they invest 
directly in stocks or bonds issued by non financial institutions in the capital markets,
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or indirect financing, where savings are intermediated by financial institutions. The 
relative use of each of them characterizes the relationship between the private sector 
and the rest of the economy.
France 
1980 2000
Germany 
1980 2000
Italy 
1980 2000
UK 
1980 2000
US
1980 2000
Deposits 59 26 59 36 58 25 43 22 33 14
Bonds 9 2 12 11 8 18 7 1 10 7
Equities 14 38 4 17 10 26 12 18 21 25
Institutional Investment 7 33 17 36 6 30 30 59 28 50
Note: Percentage share of total financial assets.
Source: Davis (2001, 2002)
Table 2.1: Financial Assets of Households
Table 2.1 shows that direct stockholdings have been growing in recent years, 
especially in France and Italy, where they have increased from 14 to 38 percent and 
from 10 to 26 percent respectively. This increase is mainly due to the privatization 
process. Transaction costs and bid-ask spreads still prevent households with low 
means from having direct stockholdings, because the cost of controlling the risk 
that a household would incur in order to diversify will not be compensated by the 
higher return. The evolution of assetholdings via institutions has been different: it 
has increased in all countries and significantly in France and the UK. Anglo-Saxon 
countries are the most developed in this respect. The UK has the highest percentage 
in institutional investment (59 percent), while that in Italy (30 percent) and France 
(33 percent) is much lower. This fact is in accordance with differences in market 
capitalization (in percent of GDP): in 2000 it was 180 percent in the UK, 6 8  percent 
in Germany, 78 percent in Italy and 110 percent in France (World Development 
Indicators, World Bank, 2003).
Institutional investors play an important role when securities entail fixed costs. 
They are able to combine and repackage a very large number of existing securities 
and make them available to individual investors that did not find it feasible to invest
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on their own. Institutional investors are “financial institutions that manage savings 
collectively on behalf of small investors, towards a specific objective in terms of 
acceptable risk, return-maximization and maturity of claims”3. Their fast growth 
in the last two decades is due to the decrease in institutional costs coming from 
improvements in price information, development of derivatives in risk control and 
improvements in capital markets with lower transaction costs. In addition, their 
success is a result of being able to match the increasing demand of long term savings 
at high return and low risk. Mutual funds differ from pension funds and life insurance 
companies by offering short-term liquidity at rates based on current market price. 
They can offer these rates via direct redemption of holdings (open-ended funds) or 
by trading shares in the funds on exchanges (closed-ended funds). Money market 
mutual funds can offer redemption of holdings at par and provide payment facilities 
by holding only liquid short term money market assets. Hedge funds are a type 
of closed-end fund that seeks to pursue high returns at the cost of taking high- 
risk leveraged positions. Guiso, Haliassos and Jappelli (2003) show, however, how 
available data on transaction costs and on characteristics of mutual funds suggest 
that Italy and France are likely to face higher production and distribution costs of 
investing in mutual funds notwithstanding the effects of less competition and fewer 
choices.
In addition, a general trend in Europe has been a decline in the share of deposits 
amongst assets, as Table 2.1 illustrates, although this trend differs among countries. 
The shares in Italy, the UK, the US and France dropped significantly, while in 
Germany the decrease has been lower. Bond holdings have remained relatively 
stable but in the case of Italy they increased from 8  to 18 percent and in the UK 
they dropped from 7 to 1 percent. The case of Italy shows that the high debt 
burden is highly financed by bonds, while in the UK households appear to be more
3Davis (2001).
CHAPTER 2. WEALTH EFFECTS IN  EUROPE 80
keen to hold shares. Following the bank lending and balance sheet channels, one 
implication of the above facts is that small borrowers are more responsive to a 
monetary tightening than large borrowers, since small borrowers are bank dependent 
and face severe credit market imperfections.
This picture can be misleading, however, because it does not reveal whether 
the increasing proportion of share holdings comes from an increase in participation 
in capital markets or an increase in the value of assets. Aggregate data do not 
allow one to distinguish whether the change in asset shares comes from a change in 
participation or to the amounts invested. Micro data is therefore needed.
Specifically there are various factors that can lead to an increase in the share of 
risky assets: first, an increase in participation; secondly, an increase in the amount 
invested by the participants; and finally, an increase in assets accruing to risky asset 
holders because of a change in wealth distribution. The first factor seems to explain 
more than 60 percent of the increase in the share of risky assets in Italy, according 
to Guiso and Japelli (2002), while the latter is negligible.
In what follows, I will focus on two countries, the UK and Italy, and in particular 
on participation. In the former country, households directly hold more stocks and 
they do not put large amounts of savings into deposits. In the latter, bonds are 
the most widespread instrument. Italy is characterized as a country that is bank- 
dominated, with a large proportion of small firms, poor contract enforcement and 
rigid labour markets. In contrast, the UK is characterized by very developed capital 
markets, the existence of large firms, good contract enforcement and flexible labour 
markets. One might say that the rest of the European countries are somewhere in 
the middle4. France has more developed capital markets but borrowing is still not 
very high, while Germany has less developed capital markets and less flexible labour 
markets, but enjoys good contract enforcement and large firms.
4See Guiso, Kashyap, Panetta and Terlizzesse (1999) for more details.
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Data from the BHPS and SHIW is used to analyze the case of the UK and Italy 
respectively. Table 2.2 shows the participation in capital markets of households in 
the UK5. British households saw dramatic changes during the 1980s in the distribu­
tion of wealth, having enormous increases in ownership of housing, private pensions6  
and stocks, but this trend has started to slow down.
Financial Assets 19781 19881 19952 20002
National Savings Certificates 5.16 2.69
Premium Bonds 24.16 17.07
Unit Trusts/Investment Trusts 6.28 8.05
Personal Equity Plan 9.04 4.46
Shares (UK or Foreign) 23.99 21.97
NS/NB Insurance Bond 11.98 2.09
Government or Corporate Bonds 3.24 3.93
Equity3 9.10 22.10 25.96 24.04
Risky Bonds4 3.24 3.93
Risky Assets5 27.47 26.14
Sources: 1FES dataset from Banks and Tanner (2002). Table 6A.1.O
Author’s calculations from BHPS dataset.
Notes: Percentage of households owning a specific asset.
o
Shares, Unit Trusts/Investment Trusts or Personal Equity Plans.
4 Government or Corporate Bonds.
5Risky Bonds or Equity.
Table 2.2: UK: Household Portfolio Ownership
The worry that employed people were not saving enough to provide for their 
consumption in old age led the Conservative Government to introduce tax incentives 
for various types of savings, such as TESSAs, PEPSs, PPPs, BESs between 1979 
and 1984.7 In addition, during the 1980s there was a much advertised privatization 
impulse, especially from 1985 to 1988 with the privatization of British Telecom and 
British Gas and the building society demutualisations (the so-called “share-owning 
democracy”). These changes altered the wealth holdings of the majority of the
follow ing Banks et al. (2002) I use the original BHPS panel members (who were a representative 
sample of the population at large).
6 There is no survey in the UK that collects information on defined-contribution pension funds.
7Thx Exempt Special Savings Schemes (TESSAs), tax favoured Personal Equity Plans (PEPs), 
Personal Pension Plans (PPPs), Business Expansion Schemes (BESs).
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population with equity holdings moving down income and wealth distributions into 
segments of the population that were not typically holding other forms of risky 
financial assets.
Information on the first category of assets in Table 2.2 comes from the National 
Savings (NS) government agencies which provide savings and investment instru­
ments in order to finance national borrowing. These assets include National Savings 
Certificates that are long-term savings deposits, NS Premium Bonds that are liquid 
assets offering returns from a monthly prize draw and NS Insurance Bonds that can 
be considered as government bonds bought at Post Offices directly by households. 
The main change over time has been within different types of financial assets.
There has been a decline in wealth held in cash and bank and building soci­
ety accounts, and the same has occurred with short-term government bonds. The 
highest decline has been in premium bonds and insurance bonds.
The increase in awareness of investment opportunities brought by PEPs, priva­
tization and mutual funds have helped spread the ownership of equities across the 
country. Nine percent of households held shares at the end of the 1970s while 26 
percent of the sample held shares in 1995. In that year, 24 percent of the households 
held shares directly and 6  percent did so through unit trusts. In 2000, however, the 
percentage of share ownership declined slightly to 24 percent, breaking the increas­
ing trend. While the number of households holding shares directly declined, the 
proportion holding unit trusts increased.
Not many households held a large number of assets but ownership rates of stocks, 
shares and bonds among middle-aged married couples was very high. Even in the 
1990s, many households only owned shares in privatized companies. The advertise­
ments at the time of the privatization resulted in an increase in asset owners among 
more young and less well educated people, but shareowners were still predominantly 
drawn from those at the top of the income distribution. Only recently was there an
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increase in share-ownership among poorer households due to the de-mutualization 
of building societies. Twenty-eight percent of households held risky financial assets 
in 1995 but this figure decreased to 26 percent in 2000.
There is a well-known trade-off between the accessibility (or liquidity) of wealth 
and the rate of return. Less wealthy households hold small amounts of risky assets 
due to the fact that transactions costs are too high to allow them to hold shares or 
other illiquid assets. Moreover, households that use their wealth as a buffer against 
uncertainty will tend to hold more liquid assets like bank and building society ac­
counts. Therefore, low wealth households hold more interest-bearing assets (even 
though they are highly taxed8) and less non-liquid assets such as PEPs and TESSAs 
(which enjoy tax preferential treatment9). TESSAs aimed to eliminate double tax­
ation for household savings held for 5 years; in fact, both PEPs and TESSAs were 
held more extensively by richer households. In this context, in 1999, the govern­
ment launched ISAs (Individual Savings Accounts) aiming to be more widespread 
since the accounts do not require a minimum lock-in period. Then, PEPs and ISAs 
are tax-advantaged savings accounts that typically have a substantial component 
invested in stocks. Banks, Blundell and Smith (2003) show that higher house price 
volatility in the UK combined with much younger entry into home ownership ex­
plains the relatively small participation of young British households in the stock 
market.
The introduction of tax-incentive programs has been wide-spread. In France, the 
✓
Plan d ’Epargue was introduced in 1990, Germany has been using the Vermogensbildungsgetz; 
and the US has been using the Individual Retirement Account (IRA) and 401 (k) 
plans in order to encourage retirement savings.
8The income paid into such an account is taxed at the marginal rate and also the nominal 
interest income is taxed at the 20% or at the 40% depending on the tax-payer. Stocks and shares 
contributions and returns are taxed but capital gains are only taxed on realisation and then only 
after a threshold.
9Payments into the accounts are taxed but returns and withdrawals are tax-free.
CHAPTER 2. WEALTH EFFECTS IN  EUROPE 84
In comparison to other European countries, Italian portfolios are still poorly 
diversified and still focus on transactions accounts and government bonds with a very 
small proportion of shares in them. In addition, savings have very short-maturities 
and fife insurance and pension funds are poorly developed. However, Italy is moving 
towards household portfolios more similar to other European countries, with higher 
proportions of riskier assets, especially in long-term bonds and mutual funds. This 
change has been due to an increase in participation. However, more than half 
of the population still have no risky assets. Guiso and Jappelli (2002) give some 
explanations for the lack of participation in risky assets. First, transaction costs are 
important for households with low wealth since brokerage fees and other transaction 
costs can amount to 4 percent of the investment. Secondly, background risk such 
as local unemployment can induce people to be more conservative at the time of 
investing. Third, information costs can prevent portfolio diversification. Fourth, 
the stock market has been very volatile due to its small size and illiquidity until 
very recently.
Table 2.3 illustrates how short-term government bonds are more widespread than 
long-term government bonds using data drawn from the SHIW10. Nevertheless, al­
though the former remained stable until 1995, since then, they have declined dra­
matically. Long-term bonds -riskier bonds- issued by the government, and especially 
by private companies, have increased significantly. The spread between the long- 
and the short-term rate explains the shift. In addition, stocks and investment funds 
have increased during the 1990s as the return on equities and mutual funds increased 
dramatically during that period11, particularly after 1995. In addition, financial in-
10 Guiso and Jappelli (2002) point out that underreporting of financial assets in the SHIW causes 
particular understatement of risky assets when it is compared to official statistics. The reason is 
that the survey is not focused specifically on rich household wealth, which still hold the majority 
of risky financial assets.
11 Italy has a very favourable tax treatment limiting the tax rate on capital gains to 1 percent. 
(Guiso, Haliassos and Jappelli (2003)).
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Financial Assets 1991 1993 1995 1998 2000
Postal Interest Bearing Bonds 4.09 5.14 7.04 6.55 5.32
Short-term Treasury Bonds 21.56 20.31 21.65 9.67 10.26
Treasury Certificates 7.10 6.81 7.56 4.74 3.57
Long-term Treasury Bonds 2.69 2.84 4.46 2.70 2.04
Other Government Bonds, Zero Coupon and Foreign Bonds 0.95 0.89 1.49 1.53 1.16
Corporate Bonds 1.39 2.41 2.57 5.55 6.40
Shares of Stock Companies Held 2.85 4.19 5.16 8.33 10.32
Investment Fund Shares Held 2.31 4.29 4.50 10.86 12.12
Shareholding in Limited Companies 0.60 0.37 0.16 0.53 0.27
Shareholding in Partnership 0.67 0.53 0.07 0.15 0.17
Equity1 5.53 7.80 8.44 15.53 18.14
Risky Bonds'^ 4.25 5.25 6.82 7.88 8.44
Risky Assets 8.49 10.83 12.29 18.60 21.06
Source: Author’s calculations from SHIW dataset 
Notes: Percentage of households owning a specific asset.
1 Stocks, Investment Funds, or Shareholdings.o
Long-term Bonds, Zero Coupon Bonds, Foreign Bonds or Corporate Bonds.
o
Equity or Risky Bonds.
Table 2.3: Italy: Household Portfolio Ownership
novation reduced minimum investment requirements and offered new diversification
H . I 7
opportunities. Moreover, as in the UK, there has been a large privatization process 
of public utilities and state-owned companies with advertisement campaigns making 
households more aware of investment possibilities. Another factor that explains the 
different behaviour of young households in the 1990s from their predecessors is the 
removal of capital controls since 1989, which has led to an increase in foreign asset 
holdings, decreasing the home bias. Finally, the reform of the social security system 
(1992, 1996) and the lower expectations of pension benefits has led households to 
increase their own savings.
It seems plausible that a long-run wealth effect exists. It is not clear, however, 
if the relationship in the short-run between asset prices and consumption is merely 
a statistical correlation. Asset prices may simply lead to economic activity that 
eventually translates into an increase in consumption in the short-run and does not
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explain changes in consumption. Therefore, in order to analyze the implications of 
these changes in household portfolios, I look at the predictions of theoretical models 
in the following section.
2.4 The Life-Cycle M odel o f Consum ption
Following Ludwig and Sloek (2002), Friedman (1957), Ando and Modigliani (1963) 
and Modigliani and Brumberg (1979) there are two transmission channels relating 
to stock market wealth:
1. Wealth effects: These can be realized or unrealized. When the value of con­
sumers’ stock holdings increases and households realize their gains then con­
sumption would increase. This would be a direct effect as a consequence of 
higher current liquid assets. In addition, an increase in stock prices can also 
have an expectation effect where the value of stocks in pension accounts and 
other locked-in accounts increases. If these assets increase in value but are not 
realized, consumption would be higher today as expected future income and 
wealth would be higher.
2. Liquidity constraints effects: Increases in stock market prices raise the value 
of portfolios. Borrowing against the value of this portfolio in turn allows the 
household to increase consumption. Haliassos and Hassapis (2002) find that 
the “equity culture” creates incentives to increase loans that lead to an increase 
in current consumption. This is due to the fact that better prospects for future 
financial wealth accumulation (because of the equity premium) dominate the 
increase in riskiness of future income streams (that could discourage current 
consumption).
There are, however, some stylised facts from the literature that characterize life­
cycle consumption and portfolio behaviour. First, the majority of households hold
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no equity - the participation puzzle. Second, levels of asset holdings in equity are 
very small. Third, the covariance of consumption growth and equity returns is low.
In what follows I would like to show evidence of wealth effects by controlling for 
liquidity constraint effects. Specifically, I will study the implications of changes in 
consumption that develop the equity culture, and how these changes are influenced 
by credit market conditions.
2 .4 .1  F irst A pproach
Let us consider the conventional life-cycle consumption model under uncertainty 
with multiple periods. The consumer with additively separable utility wants to pick 
a sequence of consumption and asset stocks which maximize the expected value of 
his life-time utility subject to each period’s budget constraint plus the boundary 
condition that requires that the consumer cannot die in debt, as follows:
T
M ax{Ca,Aa}Et 5>(c.)/(i+«r*
_8=t
(2.1)
s.t. A s < ( 1  +  rs)As—i +  Ya — Cs (2-2)
A t  ^ 0
where <5 (0< S <0) is the consumer rate of time preference, Ya is a non-property 
income sequence (labour income and grants), rs is the real rate of interest, T  is the 
length of the economic fife, A a is the end of period assets (including the interest in­
come on them) and U is the instantaneous felicity function which is a Van-Neumann 
Morgensten utility function.
The constraints will be equalities providing that this utility function is always
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increasing in consumption. Then I can write
88
M ax{Ai)Et b > [ ( l  +  r ,)A ,- i  + Y .~  A,} / ( I  +  <S)a- * j  (2.3)
to get the Intertemporal Optimality Condition:
Et [U\C.)/( 1 +  i ) - ‘] =  Et [(1 +  rs+1)U{C,+1) /( l  + 5)»+1- ‘] (2.4)
with s — t:
U'(Ct) = Et [ ( 1  +  rt+l)U\Ct+i ) / ( l  +  5)] (2.5)
that is, the relative consmnption levels at different dates.
Under rational expectations with et+i orthogonal to the information set available 
at time t, the fundamental first order condition or the observable equation is:
(1 +  rt+1)UXCt+i) =  (1 +  S)U\Ct) +  et+i (2.6)
I now impose some assumptions about the utility function in order to generate 
an expression that can be related to real data. Hall (1978) gives two possibilities: 
a quadratic and an isoelastic utility function. With the latter, also called Constant 
Relative Risk Aversion, U(C) = (C 1 - 7  — 1)/(1 — 7 ), and equation 2.6 becomes,
Ct+i ~  K1 + ^ )/(l + r)]Q 7 + £*+i/(l + r) (2.7)
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where 7  is the coefficient of risk aversion.
To sum up, Hall’s paper shows that consumption is a random walk. That is, no 
variable apart from current consumption has any value in predicting future consump­
tion, and time profile of income is irrelevant. The permanent income hypothesis/life­
cycle hypothesis (PIH/LCH) under rational expectations implies that changes in 
consumption should be uncorrelated with anticipated changes in income and other 
variables that are in the consumers’ information set. Hall’s specification can be 
expressed in terms of the following log-normal approximation of the Euler equation 
with 7  =  1 :
AlnCi+i =  ot +  £t+ 1  (2 *8 )
where A is the first-difference operator taken with respect to time. Consequently, 
the permanent income/life-cycle model of consumption, under rational expectations, 
would predict that consumer expenditure should approximately follow a random 
walk with drift.
Extensions
Without denying the intuitive appeal of the PIH, some drawbacks have been pointed 
out in subsequent papers. These follow from the two major discrepancies that have 
been found between the model’s predictions and empirical estimations.
Excess S ensitiv ity  Puzzle One deficiency of the standard model is the failure 
to adequately capture the dynamic interaction of consumption, income and interest 
rates. This failure has much to do with the underlying assumption tha t capital 
markets are perfect so that agents can transfer their resources from one period to 
another. However, capital markets are far from perfect. Altonji and Siow (1987) 
point out the asymmetry of the response of consumption to predictable income
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growth. If predicted income increases, consumers want to borrow but are prevented 
from doing so, hence consumption responds to income (liquidity constraint binding).
But if predicted income decreases, they will save and not borrow (liquidity constraint 
not binding).
One of the leading alternatives to the basic model is obtained by relaxing this 
assumption and allowing the existence of Keynesian-type consumers. In this case, 
consumption changes are no longer orthogonal to predictable, or lagged, income 
changes, since a correlation exists between consumption growth and lagged income 
growth. This is the excess sensitivity puzzle that has been investigated by Zeldes 
(1989) among others.
To allow for credit constraints, Zeldes (1989) modifies the second equation of 
the budget constraints 2.2 by A a > 0. The Intertemporal Optimality Condition for 
s = t then becomes:
U \ c t ) = £,[(1 +  r(+1)C/'(Ct+i)/( l +  *)] +  A* (2.9)
where At is the Lagrange multiplier on the borrowing constraint.
By assuming iso-elastic preferences, joint log normality, 7  =  1, and constant 
interest rates I get:
AlnCt+i =  ol +  A t  +  £ t + i  ( 2 . 1 0 )
where is a renormalisation of Af.
Zeldes divides the sample into consumers who are life-cycle optimizers and Keynesian- 
type consumers who are supposed to be consuming proportional to their existing 
income. Zeldes then finds that the time profile of income is relevant, not just the
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present value.
Borrowing restrictions -limited access to financial markets- have effects on con­
sumption that are not clear cut. When restrictions are directly binding, they make 
households consume their disposable income. When restrictions are not binding, 
they also affect consumption through the individual’s usual intertemporal optimisa­
tion concerns.
The evidence from microdata has yielded mixed results. Zeldes (1989) and Eberly 
(1994) find excess sensitivity to liquidity constraints - a significant relationship be­
tween changes in consumption and lagged income using the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (PSID) for US households. On the other hand, Altonji and Siow (1987) 
and Runkle (1991) find no evidence of liquidity constraints. Recently, studies have 
also tested for liquidity constraints. For the US, Hajivassiliou and Ioannides (1998) 
establish excess sensitivity for the low-asset income group while allowing for liquid­
ity constraints to be endogenously determined. Garcia, Lusardi and Ng (1997) find 
excess sensitivity for the low wealth group as well as for the high wealth one, due 
to the fact that households do not have time-separable preferences as assumed by 
the classical theory. Instead, there is inertia in preferences, hence households adjust 
their behaviour slowly.
In the case of Italy, Japelli and Pistaferri (2000) find that consumption growth 
is uncorrelated with predicted income growth. Attanasio and Weber (1993, 1995) 
point out the possible biases created by aggregation and by omitting demographic 
variables which are important in models with nonseparable preferences, and find that 
consumption growth does not exhibit excess sensitivity to labour income for the UK. 
The excess sensitivity seems to disappear when changes in family composition and 
labour supply are controlled for.
These contradictory findings in the literature can be explained by the fact that 
some of these studies consider that A* does not vary over time. The fact that a
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consumer is liquidity-constrained does not mean that he will be a Keynesian type 
of consumer forever. A* can still vary over time because the consumer could save 
transitory increases in income. This is allowed, for example, by Hajivassiliou and 
Ionnides (1998).
In the following sections, I present further evidence on liquidity constraints and 
habit formation using data from the BHPS and the SHIW.
R isk  A sset Puzzle o r P a rtic ip a tio n  Puzzle Another key prediction of the pure 
LCH model is that lagged wealth should have no predictive power for consumption 
because the previous value of consumption incorporates all information about the 
well-being of consumers at that time. To test this hypothesis, Hall (1978) uses stock 
prices lagged by a single quarter as a proxy for wealth and finds that changes in 
stock prices have a predictive value for consumption. He justifies the finding as 
being consistent with a modified random-walk hypothesis that allows for a brief lag 
between changes in permanent income and changes in consumption.
Poterba and Samwick (1995) find some effects of changes of stock prices on 
consumption for US aggregated data for the period 1947-1995. However, they justify 
the correlation between consumption and stock prices as the role of share prices as a 
leading indicator12. Ludvigson and Steindel (1999) analyse the short-run effects of 
wealth on aggregate consumption and find that changes in wealth are not correlated 
with the next quarter’s consumption growth, because the response of consumption 
growth to an unanticipated change in wealth is largely contemporaneous. Attanasio 
and Banks (1998) claim that aggregate household savings data are inappropriate 
for the analysis of household savings and that only data relating to the life-time 
experiences of households will help to understand recent trends and patterns in 
saving rates. They question the fact that capital gains can explain the evolution 
of savings because people do not always cash capital gains and claim that it is not
12Stock prices may rise in anticipation of strong economic activity, including consumption.
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clear if changes in asset prices are perceived as permanent.
Parker (1999) also estimates a Euler equation by adding the lag of wealth to 
test for wealth effects and controlling for stock ownership exogenously. He finds a 
negative but insignificant coefficient on wealth.
The puzzle that remains is why so few households hold risky assets. This is the 
micro analogue of the equity premium puzzle. Equilibrium portfolio theory predicts 
that individuals will diversify risks and maximise returns by holding a diversified 
portfolio containing a large number of different assets such as equity, government 
bonds, housing, etc. Despite this, the level of risky assets that are held is still low 
given the size of their returns.
Some studies have addressed the issue of limited participation in capital markets 
for risky assets. Haliassos and Bertaut (1995) point out that the excess returns to 
shares remains as a puzzle since 75 percent of American households do not hold 
shares despite the expected-utility model predictions.
Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) study the failure of the consumption-based Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) based on a Euler equation estimated for the US. 
The equity premium puzzle is explained by the fact that aggregate consumption 
growth covaries too little with the return on equities to justify the large observed 
risk premium on stocks. The authors claim that this is because the CAPM relies on 
consumption data aggregated across stockholders and non-stockholders whose be­
haviour differs substantially. They find that aggregate consumption of stockholders 
is more highly correlated with the stock market than the aggregate consumption 
of non-stockholders. In addition, the consumption of stockholders is more volatile 
than the consumption of non-stockholders and the coefficient of relative risk aversion 
calculated from the PSID falls from 100 to 35 if only consumption of stockholders is 
considered. Even though 35 is still implausibly high, it moves in the right direction. 
Therefore, as the share of equity holdings in income increases, consumption should
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become more sensitive to asset price fluctuations.
Attanasio, Banks and Tanner (2002) find that the Consumption CAPM model 
works for the group of households who hold risky assets, once separated from the 
rest, thereby reaffirming the results of Mankiw and Zeldes (1991). They improve 
the Mankiw and Zeldes analysis by using a more complete measure of consumption 
and allowing shareownership to be endogenous. Mankiw and Zeldes used only food 
consumption and shareownership in the last period of the sample. In addition, 
they find that the largest increase in shareownership comes from households with 
high incomes but low levels of education. Therefore the fact that the Consumption 
CAPM model holds for risky assetholders raises the possibility that stock returns 
affect consumption through wealth effects.
Attanasio (1998) analyses the decline in aggregate personal saving in the US in 
the 1980s and concludes that households in their 40’s and 50’s during this period 
are responsible for the decline in savings. He is unable to say, however, why those 
households did not save enough. He controls for financial asset ownership and rejects 
the hypothesis that the decline in savings in the 1980s is explained by unmeasured 
capital gains on real estate and/or financial assets13. However, Maki and Palumbo 
(2 0 0 1 ), using a cohort-level, times series data, show that aggregate trends in house­
hold consumption and savings over the 1990s can be explained by the existence of 
wealth effects on consumption.
Since the econometric techniques employed above ignore the two puzzles already 
stated, I think it makes sense to study both phenomena jointly. This is the approach 
taken in the next section.
A Euler equation is an equilibrium condition for a set of consumers that are 
unconstrained. To test it, variables are included that might be important in al­
ternative settings, in particular expected income and expected wealth. The Euler
13He uses a very rough measure of capital gains by interacting the value of stocks of assets with 
year dummies.
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equation, however, is not an equation which explains consumption or even consump­
tion growth. For instance it does not tell us what consumption growth will be for 
an unexpected change in wealth, income, interest rate or any other variable. There­
fore the possible rejection of the Euler equation gives valuable information but it is 
not clear how to interpret the coefficients on wealth. An alternative is to estimate 
consumption functions.
2 .4 .2  Second A pproach
In this section I study consumer behaviour via the estimation of household consump­
tion functions. The advantage of this approach is that the consumption function can 
be used to understand consumer behaviour rather than simply to estimate intertem­
poral substitution (as is the case with Euler equations). The old-style consumption 
function was derived by Friedman (1957) and Modigliani and Brumberg (1956) where 
each household (h) chooses at age (t) an amount of nondurable expenditures (C \t ) 1 4  
that provides utility through an intertemporally-separable, increasing, and concave 
utility function (u(.)). The function can be written as follows (See Parker (1999) for 
details):
M ax (Fh,tCh,t) +  &T+>~sVt +i (Fh,tXh,T+i)
t=S
where E s  is the expectation operator conditional on all information available at 
time s\ v  shifts utility as households age; /? is the discount factor; F  is a family- 
size adjustment that normalizes consumption to per-capita terms; X  is household 
cash-on-hand and wealth; and V{.) captures the possible value of cash on hand and 
wealth remaining at death. Households choices are constrained by an intertemporal
14 Utility from nondurable consumption is assumed to be additively separable from utility from 
durable consumption or leasure.
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budget constraint, and given their current levels of assets and income:
96
Xh,t+1 — Rh,T+l (X h,t ~  Ch,t) +  Yh,t+l
Xh,t >  Ch,t
where R h,t +i is the gross after-tax rate of return on the household’s optimal 
portfolio, and is disposable non-asset income.
I follow Parker (1999) in assuming that in order to forecast future income, house­
holds only use as the basis of their forecast an estimate of the permanent component 
of its income (Ph,t)- The latter is estimated as the forecast of the log of current in­
come from two lags of income, education and age. Therefore, the consumption func­
tion of household h is a function of family size, wealth, income, age, the permanent 
component of income, and the aggregate state:
Ch,t =  /  (Fh,t, X h,u a>9eh,u Ph,u Tt) (2.11)
Aggregate, planned consumption is explained above by labour income and wealth. 
However, actual consumption is not always equal to planned consumption due to 
several factors such as adjustment costs and liquidity constraints. Adjustment costs 
can prevent consumers from adjusting their housing services within each period. 
Capital restrictions prevent individuals from smoothing consumption by borrow­
ing, therefore these liquidity-constrained consumers are more dependent on current 
consumption.
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To sum up, the wealth effect reflected in the coefficient on lagged wealth in the 
Euler equation in the previous section is different in nature from the wealth effect 
reflected in the coefficient on current wealth in the consumption function in this 
section. The former is an excess sensitivity test of the underlying PIH model. The 
latter measures the (conditional) effect of additional financial wealth on the level 
of consumption, which is consistent with the PIH null, but close to the notion of 
wealth effects used to motivate this chapter.
2.5 The Basic M odel
The existence of both households who invest in risky financial assets and households 
who do not invest at all suggests the use of selectivity models to address the issue of 
data censoring. If assetholders are prevented from investing in the capital markets, 
then the consumption of the households that are in the market should be higher than 
those that are outside the market. The key issue is that an increased participation 
in capital markets affects households already in the market and asset prices, while 
the expectation of entering the market affects those that are not. Furthermore, 
endogenous changes in capital stock have effects on all households.
The basic model is divided into a discrete and a continuous part that charac­
terizes consumption demand and corrects for selectivity bias. The former part will 
be modelled using probit estimation. I will use a parametric model with censored 
endogenous variables to derive estimates to correct for the selection bias resulting 
from the unobserved endogeneity in the consumption function. Selectivity bias refers 
to the bias that arises due to the fact that the underlying discrete decision process 
is ignored. This bias occurs because the consumption that is observed for house­
hold participating in capital markets and being liquidity unconstrained depends on 
the underlying decision processes. I correct for that by estimating the consumption 
equations conditional on the asset or non-assetholding decision and the liquidity
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constrained probability.
In what follows I will introduce two variations on the life-cycle/permanent income 
hypothesis. First, I introduce a measure of wealth to analyse its possible effect on 
consumption in Italy and the UK in the 1990s, during which ownership increased. 
The variable has an obvious rationale, but is less closely related to competing theories 
of consumption. Theory and prevailing practice agree that contemporaneous wealth 
has a strong influence on consumption, particularly now that assets are held by a 
majority of the population. Secondly, the presence of liquidity constraints prevents 
consumers from smoothing consumption over transitory fluctuations in income.
2.5 .1  T w o -S te p  S w itch in g  M o d e l w ith  E n d o g e n o u s  S w itc h in g
To tackle the two puzzles in the literature, the inconsistency of the rational expectation- 
permanent income model of consumption and the consumption CAPM puzzle, I 
propose that:
1) At is endogenous. That is, the degree to which liquidity constraints bind 
and the length of time over which they bind varies over time. Unfortunately, At is 
unobservable, hence I follow Zeldes (1989) and Runkle (1991) in grouping house­
holds according to variables that determine whether or not households axe liquidity 
constrained.
2) The decision to own risky assets in each period is likely to be endogenous with 
respect to consumption.
The econometric model extends the classic Heckman-Lee two stage estimation 
method that allows for double-selection (See Fishe et al. (1981), Maddala (1983) 
and Tunali (1986) for examples).
I would like to model two selection equations described by the following bivariate 
probit model:
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U t  =1 (z ^ 7 L +  4 > 0 )  (2.12)
« i t= 1  (2 # 7 fi +  « g > 0 )  (2.13)
where the indicator function 1 (•) is equal to 1  if the statement in the argument is
true, and equal to 0 otherwise. That is, La and Ra  are underlying utility indices
that enable an individual to make one choice out of two alternatives. These two 
decision equations are likely to be correlated, so that E  \uft • u^] =  pul ur .
I next consider a choice model with four categories and one regression outcome 
in each category, following Dubin and McFadden (1984) and Fishe et al (1981):
Cqit =  KqitPq "1“ £qit (,Q ~  2, 3, 4)
££  =  4 t L +  «4 (i =  l ,2  N )  (2.14)
R * it = z f h R +  «« (* =  1,2,..., N )
where x qa and with K  =  L, R, are exogenous variables, eqa are identically 
and independently distributed normal variables and are assumed to be normally 
distributed with zero mean and variance normalized to unity.
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When L I  > 0 the household is liquidity constrained. When R*t > 0 the house­
hold is a risky assetholder. This generates the following probability of the joint 
decision:
Prob (L I > 0, R*t >  0) =  Prob ( 4  < 4 71, 4  <  4 l R) = F  ( 4 t L- 4 7 * ,  p) 
(2.15)
To obtain the ML estimates of 7 L, and p, I maximize the following likelihood 
function:
L  = IIF  (zit7L' zi h R> P) * II t1 ”  F  (.zit7L' V*, p)] (2.16)
7=1 7=0
under the assumption of normality of uR . Since the S  (variance-covariance matrix 
of the standardized error terms) is not a diagonal matrix, I will use a maximum 
likelihood bivariate probit to produce consistent estimates of 7L,7 i2, and p.
In this model, I have four possible decision combinations:
A lnC iit =  xut(31 +  £ 1  a i f f  i e  PC  (1)
A In C2it = x 2itP2 +  £ 2  it i f f  i € PC  (2)
A In Cut =  %3itP 3  +  £ 3  it i f f  i € PC  (3) (2.17)
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A In Cau =  xauPa +  £Ait i f f  i £ P C  (4) 
where the combination sets are:
P C (l)  = {it\L *a > 0 ,  R*t > 0}
P C (2) = { i t  \ L*t < 0 , R?t > 0}
P C  (3) = { i t  \ Llt > 0  , R*t < 0} (2.18)
PC (4) =  { t t | L J < 0 ,  / $ < 0 }  
and are jointly distributed with u t^ and uff:, such that
H  ^Sqit Uit J  =  (Tqk‘
Since the disturbances in the decision equations are correlated (Cov(uft , ufj:) 
p), equation 2.17 implies that
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FT Al n r  If r  r r ( tU X  ft V t  ■ $ ((2 1 (* e  p c (l)) -  1) ( 4 7 i ,z,?7B,P))E [A In 11  6 PC{q)\ -  x qu/3q- ^  <r,t  4 „m i ^  -------
9=1
* 7*) • $((2 1 (» € PC(g)) ~ l ) ( 4 7 L,^ 7 fi 
$2((2 1 (i e PC(g)) -  l ) ( 4 7 L,Zi?7fi,p))
(2.19)
where g =  1,2,3,4 and K  = L ,R .
The last term of equation 2.19, the Heckman correction term or Inverse Mills 
ratios, can be interpreted in terms of the endogeneity of the two selection equations, 
hereafter. $2(0 is the bivariate standard normal distribution, $(.) is the stan­
dard normal distribution function, and 0(.) is the density function, (see Appendix 
for details).
By looking at the BHPS and SHIW calculations stated in Table 2.415,1  observe 
that the PC(1) combination of equation 2.18 -namely, L, R- contains a small propor­
tion of households. As a result I will mostly be concerned with equations defining 
A l n C 2 it, A In Cm  and A lnC ^t.
1995
UK IT
NL,R:0.22 NL,NR:0.27 NL,R:0.12 NL,NR:0.43
L,R:0.05 L,NR:0.46 L,R:0.01 L,NR:0.44
2000
UK IT
NL,R:0.18 NL,NR:0.20 NL,R:0.20 NL,NR:0.35
L,R:0.08 L,NR:0.54 L,R:0.01 L,NR:0.44
Source: Author’s calculations from BHPS and SHIW. 
Note: Percentage of households in each category. 
L=Liquidity constrained, NL=no-L; R=Risky 
Assetholder, NR=non-R.
Table 2.4: Liquidity Constraints and Assetholdings
15The asset-based split is used to calculate the proportion of liquidity constrained households in 
Table 2.4. See section 2.6.1. for an explanation on the definition.
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2.6 Empirical Results
The principal economic framework underlying the analysis is the life-cycle model, 
and my aim is to test the model and improve its empirical specification. Once 
the estimation equations have been obtained, I will discuss the implications for the 
theoretical model. For the sake of comparison I use the same time period for both 
countries. The BHPS has only financial information for 1995 and 2000 (while the 
SHIW has information for the whole period 1991-2000) hence I restrict the analysis 
to these two years.
2.6 .1  L iqu id ity  C onstraints
Different forms of liquidity constraints have been examined in the literature, usually 
in the form of a price or quantity restriction on the holding of assets. I consider two 
measures of liquidity constraints: first, following Zeldes’ paper I rely on an asset- 
based sample separation rule, that is, the ratio of total wealth in t to the average 
of disposable income in t  and t — 1. Based on the level of assets held, households 
are divided into liquidity constrained (low wealth) households and those with access 
to credit markets (high wealth). Second, following Jappelli, Pischke and Souleles 
(1998) I consider a more direct measure of liquidity constraints, namely, information 
on credit card holdings. The Appendix contains an explanation of the construction 
of the variables. In this way I can weaken the spurious problem arising from the 
correlation between consumption growth, lagged income, and assets when the Euler 
equation is estimated in a linearized way, omitting the second and higher order terms 
of the conditional distribution of consumption growth.
Tables 2.5 and 2.9 (the latter in the appendix) display the results of the liquidity- 
constrained equations for the UK and Italy using two measures of liquidity con­
straints, the asset-based and credit card splits. The explanatory variables in these 
probit equations include age of head of household, age squared, a dummy for the
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poorest region, house ownership (with mortgage and without), sex of household 
head, marital status (married), family size, number of children, employment status 
of household head, employment status of spouse, education of head, and year effects.
The coefficients on age for the asset split in both countries are negative and sig­
nificant, implying that aging decreases the probability of being liquidity constrained. 
The positive sign on age squared suggests that after a certain age, aging increases 
the probability of being liquidity constrained. Education is highly significant and 
negative in both countries, implying that schooling is a predictor of future earnings 
and ability to repay loans.
Female headed households might have a lower level of expected future income 
and appear to suffer from additional credit rationing. This difference may be the 
result of discrimination. On the other hand, sex turns out to be insignificant when 
the credit card split is used.
The negative sign on the marital status dummy also accords with theory but is 
only significant in the case of the UK, thus supporting the idea that married couples 
are less constrained than singles. A big family is likely to be more constrained in 
the UK although the family size variable is insignificant in the case of Italy. A larger 
number of children increases the likelihood of being constrained for both countries 
using the asset split. I include a dummy for the poorest regions and this is significant 
in both countries; northern regions for the UK and southern regions for Italy.
In the UK, employment status of the household head plays an important role 
in determining the existence of liquidity constraints when either of the two splits 
is used. In Italy, however, it is only significant when the credit card split is used. 
Employment of the spouse is important in the case of Italy (according to both 
splits). For the UK, it is only significant for the credit card split. The year effect is 
significant in both countries. Interestingly, the data suggests that households that 
own a house are less liquidity constrained in the UK. In Italy, however, it is only
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Italy UK
Dependent variable:
Asset Split Risky Assets Asset Split Risky Assets
Variables Coeff. T-Stat. Coeff. T-Stat. Coeff. T-Stat. Coeff. T-Stat.
Constant 1.682 11.82 -5.151 -22.80 2.310 16.08 -3.614 -21.90
Age -0.026 -5.52 0.038 5.65 -0.034 -6.33 0.054 8.71
Age2 0.000 3.77 -0.000 -5.25 0.000 2.71 -0.000 -7.44
Region 0.600 26.08 -0.759 -21.73 0.063 5.02 -0.033 -2.73
Ownlmort 0.010 0.16 -0.132 -0.25 -0.344 -8.64 0.764 16.17
OwnOmort -0.282 -11.84 -0.009 -0.20 -0.684 -17.04 0.877 18.25
Sex -0.152 -5.24 0.163 4.45 -0.153 -4.14 0.161 3.89
MS -0.048 -1.43 0.086 2.02 -0.126 -3.15 0.080 1.81
Fsize 0.001 0.05 -0.091 -5.67 0.054 2.42 -0.086 -5.12
Child 0.091 3.89 - - 0.082 3.07 - -
Adult - - 0.101 5.04 - - -0.028 -0.88
Emplh -0.004 -0.14 - - -0.143 -3.56 - -
Empls -0.177 -6.93 0.127 3.77 0.042 1.11 -0.010 -0.21
Educ -0.342 -20.05 0.545 22.53 -0.255 -16.45 0.294 18.06
Wage - - 0.013 3.59 - - 0.031 4.78
Selfemp - - 0.015 0.37 - - -0.045 -0.90
FWealth - - 0.121 7.17 - - 0.041 9.21
YearEffect 0.047 2.33 0.371 14.43 0.180 7.26 0.057 1.96
PuL UR -0.680 -31.31) -0.471(-22.27)
Log likelihood 
No. Obs
-15118.076
16136
-10545.485
10195
Notes: t-statistics calculated with robust standard errors clustered by household 
corrected for heteroskedasticity. Sample: 1995, 2000.
P „ l , .r  controls for common determinants of liquidity constrains and asset
u it ' i t
holding equations, not fully captured by the explanatory variables.
and
Table 2.5: Selection Equation. Asset Split
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the case if the household does not have a mortgage.
To sum up, the fraction of constrained households is endogenous, and varies in 
response to changes in demographic characteristics and future income.
The difference in liquidity constraints results between the credit card measure 
and the asset ratio measure is due to the fact that the group without credit cards 
is observed to be different to one with a low asset ratio. The former can be charac­
terized as unmarried, older and with lower education.
2 .6 .2  A sseth o ld in g  O w nership
Empirical models of household portfolio choice in the literature axe typically of 
a reduced form, not least because a structural empirical model will require more 
complete information than typically provided in the data. In this fashion, King and 
Leape (1998), Hochguertel, Alessie and van Soest (1997), Banks and Tanner (2002), 
and Guiso and Japelli (2002, 2003) analyse American, Dutch, British and Italian 
household portfolios respectively.
Among the variables that can affect assetholding ownership, I consider net worth, 
age, age squared, sex of head, poorest region, family size, number of adults, marital 
status, homeownership (with and without mortgage), education of head, employ­
ment of spouse, dummy for self-employment, labour income, financial wealth, and 
year effects.
Tables 2.5 and 2.9 present the asset ownership equations for the UK and Italy. 
They show that ownership of risky financial assets depends strongly on financial 
wealth in the positive direction predicted by portfolio theory. In addition, the per­
centage of households that hold risky financial assets increases with average labour 
income. This is because households have larger portfolios, hence they axe more 
willing to pay for the fixed information cost.
Standard asset portfolio models without transaction costs, in which risky assets
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have a higher return than safe assets, do not address the issue of participation/ 
non-participation. Since some households do not hold assets because they axe not 
aware of their existence, models should include transactions costs and incomplete 
financial information. Education is a good proxy for these variables since it can be 
interpreted as a measure of the ability to process information about the market and 
overcome the barriers to shareholding.
Older households are more likely to hold assets than younger ones. The positive 
sign on age and the negative sign on squared age implies that participation is hump 
shaped. Households invest a small proportion of their wealth in risky financial 
assets when they axe young, but they increase this proportion as they accumulate 
more wealth to cover the fixed costs of investing in risky assets. After reaching a 
maximum at middle age, this proportion starts declining. Young and old people 
have greater income vaxiability, and therefore they axe the groups less likely to hold 
risky financial assets. In addition, liquidation costs and market imperfections make 
younger households less willing to invest in risky assets, especially when they axe 
looking for a home purchase. On the other hand, health risk shortens the period 
of investment payoff and thus makes elder people more reluctant to invest in risky 
assets.
The significant positive sign of marital status indicates that married couples 
own more risky assets than single people. Single-parent households tend to have 
the lowest ownership rates and married couples without children tend to have the 
highest. Larger households own less risky assets but the larger the number the adults 
the higher the likelihood of having risky assets in Italy. Employment of the spouse 
is important for Italy. Homeownership is critical for households in the UK but not 
Italy. The self-employment dummy turns out to be insignificant. The dummy for 
poor regions has a negative influence on market participation. Finally, male heads 
of household axe more likely to be risky asset holders in both countries.
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L RThe correlation between the error terms of the two equations, puit>u»t, is negative 
and highly significant, showing a negative relationship between the errors of holding 
shares and liquidity constraints. The results are in line with Paxson (1990) who 
shows that households exposed to liquidity constraints and facing uncertain liquidity 
needs will tend to hold relatively liquid and safe assets. This result suggests that 
liquidity constraints and asset holdings may be determined by common variables 
omitted from both specifications.
2 .6 .3  C on sum p tion  E quations
Focusing on equation 2.10,1 can test two orthogonality restrictions associated with 
the model. Specifically, under the null hypothesis of no borrowing constraints A# 
should equal zero for both constrained and unconstrained households, labour income 
(Yu) should be insignificant, and parameters should be similar across both types of 
households. Under the alternative hypothesis of borrowing constraints Xu will not 
equal zero for the constrained group and will be correlated with Yu. Furthermore, 
I can test for wealth effects and see whether they can lead to another rejection of 
the Euler equation. A simple test of these hypotheses is to enter Yu and financial 
wealth, Wu, as additional regressors and test their significance.
In order to fit the equation a number of modifications are necessary. The utility 
derived from consumption also depends on family composition. Therefore a simple 
correction is made by assuming that the utility is shifted by a number of demographic 
variables such as age, family size, number of children, and so forth. Moreover, 
following Attanasio and Weber (1995) I include a labour supply variable to take 
into account nonseparability between consumption and leisure.
Euler Equations o f Consumption Growth
Estimates are based on the typical Euler equation derived from 2.10:
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A Cft+ 5  = a* +  <pqAit +  P  AXit+5 +  4 + 5  (2-20)
where the dependent variable, ACft+ 5  = ln(Cu+h/Ou), is real non-durable and 
services consumption, An represents age variables (controlling for changes in prefer­
ences) and AXjt+ 5  =  ln(Xu+5 /X u )  represents demographic characteristics.16 The 
elasticity of intertemporal substitution is a , q is the number of regimes (q =  1,2,3,4) 
and 4 + 5  is a residual uncorrelated with all the information available at time t or ear­
lier for household i at time £ in a regime q. The constant a q depends on conditional 
second moments of consumption growth and the real interest rate.
I use five-year changes in consumption to maintain comparability with the finan­
cial data available from the BHPS. Notice that in these equations the only source 
of variation is cross-sectional.
According to theory, innovations in the Euler equation are not predictable by 
the variables on the right-hand-side. However, the existence of positive shocks to 
wealth could generate a correlation between innovations to wealth and predictable 
movements in the real interest rates. In other words, increases in consumption will 
remain unexplained after removing the substitution effect due to movements in real 
interest rates. In order to avoid possible sample bias on the remaining coefficients, 
I have allowed for different rates of consumption growth for assetholders and non- 
assetholders in the four regime model.
To recapitulate, the key hypothesis is that under a simple version of the life­
cycle model, there should be no relation between consumption growth and expected 
income or wealth, since consumers with a concave utility function should smooth 
expected income and wealth fluctuations. I therefore include In Yu to test for excess
16Following Japelli, Pischke and Souleles (1998), I include directly the change in number of adults 
and change in the number of children as opposed to using the measure of food needs.
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sensitivity following Zeldes (1989), and I include the amount of financial assets held 
(In Wu) in order to test for wealth effects. I modify equation 2.20 to make consump­
tion expenditure a function of household wealth and labour income as follows:
A C ?t+ 5  =  a 9 +  <fi9Ait +  {39A X i t+ 5  4- 79 In Yit +  S9 In Wit +  4 +5 (2.21)
I therefore assume that households only require knowledge of demographic char­
acteristics, current and expected future resources, income and wealth.
Since sections 6.1 and 6.2 have shown that both the probability of being liq­
uidity constrained and of being an assetholder are endogenous, I cannot estimate 
Euler equations treating both characteristics as exogenous. Consequently, I modify 
equation 2.21 to account for selection by including M the Heckman correction 
term for the endogenous selection as an additional regressor. The coefficients on the 
selection correction terms are identified in this analysis by excluding the dummy for 
the poorest region, house ownership (with mortgage and without), sex of household 
head, number of adults in the household, employment status of the household head, 
and education of head from the Euler equation. The analog of 2.17 will be as follows.
A Cft+S =  «« +  vflAu + fFAXa+s + 'f i n  Yit + SHn Wit + +  4 +6 (2.22)
The specification of the equation is similar to that estimated by several authors, 
such as Zeldes (1989), Attanasio and Weber (1995), Shea (1995), Garcia et al. (1997) 
and Japelli et al. (1998). Following Japelli et al. (1998) and Garcia et al. (1997) I 
omit the interest rate from the Euler equation (I only have one cross section Euler 
equation for both samples).17 As a consequence, I do not need to use instrumental
17Since I am asssuming a constant interest rate, I am not considering the channel of liquidity 
constrained households whose cost of borrowing is higher than the return to saving.
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_______________Dependent Variable: A Cft+5 =  ln (C jt+ 5 / C g )__________
Select. (K ):  Asset Split, Risky Assets
Regime (q): UR CNR UNR
Country: Italy UK Italy UK Italy UK
a 0.359 0.91 0.536*** 0.995 0.248 2.592***
(0.43) (0.76) (0.184) (0.36) (0 .21) (0.78)
Ageu -0.006 -0.06** -0.015** -0.031*** -0 .012* -0.03*
(0.013) (0.03) (0 .01) (0 .01) (0 .01) (0 .02)
Ag4 0.410 0.047** 1.194* 0.020 1.092 0.012
(1.27) (0 .02) (0.65) (0.15) (0.67) (0 .02)
AFsizejt+5 0.350** 0.263* 0.449*** 0.349*** 0.420*** 0.463***
(0.14) (0.16) (0.079) (0 .12) (0 .10) (0.14)
AChildj£+5 0.012 -0.015 -0.244*** -0.178* -0.115* -0.015
(0 .10) (0.18) (0.06) (0.09) (0.07) (0.16)
In Yu -0.00008 0.009 -0.003 -0.006 -0.0003 -0.017
(0.006) (0 .02) (0.003) (0.01) (0.004) (0 .02)
In Wa -0.034** -0.012 - - - -
(0.017) (0 .02) - - - -
Married^ -0.037 0.103 -0.004 -0.071 0.079** 0.172*
(0.07) (0.09) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0 .10)
Emplsfi 0.065 0.010 0.040 -0.052 -0.023 -0 .210*
(0.05) (0 .11) (0.03) (0.07) (0.03) (0 .11)
K -0.030 0.582 -0.089 0.453* -0.026 0.625**
Mg
(0.49) (0.47) (0.065) (0.24) (0.09) (0.30)
0.158** 0.580** 0.075 1.286*** -0.035 1.149***
(0.07) (0.26) (0.38) (0.34) (0.09) (0.24)
Notes: U= unconstrained, C=constrained; R=assetholder, NR=non-R. 
Dependent variable is the five-year change in log of non-durable 
consumption. Standards errors in parenthesis. Standards errors 
obtained by bootstrapping (1000 replications) to adjust for the presence
of M g .
*, **, and *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively.
Table 2.6: Euler equation. Asset split
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_______________Dependent Variable: A Cft+5 =  ln (C i t+ 5 /C i t )_________
Select. (K ):  Credit Card, Risky Assets
Regime (q ): UR CNR UNR
Country: Italy UK Italy UK Italy UK
a -0.684 0.842 0.397** .891** 0.484*** 1.136**
(0.87) (0.73) (0.20) (0.38) (0.21) (0.50)
Age# 0.004 -0.068** -0.010* -0.016 -0.019** -0.054***
(0.02) (0.29) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
AZeit -0.562 0.064** 0.773 0.007 1.600** 0.044**
(2.40) (0.03) (0.67) (0.01) (0.70) (0.02)
AFsizejt+5 0.411 0.327** 0.285*** 0.433*** 0.579*** 0.335**
(0.26) (0.16) (0.09) (0.12) (0.08) (0.13)
AChildjt-|-5 -0.085 0.157 -0.091 -0.091 -0.300*** -0.166
(0.18) (0.17) (0.06) (0.11) (0.08) (0.10)
In Yit -0.011 0.018 -0.001 -0.012 -0.002 0.004
(0.01) (0.02) (0.003) (0.01) (0.004) (0.02)
In Wit -0.012 -0.040* - - - -
(0.03) (0.02) - - - -
Married# 0.198 0.090 0.056* 0.012 0.017 0.059
(0.15) (0.10) (0.03) (0.07) (0.04) (0.08)
Emplsit 0.097 0.035 0.028 -0.097 0.003 -0.100
(0.10) (0.10) (0.03) (0.10) (0.04) (0.08)
-0.144 -0.181 -0.135 -0.310** -0.124 -0.272*
M,g
(0.37) (0.32) (0.12) (0.14) (0.14) (0.16)
0.409** 0.262* 0.146 0.382* 0.151 0.363**
(0.16) (0.16) (0.12) (0.21) (0.13) (0.16)
Notes: U=unconstrained, C=constrained; R=assetholder, NR=non-R. 
Dependent variable is the five-year change in log of non-durable 
consumption. Standards errors in parenthesis. Standards errors 
obtained by bootstrapping (1000 replications) to adjust for the presence 
Of M * .
*, **, and *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively.
Table 2.7: Euler Equation. Credit Card split
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variables in the estimation since all regressors are part of the household information 
set. Since the analysis is motivated by the existence of wealth effects coming from 
risky assets, the wealth term is not included in those cases where the household is 
not a risky asset holder. The inclusion of different components of wealth as separate 
regressors is ruled out since comparable disaggregated wealth for both countries 
is not available. Following Zeldes (1989) I assume that family composition (and 
the number of children) and the age of the head at t +  5 are known at time t. 
I include a large number of demographic characteristics (age, age squared, family 
size, number of children, a dummy that equals unity if the spouse works, and a 
dummy for married individuals) to address Attanasio and Weber (1995)’s point 
that excess sensitivity disappears when controlling for those variables. For obvious 
reasons, I do not include time effects since I do not have enough variability in the 
data. Moreover, given that the analysis uses only one cross-section observation, the 
inclusion of a constant prevents the estimation of separate time dummies. This is a 
strong assumption since there may be aggregate expectations errors . 1 8  Shea (1995), 
Japelli et al. (1998) and Garcia et al. (1997), however, only report the estimation 
without time effects after finding that results were qualitatively and quantitatively 
similar. In addition, for the same reason, I do not include fixed household effects in 
the estimation. Japelli et al. (1998) and Garcia et al. (1997) do not include fixed 
household effects either.
Tables 2.6 and 2.7 show the results. In general the negative coefficients on age 
and sometimes positive coefficients on age-squared are consistent with the hump- 
squared pattern of consumption over the life-cycle.
The first regime is the group of unconstrained and risky asset households. When 
the asset split is used in the selection equations, the coefficient of labour income
18The time average of individual forecast errors over T periods should converge to zero as T  —► oo 
assuming forecast errors are unbiased; but an average of forecast errors at a given point in time 
across N individuals surely need not converge to zero as N  —► oo, there may be common components 
in those errors, due to the economy-wide innovations.
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is insignificant, as predicted by the theory of liquidity constraints with both splits 
(asset and credit card). The coefficient on financial assets, however, is significant. 
This violates the PIH, and gives room for wealth effects. In the case of Italy, this 
occurs when the asset split is used, while in the UK this happens with the credit 
card split. The coefficient for Italy is 0.034 while the coefficient for the UK is a 
bit higher (0.04). The second column shows the case for constrained households 
where, contrary to expectations, the labour income coefficients are insignificant for 
both countries, although the sign is correct. The interpretation of the negative 
coefficient on the labour income in levels is that if disposable income at time t 
increases and nothing else in the model changes, consumption will rise today relative 
to tomorrow, lowering the expected growth in consumption. This interpretation 
suggests a negative partial correlation between Xu and Yu. In summary, I do not 
find excess sensitivity although PIH is violated by wealth effects on consumption.
C onsum ption  functions
The log-linear approximation of equation 2.11 will be as follows:
In C = So +  Si f  size +  S^child -I- £ 3  In W  + 64  In Y  +  S^age +  Se In Y p  +  6 7 T  +  e
where fs iz e  is family size, child is number of children, W  is wealth, Y  is current 
labour income, age is age of the household, Y p  is the permanent component of 
labour income1 9  that forecasts expected labour income and T  is a year effect.
This equation is estimated based on 1995 and 2000 data for both countries. 
Results are similar if a two-stage least squares estimation is implemented and more
19Following Parker (1999), I construct the permanent component of labour income as the forecast 
of the log of current labour income from two lags of the log of labour income, education, and age- 
group dummy variables.
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control variables are added.20 The coefficients on the selection correction terms are 
identified in the estimation by excluding age squared, the dummy for the poorest 
region, house ownership (with mortgage and without), sex of household head, marital 
status, number of adults in the household, employment status of the household head, 
employment status of the spouse, and education of head from the consumption 
function.
Tables 2.8 and 2.10 show the results. The first thing to note is the significant co­
efficient of financial wealth in all specifications. The marginal propensity to consume 
out of risky financial assets is estimated to be around 4 percent in both countries. 
A common assumption is that the coefficient of stock market wealth is 0.05 for the 
US. For example, Ludvigson and Steindel (1999) find a marginal propensity to con­
sume out of wealth of 0.04 for aggregate consumption. The fact that this coefficient 
on equity wealth is different from the coefficients on other kinds of wealth (such as 
housing, see Chapter 3) might be explained by the fact that consumers are heteroge­
neous and stock market owners may be systematically older or younger than other 
wealth owners, or may have other distinctive characteristics.
All specifications show, consistent with Parker (1999), a significant correlation 
between consumption and the permanent component of income. Another interesting 
result is that while current income is significant in all specifications for the UK, it 
is only significant for constrained households in Italy. In the presence of liquidity 
constraints, I expect to see a significant coefficient on current income for the con­
strained households. At the same time, however, habit formation applies to both 
constrained and unconstrained individuals, hence the current income coefficient is 
significant in both cases.21 I might therefore interpret the results as owing to the
20Given the limited number of time periods available for the analysis, the use of Generalised 
Method of Moments estimators in the context of single equation, autoregressive-distributed lag 
models was not feasible. (See Bond (2002) for a review of dynamic panel data models).
21Habit formation assumes inertia in preferences. If this is the case, households will adjust their 
behaviour slowly, therefore omitting lags of consumption might explain the significant coefficient of 
income (See Garcia et. al (1997) for a discussion).
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Dependent Variable: Cft  ^ =  ln{Cjt)
Select. (K ): Asset Split, Risky Assets
Regime (q ): UR CNR UNR
Country: Italy UK Italy UK Italy UK
a 11.611*** 5.873*** 10.907*** 6 .221*** 11.550*** 4.628***
(0.15) (0.43) (0.07) (0.16) (0.08) (0.46)
Ageit 0.007*** -0.007* 0.004*** 0.005** 0.003*** 0.005
(0 .001) (0.004) (0 .001) (0 .002) (0.0008) (0.004)
Fsizen 0.159*** 0.168*** 0.157*** 0.153*** 0.172*** 0.177***
(0 .01) (0.03) (0 .01) (0 .02) (0.007) (0.03)
Childn -0.037** -0.063 -0.049*** -0.125*** -0.030*** -0.105**
(0 .02) (0.04) (0 .010) (0 .02) (0 .010) (0.04)
Yit 0.001 0.032*** 0.015*** 0.063*** -0.001 0.066***
(0 .002) (0 .01) (0 .001) (0.006) (0 .001) (0 .01)
Ypu 0.017** 0.095*** 0 .021*** 0.059*** 0.013** 0.071***
(0.008) (0 .02) (0.005) (0 .01) (0.005) (0 .02)
w it 0.034*** 0.037*** - - - -
(0.007) (0 .01) - - - -
Tu -0.182*** -0.349*** -0.072*** -0.308*** -0.160*** -0.346***
(0 .02) (0.05) (0.009) (0.03) (0 .01) (0.051)
-0.343** -0.958*** 0.565*** -1.328*** 0.163*** -0.938***
(0.13) (0.23) (0 .02) (0.14) (0.03) (0.16)
M S -0.442*** -0.02 -1.968*** -2.353*** -0.803*** -0.370***
(0 .02) (0.15) (0.08) (0.17) (0.025) (0.14)
Notes: U=unconstrained, C=constrained; R=assetholder, NR=non-R. 
Standard errors clustered by household in parenthesis.
Standards errors obtained by bootstrapping (1000 replications) to adjust for 
presence of W -£  .
*, **, and *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively.
the
Table 2.8: Consumption Function Regression
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presence of liquidity constraints in Italy and habit formation in the UK. Caution 
is needed when interpreting the coefficient on the income variables, since the time 
effects remove mean long-run correlations (see Parker (1999) for details).
2.7 Conclusion
I analysed the structure of financial household portfolios by looking at the deter­
minants of risky assets for two European countries -the  UK and Italy. Households 
have shifted towards riskier portfolios by substituting stocks and bonds for bank 
accounts in both countries. Differences remain, however. In 2000, while 24 percent 
of households held stocks in the UK, only 18 percent did in Italy (26 and 8 percent 
respectively in 1995).
I used a standard life-cycle model of consumption, augmented to include liquid­
ity constrained consumers and risky financial assetholders who behave differently 
from other households. I estimated an endogenous switching model with the switch 
depending on two criterion functions to analyse the endogeneity process behind liq­
uidity constraints and stocks and bond-ownership. My main argument was that if 
assetholders are prevented from investing in capital markets, then the consumption 
of the households that are in the market should be higher than those that are outside 
the market. An example of that is the case of households that are poor, which do not 
feel that the fixed costs of investment required to access capital markets are worth 
the potential payoff. The key issue is that increased participation in capital markets 
affects both households already in the market and asset prices, while the expecta­
tion of entering the market affects those that are not in the market. Furthermore, 
endogenous changes in capital stock have effects on all households.
I found that the value of financial assets had a significant impact on consumption 
in both countries, whilst high frequency studies find little relationship (a marginal 
propensity to consume out of financial assets of 0.04).
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Results axe not clear with respect to liquidity constraints. I found no evidence 
of excess sensitivity in the Euler equations. By analysing the standard consumption 
function equation, however, I found some evidence of liquidity constraints in Italy 
and of habit formation in the UK.
The task of finding empirical differences in the impact of monetary policy on 
output and prices is difficult. It is clear that there are cross-country differences in 
the financial structure, as we have seen in the third section of the chapter, but their 
direct translation to output and prices is not clear-cut due to different forces that 
can offset each other. In addition, using different models can bring different results 
for the same country as we saw in the case of liquidity constraints.
The financial structures are expected to converge in Europe and effects are ex­
pected to become more homogeneous. The convergence, however, can be slow and 
the asymmetry may have important consequences for the harmonized monetary pol­
icy of the ECB.
2.8 Appendix
2 .8 .1  D escrip tion  o f  th e  C onstru cted  V ariables 
Asset-based separable rule
I use an asset-income ratio split based on Zeldes (1989): specifically, I categorise a 
household as liquidity constrained if the ratio of wealth to the average disposable 
income in t and  ^— 1 is less than 2/12.
M ore direct measures o f constraints
Japelli, Pischke, and Souleles (1998) discuss some drawbacks of splitting the sample 
on the basis of wealth: 1) Since there is not a monotonic relationship between 
wealth and liquidity constraints, a household with zero or negative wealth has not
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necessarily reached the limit. 2) The fact that assets and income are poorly measured 
overstates the number of low-asset households. Therefore, they use direct indicators 
of credit constraints:
•  Self-reported indicators of whether people were turned down for loans.
• Credit card ownership.
•  Availability of a credit line
Only the second measure is available for both datasets, therefore for compa­
rability reasons I use only credit card ownership.
Real disposable income
The disposable income variable is income after taxes deflated by the Department of 
Social Security monthly price index before housing costs for the BHPS data and the 
Consumer Price Index for the SHIW data.
Consumption
The basic theory of consumption is applicable to the flow of consumption and so 
durable consumption is excluded from the definition used here. Durable consumption 
is not a service flow from the existing stock but replacements and additions to the 
asset stock.
The BHPS consumption measure does not include expenditures on shoes and 
clothing.
A sset values
The value of the different types of wealth were reported in intervals in both datasets 
(BHPS and SHIW) and for the purposes of this paper, I use mid-points of the bands 
to estimate asset holdings.
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In the BHPS the calculation of single estimates of household wealth in each 
subcategory of financial wealth is not straightforward since it is not always clear 
whether assets are held solely by an individual or jointly with someone else (every 
individual is asked “Are your investments jointly held with someone else?”). I ad­
dress this issue by using an upper bounding approach under the assumption that 
any jointly-held asset classes are actually held solely by the individual.22
Drawbacks also exist in using household survey data, such as measurement error, 
sample size and non-random non-response. In particular, BHPS data on net wealth 
is not fully comparable between 1995 and 2000 because debt in 2000 includes student 
loans and overdrafts whereas the 1995 survey did not include them. Moreover, the 
amount of investments seem to be overstated in 1995 (see Banks et al. (2002) for 
details).
2.8 .2  D efin ition  o f  variables  
BH PS
Age: “Age at 1.12.XX”.
Region: “Live in north?
1 if Inner London, Outer London, R. of South East, South West, East Anglia, 
East Midlands.
0 if West Midlands Conurb, R. of West Midlands, Greater Manchester, Mersey­
side, R. of North West, South Yorkshire, West Yorkshire, R. of Yorks & Humber, 
Tyne & Wear, R. of North, Wales and Scotland”
Ownhome: “Own home?
1 if Owned or on mortgage, Shared ownership
2 if Rented, Rent free, Other”
22 Banks et al. (2003) compute two measures, an upper and lower bound. The latter is computed 
under the assumption that an individual only owns 1/Nth of the asset class in which joint ownership 
is reported. They show that the results appear not to be sensitive to the choice of measure.
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OwnOmort: “Own home without mortgage?
1 if Owned outright
2 if Buying mortgage/loan, Inapplicable”
Ownlmort: “Own home with mortgage?
1 if Buying mortgage/loan
2 if Owned outright, Inapplicable”
Sex: “Sex
1 if Male
2 if Female”
Ms2: “Marital Status
1 if Married, Living as Couple
2 if Child under 16, Widowed, Divorced, Separated, Never married”
Fsize: “Number of persons in household”
Child: “Number of own children in household”
Adult: “Number of persons in employment in household”
Emplh: “Head employed?
1 if Self-employed, Employed
0 if Unemployed, Retired, Maternity Leave, Family Care, Full Time Student, 
Long Term Sick/disability, Government training scheme, Waiting the take up a job
Empls: “Spouse employed?
1 if Yes
0 if No”
Educ: “Highest academic qualification:
1 if None, CSE
2 if 0  Level
3 if HND, HNC, Teaching, A Level
4 if Higher Degree, 1st Degree”
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Selfemp: “Self-employed?
1 if Self-Employed
2 if Employee
SHIW
Age: “No. of years”
Region: “Live in south?
1 if South
2 if North, Central Regions 
Ownhome: “Own home?
1 if Property
2 if Rented, With Right of redemption, usufruct, free use 
Housloan: “Debts for real estate purchase-renovation?”
1 if yes
2 if no
OwnOloan: “Own home without debt?”
1 if own home and no debts for real estate purchase-renovation
2 otherwise
Ownlloan: “Own home with debt?”
1 if own home and debts for real estate purchase-renovation
2 otherwise 
Sex: “Sex
1 if Male
2 if Female
Ms: “Marital Status:
1 if Married, Cohabitant
2 if Single, Separated, Divorced, Widow
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Fsize: “Nunber of household members”
Child: “Number of children”
Adult: “Number of income receivers”
Emplh: “Head employed?”
1 if Blue Collar, Apprentice, White Collar (low level), Teacher, White Collar 
(high level), Manager, Head Master, Magistrate, University Teacher, Professional 
Man, Entrepreneur, Self Employed, Owner, Assistant of a Family Firm, Partner in 
a company
2 if seeking first occupation, unemployed, housewife, independently wealthy, re­
tired from work, retired not from work, student, pre-school age child, serving in the 
army, other not professional conditions, other.
Empls: “Spouse employed?
1 if Blue Collar, Apprentice, White Collar (low level), Teacher, White Collar 
(high level), Manager, Head Master, Magistrate, University Teacher, Professional 
Man, Entrepreneur, Self Employed, Owner, Assistant of a Family Firm, Partner in 
a company.
2 if Seeking first occupation, unemployed, housewife, independently wealthy, 
retired from work, retired not from work, student, pre-school age child, serving in 
the army, other not professional conditions, other.
Educ: “Education:
1 if No Schooling
2 if Elementary School (5 years)
3 if Junior High (8 years), High School Diploma (13 years)
4 if B.A./B.S. (17 years), Specialization
Self: “Self-employed?”
1 if self employed
2 otherwise
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2 .8 .3  C om parison  o f  D a ta  b etw een  th e  SH IW  and  th e  B H P S
1995,2000 SHIW BHPS
Variable Mean Mean
Age, years 54.60 50.95
Family Size 2.9 2.4
Male, fraction 0.70 0.66
Married, fraction 0.71 0.53
1st degree, fraction 0.08 0.43
A levels, fraction 0.31 0.22
CHAPTER 2. WEALTH EFFECTS IN EUROPE 125
SHIW(1991-2000)
1.Real estate value, firm’s assets, valuables
2.Bank current account, personal savings, 
certificates of deposit
3.Postal accounts and deposits, 
postal interest bearing bonds
4. Treasury bills, treasury certificates, 
long term treasury bonds
5. Zero coupon bonds, other government bonds, 
non government bonds, foreign government bonds
6 . Investment funds shares, stocks of listed companies, 
stocks of privatized companies,
stocks of unlisted companies, 
shareholding (limited companies and partnership), 
foreign stocks
7. Debts for real estate purchase/renoval; 
valuable goods purchase; transport purchase; 
furniture, electric appliance purchase; 
nondurable goods purchase or other reasons
BHPS (1995/2000)
1. Value of property, value of second property, 
value of car less amount outstanding
2 .Regular savings in banks, 
building societies and Post Office, 
non-regular savings (including TESSAs and ISAs)
3. Not available
4. National Savings Certificates
5. Premium bonds; National Saving,
Building Society, Insurance Bonds
6 . Unit 'Rusts, Personal Equity Plan,
Shares (UK or Foreign), other investment,
government or corporate securities
7. Total mortgage on all property; Debts for 
hire purchase, personal loan, credit card, 
mail order purchase, DSS Social Fund Loan, 
loan from individual overdraft, student loan, 
joint commitment or something else a,
Net W orth=l+2+3+4+5+6-7 Net Worth=l+2+4+5-t-6-7
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SHIW (1989-2000) BHPS (1991-2000)
1. Transportation expenditure
2. Furnishing, electric appliance expenditure 2 . Amount spent on consumer durables (TV, VCR, 
deep freeze, washer, tumble drier, dish washer, 
microwave, computer, CD player, satellite, 
cable TV, telephone), home improvements
3. Non durable consumption 3. Food and grocery bill, expenditure on gas/oil/electric, 
childcare, mortgage or rent costs
Durable Consumption: 1-1-2 Durable Consumption: 2
Non-durable Consumption: 3 Non-durable Consumption: 3
Consumption: 1+2+3 Consumption: 2+3
2.8 .4  C orrection  term s for each sam ple se lec tio n  regim e
Following Tunali (1986), the correction terms for each sample selection regime are 
as follows:
For P C (1) = { i t  \ L*t > 0 , R*t > 0} :
For PC  (2) = { i t  \ L 't < 0  , > 0} :
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lt $2 ( - 4 7 L, z i t l R i - p )
“ $ 2 (~ 4 t 4 > 4 4 ,  ~ p)
For P C  (3) =  { it | >  0 , i l j  <  0} :
* ( W ( - g )
** $2 (4 7 L, - Z i t l 11, - P)
“ $ 2 ( 4 7 L> - 4 4 ,  -p )
For P C  (4) =  { «  | LJ < 0 , J $  <  0} :
M , t  $2 ( - 4 4 ,  - 4 4 ,  p )
mS = - H44) *{ -*& $ £ )
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Italy UK
Dependent variable:
Credit Card Risky Assets Credit Card Risky Assets
Variables Coeff. T-Stat. Coeff. T-Stat. Coeff. T-Stat. Coeff. T-Stat.
Constant 0.453 3.24 -5.334 -21.97 2.665 18.57 -3.685 -22.07
Age -0.014 -3.02 0.030 4.49 -0.053 -9.65 0.051 8.21
Age2 0.000 2.58 -0.000 -4.35 0.000 9.53 -0.000 -7.28
Region 0.502 22.38 0.665 -18.57 0.031 3.25 -0.027 -2.41
Ownlmort -0.056 -1.52 -0.302 -5.20 -0.643 -16.05 0.867 18.57
OwnOmort -0.116 -5.01 -0.289 -5.71 -0.750 -16.99 0.777 16.01
Sex -0.051 -1.76 0.150 3.95 0.024 0.62 0.145 3.49
MS -0.058 -1.79 0.081 1.85 -0.221 -5.30 0.047 1.05
Fsize 0.028 1.37 -0.096 -5.87 0.039 1.75 -0.075 -4.48
Child 0.004 0.16 - - 0.077 2.89 - -
Adult - - 0.104 4.91 - - -0.047 -1.42
Emplh -0.090 -3.17 - - -0.511 -12.68 - -
Empls -0.100 -3.93 0.076 2.15 -0.085 -2.15 0.012 0.25
Educ -0.074 -4.49 0.463 18.41 -0.356 -21.61 0.272 16.62
Wage - - 0.013 3.17 - - 0.035 5.11
Selfemp - - 0.003 0.06 - - 0.050 -0.95
FWealth - - 0.199 9.80 - - 0.084 20.27
Year Effect -0.150 -7.60 0.374 14.23 -0.165 -6.72 0.151 5.13
P u L UR -0.171 (-10.26) -0.272(-12.72)
Log likelihood 
No. Obs
-16267.563
16136
-10176.477
10183
Notes: t-statistics calculated with robust standard errors clustered by household 
corrected for heteroskedasticity. Sample: 1995, 2000.
p . ,L  .  r  controls for common determinants of liquidity constrains and asset
it * i t
holding equations, not fully captured by the explanatory variables.
and
Table 2.9: Selection Equations. Credit Card split
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Dependent Variable: Cft^ =  ln(Cit)
Select. (K ): Credit Card, Risky Assets
Regime (q ): UR CNR UNR
Country: Italy UK Italy UK Italy UK
a 11.786*** 7.495*** 11.501*** 6.290*** 10.836*** 7.640***
(0.29) (0.40) (0.07) (0 .20) (0.08) (0.29)
Ageit 0 .012*** -0.021*** 0.003*** -0.006** 0.007*** -0 .010***
(0 .002) (0.004) (0 .001) (0.003) (0 .001) (0.003)
Fsizeu 0.150*** 0.168*** 0.161*** 0.197*** 0.161*** 0.103***
(0 .02) (0.03) (0.007) (0 .02) (0.009) (0 .02)
Childit -0.027 -0.034 -0.042*** -0.117*** -0.066*** 0.021
(0 .02) (0.04) (0.008) (0.03) (0 .01) (0.03)
Yit 0.0005 0.024** 0.004*** 0.063*** 0 .012*** 0.054***
(0 .002) (0 .01) (0.001) (0 .01) (0 .001) (0 .01)
Ypu 0.033*** 0.041* 0.009** 0.019 0.039*** 0.046***
(0 .01) (0 .02) (0.004) (0 .01) (0.005) (0.017)
Wu 0.036*** 0.037*** - - - -
(0 .01) (0.007) - - - -
Tit -0.161*** -0.315*** -0.170*** -0.244*** -0.138*** -0.268***
(0 .02) (0.05) (0.01) (0.04) (0 .01) (0.04)
M tt 0.214* 0.862*** 0.061 0.562*** -0.089** 0.569***
(0 .11) (0.19) (0.04) (0.08) (0.04) (0 .10)
M S -0.448*** 0.398*** -1.096*** 0.407*** -1.196*** 0.230**
(0.06) (0 .10) (0.03) (0.13) (0.04) (0.09)
Notes: U= unconstrained, C=constrained; R=assetholder, NR=non-R.
Standard errors clustered by household in parenthesis.
Standards errors obtained by bootstrapping (1000 replications) to adjustfor the 
presence of W #  .
*, **, and *** denote significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively.
Table 2.10: Consumption Function Equation. Credit Card split
Chapter 3
Real Effects of Regional House 
Prices: Dynamic Panel 
Estim ation with Heterogeneity
This chapter uses recently developed methods for estimating dynamic heterogeneous 
cointegrated panel data models - which allow for heterogeneity in parameters and 
dynamics across agents - to study housing wealth effects in a dynamic model of the 
50 US states and the District of Columbia from the 1970s to the 1990s. The results 
show that housing prices have a unit root and are cointegrated with consumption. 
Even though an aging population has some effect on consumption in some states, it 
cannot account for the heterogeneity in housing wealth elasticities. Finally, I  find 
that when state heterogeneity is taken into account, housing capital gains translate 
into increased spending with an elasticity ranging from 0.15 to 0.23.
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3.1 Introduction
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Over the past few years, the US has experienced a housing boom, with prices con­
tinuing to rise at higher rates than in the 1980s. Figure 3.1 shows how real housing 
prices have risen steadily since 1994.
-61
-58
-55
-52
-49
-46
-43
Figure 3.1: Real Housing Prices
In recent years, housing prices in most parts of the US have, rather surprisingly, 
stayed high despite the downturn in the economy. This has coincided with the decline 
in the stock market. The apparent firmness of housing prices has been explained 
by the drop in mortgage interest rates and by the combination of a strong housing 
demand and the stability of housing supply1.
The importance of housing wealth and the mortgage debt available against this 
wealth has increased over the last 20 years in the US. In 1982 the ratio of debt to 
home equity was 0.43 while in 2002 it reached 0.80 (See Table 3.1). Of the increase
1See Krainer (2002) for a discussion.
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1972 1976 1982 1986 1992 1996 2002
Home equity 3234 3380 4497 5654 5461 5435 7587
Mortgage Debt 1498 1649 1933 2703 3666 4102 6054
Mortgage Debt/Home equity .46 .49 .43 .48 .67 .75 .80
Note: All figures are in 2002 billions of dollars
Source: Federal Reserve Flow of Funds of Accounts (Table B.100)
Table 3.1: Home Equity and Mortgage Debt
in housing stock, the greater part has been due to changes in the relative value 
of houses. Figure 3.2 shows that inflation-adjusted home prices explain most of 
the changes in real home equity. Increases in home prices have outpaced overall 
inflation for the last decade, so widespread home price inflation has lifted household 
net worth. Despite huge gains in stocks during the 1990s, housing assets still account 
for much of the wealth of most Americans. Home equity remains the cornerstone 
of household wealth, even among the majority of homeowners who also have stock 
holdings. In 1998 around 50 percent of homeowners held at least 50 percent of their 
wealth in home equity. Less than one half of all households hold stocks and the 
top one percent own one-third of the total value. In addition, because property 
prices are much less volatile than share prices, there should be far less uncertainty 
surrounding gains and losses in property wealth.
This motivates the interesting question of whether housing prices have influenced 
the real economy significantly.
Over the 25 years from 1970 to 1995 house price inflation at the national level 
moved roughly in line with the consumer price index (CPI) inflation. (Figure 3.3 
plots house price inflation and CPI inflation since 1976). Given this close comove­
ment it was hard to identify the effect of housing wealth on consumption. In the last 
few years the movement of house price inflation and CPI inflation has been different. 
Figure 3.3 shows how since 1995, the series have grown apart. This suggests that 
the relative effect of housing and CPI prices and home equity on consumption may 
be identified with national aggregates. However, the close correlation between na-
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Figure 3.2: Real Home Equity and Real Housing Prices
tional housing prices and CPI has obscured the degree of heterogeneity and diversity 
between states. Looking at the state level allows us to examine the high degree of 
diversity and helps to identify the effects of housing prices on consumption.
Traditionally, empirical work on housing prices has focused on national level 
aggregate data, although micro-econometric studies have increased recently. I use 
state level data in order to exploit cross-sectional variation and at the same time 
reduce the measurement error included in micro-data. The same idea has been 
explored by Case et al. (2001) but this chapter improves the methodology used and 
comes to some different conclusions. In particular, this paper takes into account 
the long-term relationship between consumption, labour income and housing prices 
in order to estimate the effects of housing on consumption. As a consequence, the
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Figure 3.3: CPI Inflation and House Price Inflation
estimated effect of housing prices on consumption more than doubles that of Case 
et al. (2001). In addition, this chapter explores possible sources of heterogeneity 
among state estimates.
A national housing bubble has been denied by some economists, yet local infla­
tions have appeared in New York and parts of California (The Economist, March 
6, 2003). Figures 3.4, 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7 show the log level of housing prices in four 
regions: the Northeast, Midwest, South and West. There is an obvious change in 
behaviour from the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. Before, hous­
ing prices were very volatile, whilst they have been relatively smooth since. Similar 
patterns of boom and bust were followed by new construction before the 1990s. Nar 
tional data masks heterogeneity across states and regions: the plots show that only
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in the Northeast is there coherence amongst states. In the other regions, particularly 
the West, there is more diversity within a region than between regions. Average an­
nual housing prices have appreciated in the West and in the Northeast during the 
1976-96 period, while real prices declined in the South and Midwest. The timing of 
the real price changes also differs between regions. In the 1970s, real prices more 
than doubled in the West, while homes in the Northeast gained only 17 percent. 
During the late 1980s, real prices declined in all regions except the Northeast. De­
spite reductions at the end of the decade, real prices in the Northeast climbed 39 
percent between 1980 and 1990. Homes in the West declined in value by nearly 10 
percent, and those in the South and Midwest lost more than 20 percent of their real 
value.
The contribution of this chapter is twofold: it describes the time series properties 
of state housing prices in the US and it shows how housing prices are related to con­
sumption taking into account state heterogeneity, demography and homeownership 
rates.
Since there is a great diversity of state housing market activity in the US, it will 
be necessary to study state disaggregated consumer spending and housing prices in 
order to allow inter-state and regional differences and, then, achieve a tighter esti­
mation. The model will seek to overcome the drawbacks of national level aggregate 
data in imposing equal slope parameters across states. In addition, since individuals 
in states can borrow from each other, each state in the panel is considered as an open 
economy where shocks can be transmitted through the housing and credit markets. 
To this end, I will use state cross-sectional and quarterly time-series data for the 
period 1975:1 to 1996:4. The choice of state data for this exercise is explained by the 
fact that wealth effects coming from housing prices are locally driven - while wealth 
effects coming from the stock market and capital inflows are nationally driven. The 
study will estimate dynamic heterogeneous panel models and will allow for spillover
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effects between states.
The chapter is organized as follows: section 2 assesses the links between housing 
wealth and consumption and reviews the empirical literature; section 3 describes 
the behaviour of state housing prices in the United States; section 4 shows efficient 
ways of modelling state variables such as consumption and housing prices; section 5 
compares and contrast my results with Case et al. (2001); and section 6 concludes.
3.2 Theoretical Assessm ent o f the Links betw een H ous­
ing W ealth and Consumption: A n Empirical Liter­
ature Review
The fact that consumer spending has amounted to about 90 percent of income has 
led some earlier analysts to suppose that income alone could explain consumption. 
Yet different studies have shown that wealth can explain up to one fifth of total 
consumption. Income and wealth do not move tightly together over time, and their 
relationship is generally not stable. As a consequence, the behaviour of wealth 
represents an additional instrument in understanding consumption.
Housing prices can have an effect on consumption through both the easing of 
liquidity constraints and wealth effects. The easing of liquidity constraints is very 
intuitive. If households are liquidity constrained, access to credit against the value of 
the house would alleviate the constraint. Rising house prices increase house equity. 
Households can choose to sell the house or to refinance their mortgages (taking a loan 
on the increase of the house value) and take cash in the process. House appreciation 
is therefore a determinant of consumption. Households can trade up for better 
houses, purchase goods and services and accumulate resources for retirement. In 
addition, even for homeowners who do not refinance, the increase in home equity 
leads to a rise in consumer confidence.
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Wealth effects are, however, more difficult to quantify, since different forces go 
in opposite directions. Some households choose to move to smaller houses when 
they get older. These downsizers are better off when housing prices increase relative 
to other prices and they can therefore increase their consumption. At the same 
time, house price appreciation undermines affordability, especially for first-buyers 
who are struggling to save for their downpayment and qualify for a mortgage. In 
addition, some households who own small houses want to move to larger houses, 
and these upsizers might respond to the increase of housing prices by reducing 
their consumption. Determining the relative magnitude of these effects is difficult. 
The Governor of the Federal Reserve Board, Edward M. Gramlich2, suggested that 
downsizers generally have higher marginal propensities to consume out of housing 
wealth than upsizers since downsizers tend to be older and have more time to smooth 
consumption, whilst upsizers tend to be liquidity constrained. According to that 
hypothesis, housing prices might have a positive effect on consumption. In the end, 
the relative response of downsizers and upsizers is an empirical question.
In section 4 ,1 will estimate the wealth effect of changes in housing prices. Before 
that, I summarize the previous literature dealing with housing effects on consump­
tion that use different data than my own.
Some studies have tried to answer the question of whether housing wealth has 
an effect on the real economy. McFadden (1994a, 1994b) finds that the impact of 
house price changes on consumer welfare are quite small (and predicts that housing 
prices will be stable for generations to come). Lettau and Ludvigson (2001) argue 
that temporary movements in asset values are often not associated with aggregate 
consumption movements, and only permanent changes in wealth affect consumption. 
However, Skinner (1996) suggests that one of the reasons why housing wealth is
2Remarks by Governor Edward M. Gramlich: “Consumption and the Wealth Effect: The United 
States and the United Kingdom”. Before the International Bond Congress, London, UK. February 
20, 2002.
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important for consumption is that there are regional fluctuations in housing prices 
even when national housing prices are flat.
Bosworth, Burtless and Sabelhaus (1991) argue that capital gains may have 
contributed to lower savings rates since savings rates of homeowners fell much more 
than those of nonhomeowners since the 1960s. They claim that the boom in housing 
prices may have contributed to reduced household savings. They also find that 
the decline for homeowners is pronounced in the middle age group. Summers and 
Carroll (1987) also argue that the growth in mortgage debt during the previous eight 
years has increased consumer spending and depressed private savings. Manchester 
and Poterba (1989) find that the incidence of second-mortgage borrowing rose from 
1.5 percent of all mortgages in 1970 to 10.8 percent in 1987 and was concentrated 
in the middle age group. Their view is that increased access to second mortgages 
has reduced personal savings. Some second mortgages axe incurred when a home is 
purchased, but post-acquisition second mortgages have grown faster. An alternative 
possibility is that households could have used second mortgages to invest in other 
assets or to repay other debts, although the majority of households used the second 
mortgages to make home improvements. They find that while net housing equity 
does not have a significant impact on second mortgage probabilities, accrued capital 
gains have a significant effect on second mortgage probabilities.
Aoki, Proudman and Vlieghe (2002) apply the financial accelerator mechanism3 
proposed by Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) to the household sector and show 
that fluctuations in housing prices significantly affect the value of houses as collateral 
and influence borrowing conditions for households in the UK. Their model is based 
on the macroeconomic effects of imperfections in credit markets that generate premia 
on the external cost of raising funds. They find that endogenous developments in
3The mechanism goes as follows: when house prices fall, households that are moving home 
have a smaller net worth available for the purchase of the new house. Therefore they will get 
less favourable mortgage interest rates when renegotiating their mortgage, and have less scope for 
extracting additional equity to finance consumption.
CHAPTER 3. REAL EFFECTS OF REGIONAL HOUSE PRICES 139
credit markets such as variations in collateral or net worth amplify shocks to the 
economy. Consequently, a positive shock to the economy causes a rise in housing 
demand that leads to a rise in housing prices and an increase in homeowners’ net 
worth. This decreases the external finance premium that leads to a further rise in 
consumption demand. Muelbauer and Murphy (1993, 1995, 1997) also argue that 
changes in housing values can change the borrowing opportunities of constrained 
households via a collateral effect.
3.2 .1  T h e  Standard  M odel
The theory of consumer behaviour has been described by Friedman (1957), Ando 
and Modigliani (1963) and Gafi (1990) among others. The latter develops a model 
for time-series analysis of aggregate consumption which dispenses with the assump­
tion of an infinite-lived representative consumer4. Therefore the model preserves the 
main features of the explicitly aggregated life-cycle models (Ando and Modigliani, 
1963) but gains the tractability of the infinite-horizon model in terms of its econo­
metric implementation. The life-cycle models account for two factors: (a) finite 
horizons and (b) a life-cycle profile for individual labor income characterized by re­
tirement in a late stage of the cycle. Therefore the models assume the existence of 
annuity markets whenever there is uncertainty about death.
Gafi (1990) proposes a discrete-time, quadratic-utility, open economy version of 
the overlapping-generations framework in Blanchard (1985) where each consumer 
born at time s maximizes his expected present discounted value of utility as follows:
oo
m axEt (1 +  S)~j  (1 -  p ) 3 U (cs,t+j) , (3.1)
j =o
4The infinite-horizon model appears as a special case of the model by a specific configuration of 
values for those parameters.
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subject to
W8,t+i+j = Wstt+j (1 +  z) +  yla,t+j ~  cs,t+ji (3-2)
lim (1 +  z)~j W8,t+j =  0, (3.3)j-* oo
for j=0,l,2,..., and where c is consumption, W  is nonhuman wealth, yl is labour 
income, and x8,t is the value of variable x  at time £, for a consumer born in period 
s. S is the discount rate. Etxs,t+j denotes the expected value of x 8ft+j conditional 
on the consumer being alive in period t+ j, given the information available at time 
t. Equations 3.2 and 3.3 are the budget constraint and transversality condition, 
respectively. Individuals are born with zero financial wealth.
Gali (1990) derives from this model the aggregate consumption that is given by
ct = H +  (3yk +  zW t +  ut, (3.4)
where
P ~ ( z  + a) '  (z + a) '
OO
ut = p  ^ 2  (i +  z}~3 11 -  a y  (Et ^yk+ j -  v) •
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and (1 -I- z) =  (1 +  r) (1 +  p)-1 , with (1 4- r) being the pure interest rate and (1 +  p)-1 
the annuity rate; a  is the rate by which services supplied by an individual consumer 
is assumed to decline; and [l — E  (Ayl)\s assumed.
Equation 3.4 establishes a linear relationship between aggregate consumption, 
labour income and nonhuman wealth in line with the life-cycle model of Ando and 
Modigliani (1963). Its aggregation properties generate a simple relationship be­
tween the coefficients of the consumption equation and the underlying structural 
parameters. The model is constructed based on the maintained hypothesis that the 
aggregate labour income is a unit-root process with drift and implies that W  and 
c are also unit-root processes, and both ut and A W  are stationary. Therefore, the 
model implies a common trend in c, yl and W .
In this model, an unexpected increase in wealth will raise consumption over the 
lifetime. Agents will consume more today and save less. Aggregate, planned con­
sumption is explained by labour income and wealth. However, actual consumption 
is not always equal to planned consumption due to several factors such as adjust­
ment costs, habit formation in consumption and liquidity constraints. Adjustment 
costs can prevent consumers from adjusting their housing services within each pe­
riod. If habit persistence is in place, households adjust their consumption towards 
the equilibrium level slowly. Capital restrictions prevent individuals from smooth­
ing consumption by borrowing, hence these liquidity constrained consumers follow 
current consumption more closely. For these reasons I allow adjustment lags in the 
consumption function. In this sense, consumption will adjust to the planned level 
with an error correction dynamic specification.
3 .2 .2  T h e  C on sum p tion  F unction  incorporatin g  H ou sin g  W ealth
In what follows I will estimate aggregrated consumption functions at the state level 
and investigate the role of housing prices as a proxy for housing wealth. I will follow
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an Error Correction Model (ECM) for the estimation:
( k \  m  m  k+ ~  Vit- 1 I +  ^ 2  la^V it-s  +  ^  7j« AXjtt-a (3-5)j=l J  8=1 8=1 j=1
with yi = 0 i + Y2j=i Pjxji being the long-run relationship and where Xjit stands 
for labour income and housing prices and yn for consumption.
By using an ECM I maintain the rationality implied by the Euler equation in 
the long-run, but I relax it in the short-run, where agents and households may 
be subject to various frictions. The ECM allows one to distinguish between the 
long-run relationship among the variables of interest and the short-run variation 
around the equilibrium. Even though the optimization is based on the long-run 
relationship, modelling the short-run dynamics is necessary for a  proper description 
of the process. The idea is that outside forces drive the common stochastic trends 
in consumption, income and housing, whilst short-run shocks divert consumption, 
income and housing prices from their planned time paths. Adding the latter to the 
ECM improves the fit of the regression.
Unfortunately, there is no series of housing wealth by state available5. However, I 
will calculate a proxy in section 5 to facilitate comparison. Since the major variation 
in housing wealth comes from changes in housing prices, I estimate the consumption 
functions using housing prices instead of housing wealth in this section. Another 
series that is missing at a state level is consumption. I proxy it by Retail Sales 
(See the Appendix for detailed description of the data). I calculate real per capita 
retail sales by deflating by the calculated state CPI and using interpolated state 
population following Chow and Lin (1971). This is because population estimates by
5 In addition, there are no series of stock wealth and high frequency demand deposits (non-equity 
financial wealth) by state either. A calculation of a proxy for them will imply too strong assumptions 
leading to misleading results.
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state are only available on an annual basis.
Our long-run equilibrium consumption equation extends from 1975:1 to 1996:4 
and uses real per capita retail sales (real per capita consumption, hereafter), real 
per capita labour income and real housing prices.
The decision of whether to pool the data will depend both on the degree of 
heterogeneity and on the purpose of the exercise. I want to estimate a dynamic 
consumption model from a panel set of data in which I have a number of economic 
units (states in the US) i =  1,2, ...,1V (51 states) and a number of times series 
observations, t = 1,2, ...,T  (T=88, from 1975ql to 1996q4). Since both T  and N  
are relatively large, two issues arise. First, time series are usually non-stationary 
and certain combinations of them are stationary (I deal with this issue in the next 
two subsections). Second, because of the large T, I can estimate a regression for 
each state, parameters can vary a lot among states, and so heterogeneous panels 
should be considered (This issue is addressed further below).
Ando and Modigliani’s model does not imply that there is a cointegrating re­
lationship among consumption, labour income and wealth. Rather, it says that 
consumption is linearly related to labour income and wealth. As seen above, Gall 
(1990) however, shows that consumption, income and wealth share a common trend. 
Therefore, if variables under study are unit root, estimates would be not consistent 
unless consumption is cointegrated with income and wealth variables.
3.3 H ousing Prices in the U nited States
3.3 .1  H ou se  P rice  Inflation  versus C P I Inflation
One of the most interesting features of Figure 3.3 is that annual home price inflation 
is currently well above consumer price inflation. In addition, differentials in house 
price inflation tend to be persistent. One explanation for this is that house price
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changes are persistent themselves. Asset prices are expected to adjust automatically 
to the new information on the fundamental value, yet housing prices appear to 
adjust gradually. Krainer (2002) points to two possible reasons. First, housing 
markets might be inefficient because either the market does not clear automatically 
or housing price expectations are backward-looking. And second, housing prices 
themselves depend on persistent variables such as employment growth and changes 
in personal income.
Cecchetti et al. (2000) find that price level divergences across US cities are 
temporary although persistent. They show that the relative price levels among cities 
mean revert at an exceptionally slow rate due to a combination of transportation 
costs, differential speeds of adjustment to small and large shocks, and the inclusion 
of non-traded good prices in the overall price index.
Table 3.2 explores this idea for both real house price inflation and CPI inflation 
for the US state data and gives the highest and lowest 10 and 20-year rate of housing 
price real appreciation and CPI6 inflation in each state. The table shows big fluc­
tuations in real state housing prices and, most importantly, big differences among 
states in the same period. These localized price declines/increases affect household 
networth and contribute to the stress on financial institutions. For instance, while 
Massachusetts had the highest housing price inflation rate of 11.42, North Dakota 
had the lowest (4.23) during the period 1975-1985. At the same time, the highest 
CPI inflation rate was Ohio with 7.64 and the lowest New York with 6.35. The 
difference between the maximum and minimum is larger for the 1975-85 period than 
for the 1986-96 and, as expected, decreases as the sample increases. As Cecchetti et 
al. (2000) point out, inflation differences seem to reverse themselves since the high
6These are state consumer prices indexes. In the previous literature, national CPI has been used 
in order to deflate nominal variables. This is due to the fact that state CPI was not available. CPI 
is available at a national level for the four Census Regions and for 26 Metropolitan Statistical Areas 
(MSAs), Primary Metropolitan Statistical Areas (PMSAs) and Cities. This study, however, takes 
into account regional differences in CPI by matching each state with the closest MSA, PMSA or 
city CPIs. Appendix 1 lists the CPI used and the matching with each state.
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inflation during the period 1986-96 period is preceded by a relatively low rate during 
the previous decade (as the New York case shows). House price changes, however, 
behave in a different way. While on average the difference between the state with 
the highest and the lowest inflation rate is 0.35 percentage points for the whole pe­
riod, the same average for changes in housing prices is 4.09 percentage points. The 
speed of adjustment for CPI rates is slow, and it takes over 20 years for state CPI 
rates to converge. The speed of convergence of housing prices, however, is too slow, 
suggesting that real house price differentials can persist indefinitely, that is, housing 
prices in one state can deviate from that in another by an arbitrarily large amount. 
To this end, the next section will employ panel data procedures to study whether 
or not real housing prices between states are unit root processes. The econometric 
models used to deal with the problem of heterogeneity of housing price effects on 
consumption are presented in section 4.
Index Sample Maximum State Minimum State Differential
Real House Price 1975-1985 11.42 Massachusetts 4.23 North Dakota 7.19
Inflation 1986-1996 7.10 Oregon .51 Alaska 6.59
1975-1996 7.55 California 3.47 North Dakota 4.09
CPI 1975-1985 7.64 Ohio 6.35 New York 1.29
Inflation 1986-1996 3.90 New York 2.90 Texas 1.00
1975-1996 5.31 Washington 4.96 Michigan .35
Table 3.2: House Price Inflation and CPI Inflation Rates
3 .3 .2  H ou sin g  P rice  P rop erties
Econometric analysis of relationships between housing prices and other economic 
variables is sensitive to the possible existence of (common) trends (See Lettau and 
Ludvigson, 2003, 2001). Hence I begin this section by an exercise to test whether , ' 
real housing prices are unit root processes, that is, whether they contain a unit 
root, or stochastic trend, and whether they diverge from one another. Figure 3.8 
illustrates the log level behaviour of real housing prices. Looking at the plots, it
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seems the series axe non-stationary.
Univariate unit-root tests like those of Dickey and Fuller have proven to have
root in small samples, hence I will use the Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) (IPS) test7, 
which proceeds as follows:
1. First eliminate the common time effect 6 t by substracting the cross-sectional 
mean from the data (<&,*) as follows:
6 t stands for the common time effect, that is, macroeconomic shocks that induce 
cross-sectional dependence. The latter cannot be introduced in a univariate regres­
sion, but it can be fully taken into account by substracting the cross-sectional mean 
of the variable under study. In this way, it will take into account the cross-sectional 
dependence asymptotically8.
2. Then calculate the Augmented Dickey-Fuller-GLS test9 by Elliot, Rothenberg, 
and Stock (1996) of each state by regressing Aq^t on q^t- 1 , a constant, a trend and 
lagged values of Aq^t.
ki
A q ift =  a* +  P i % t - 1  +  ^ 2  +  e ift (3.7)
3= 1
where a* accounts for the heterogeneity among states - reasons for such het­
rFor cases where the number of individuals is large and the number of time periods is very small, 
see Bond et al. (2002) for a comparison of alternative unit root tests for micro panels.
8 Cecchetti, Mark and Sonora (2000) also control for residual dependence across individuals and 
calculate the p-values of the IPS test from a parametric bootstrap consisting of 2000 replications 
using the estimated error-covariance matrix in the datargenerating process.
9DF-GLS test is a modified augmented Dickey-Fuller test where the times series is transformed 
via a generalized least squares regression (GLS) prior to performing the test.
extremely low power and tend to be biased towards failing to reject the null of unit
N
(3.6)
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erogeneity being different tax rates and income levels. Note that these regressions 
implicitly allow for 0* on the right-hand side since I have adjusted series q^t by 
substracting the estimated common macro effect through (1 /N )
The null hypothesis is that each series has a unit root, H0 : f t  =  (3 = 0 for all i. 
The interpretation is as follows: the closer the estimate of /? is to zero, the closer to 
a stationary process Aq^t is, implying that q^t is a unit root non-stationary process. 
The alternative hypothesis is Ha : < 0 for some i, allowing for heterogeneity
across states.
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State
Levels 
t lags
Alabama -1.752 11
Alaska -2.261 8
Arizona -3.873 9
Arkansas -1.881 9
California -2.007 8
Colorado -2.654 8
Connecticut -2.539 9
Delaware -2.415 9
District of Columbia -1.742 5
Florida -3.703 10
Georgia -2.283 10
Hawaii -1.794 1
Idaho -1.965 8
Illinois -1.453 2
Indiana -0.929 7
Iowa -1.920 11
Kansas -1.503 5
Kentucky -0.875 3
Louisiana -2.550 5
Maine -1.560 6
Maryland -2.051 4
Massachusetts -2.157 10
Michigan -0.990 6
Minnesota -1.293 6
Mississippi -1.399 8
(continued on next page)
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Missouri -3.185 9
Montana -2.388 10
Nebraska -2.373 11
Nevada -1.129 1
New Hampshire -2.415 8
New Jersey -1.733 11
New Mexico -2.683 10
New York -2.593 7
North Carolina -1.926 8
North Dakota -0.903 5
Ohio -2.487 11
Oklahoma -2.348 5
Oregon -2.435 7
Pennsylvania -2.268 6
Rhode Island -2.670 10
South Carolina -1.438 11
South Dakota -2.063 10
Tennessee -1.874 5
Texas -1.515 3
Utah -2.868 9
Vermont -1.535 11
Virginia -1.596 8
Washington -2.677 6
West Virginia -1.408 9
Wisconsin -1.624 1
Wyoming -2.032 11
Average -2.034
Note: IPS test. 5% Critical Value:-2.36 
from Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003, table 2). 
Sample Period: 1975:1-1996:4
Table 3.3: Panel Unit-Root Test for log Housing Prices 
In order to determine the lag length (hi) of equation 3.7 I follow Ng and Perron 
(1995), who suggest a sequential t-test algorithm for choosing k. For instance, let 
us suppose that I start with hi = 6 . If the absolute value of the t-ratio for 7 i6 is less 
than 1.96, I reset ki = 5 and reestimate the equation. The process stops when the 
estimated coefficient with the longest lag exceeds 1.96.
3. Calculate the IPS test statistic t by averaging the univariate ADF test £»:
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N
F = ( 1 / J \ 0 $ > .  (3.8)
t = l
4. The null hypothesis is that each series has a unit root and there exists cross- 
sectional independence among them. Since the asymptotic distributions of the t-bar 
statistics axe nonstandard and do not have analytic expressions, I will use the critical 
values tabulated by IPS using Monte Carlo simulations.
Table 3.3 shows the results of the IPS test for the whole period sample. The 
results provide evidence towards the existence of a stochastic trend in the series of 
interest. In most cases I cannot reject the null hypothesis of unit root. The IPS test 
t is -2.03 and the critical value -2.36, hence I cannot reject the null of a unit root 
in housing prices. Failing to reject the null hypothesis is interpreted as implying 
that housing prices are trended. As mentioned before I account for a common time 
effect (the cross-sectional mean) so that the results are invariant to the choice of a 
numeraire state . So the fact that the level of prices in most states relative to the 
cross-sectional mean contains a unit root means that relative prices would wander 
apart indefinitely and the housing prices could become arbitrarily high or low. Hence 
the issue of possible cointegration arises.
3.4 M ethodology
The aim of this section is modelling the consumption-house prices linkage in order 
to shed fight on how closely the two variables are actually correlated.
3.4.1 In tegration
As a first step, I test the consumption series for integration as I did for the housing 
price series. Table 3.4 shows the IPS test results for real per capita consumption
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and real per capita labour income. These tests give unambiguous results; unit roots 
appear to be present for the log levels of the series in all three cases.
Levels
Variable t
C -2.157
Y -2.068
HP1 -2.034
Note: IPS test. 5% Critical 
Value: -2.36 from Im, Pesaran 
and Shin (2003, table 2).
Sample Period: 1975:1-1996:4 
* Later on I will show that 
housing wealth has a t of -2.118
Table 3.4: Panel Unit-Root Tests
Since both the independent and dependent variables are non-stationary, I now 
test whether a combination of them is stationary - a test of whether C, Y and HP 
are cointegrated.
3.4 .2  C oin tegration  in  H eterogen eou s P an els
I follow Pedroni (1999) in testing the null of no cointegration in heterogeneous pan­
els. The advantage of this test is that it allows for heterogeneity among individuals, 
both in the long-run cointegrating vector and the short-run dynamics from the coin- 
tegrating vectors. In addition it allows for multiple regressors.
I first compute the OLS residuals e^t from each cointegration regression:
k
Vi,t =  O!* -f- "t* ^   ^ “h ®i,t (3'9)
j = l
estimated from state i , with t — 1,..., T, T  being the number of observations over 
time; i = 1,...., IV, N  being the number of states; and j  =  1, K  being the
number of regressors, y^t is real per capita consumption, Xj^t are real per capita
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labour income and real housing prices. The variables in the regression are not 
measured as deviations around a common component. When regressors coefficients 
are allowed to vary over individual members, as in equation 3.9, demeaning the 
data over the cross-section dimension can have the consequence of introducing data 
dependencies into the estimated residuals so that the asymptotic distributions are 
no longer nuisance parameter free (See Pedroni (1999) for details).
I then calculate the Panel Cointegration Statistic (Group t-Statistic) as the sum 
of the individual ADF t-statistic (r*) :
N
Z'tN.T = N f  = ' £ n  (3.10)
t = l
with a distribution expressed as
where n  and v are functions of the moments of the underlying Brownian motion 
functionals that can be found in Table 3 (Pedroni, 1999).
Table 3.5 shows the results of the test. These are one-sided statistics with a 
critical value of -1.64, thus large negative values imply rejection of the null of no 
cointegration. The table shows that in all cases, with or without intercept and 
trend included, I can reject the null of no cointegration. Cointegration estimates 
are robust to the presence of measurement error and endogeneity of the regressors, 
hence the superconsistency result. Therefore there is evidence that C , W  and Y  are 
cointegrated and that they form a meaningful regression relationship. ,
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Pedroni Group t-statistic With housing prices With housing wealth
t p-value t p-value
Standard case -12.452 0.000 -12.988 0.000
Heterogeneous Intercept Included -8.444 0.000 -8.902 0.000
Heterogeneous Trends and Intercepts Included -4.758 0.000 -4.935 0.000
Note: t-value calculated following Pedroni (1999)
One-tailed test at 5 percent level on the Normal distribution. Critical value: -1.64
Table 3.5: Cointegration IPS Test 
3 .4 .3  E s t im a tio n  a n d  R e su lts
In this section I deal with the estimation of a consumption function in which the 
regressors are non-stationary and there exists cointegration among variables. I con­
sider three estimators: the Mean Group (MG) Estimator, the Pooled Mean Group 
(PMG) Estimator and the Dynamic Seemingly Unrelated Regression (DSUR) Esti­
mator.
M ean Group Estim ator
One way to estimate panel data models is to estimate the separate equations for 
each group of individuals and study the distribution of the mean of the estimated 
coefficients across groups. Since T  is large (88 observations) I can estimate an Au­
toregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL(p,q,q, ...,q)) model for each group separately 
as follows:
p  9
Vit =  ^   ^^ijUiyt—j  P  ^   ^fiij&ift—j  P  ^it (3.11)
j =1 j=0
where xa  is the vector of regressors for each equation i and fa is the constant 
for each equation. (I include seasonal dummies in one of the models). I allow for 
different lag order for each state and use the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (SBC) to 
select the right lag order.
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In what follows I work with the more convenient re-parameterization of the 
ARDL model of the form of an ECM as in equation 3.5 above. Pesaran and Smith 
(1995) show that this MG estimator gives consistent estimates of the average of the 
parameters. The drawback is that it does not take into account the fact that some 
parameters might be the same across groups.
Tables 3.13 and 3.14 present the MG estimated results (the first table does not 
include seasonal dummies whilst the second one does). The first column of each 
table shows the lag orders for each group selected by the SBC, and the second, 
third and fourth illustrate the labour income elasticity, housing price elasticity and 
the adjustment coefficient of equation 3.5, respectively. Table 3.13 illustrates how 
labour income and housing elasticities seem to differ among states. Housing prices 
are significant in half of the states, probably due in part to the fact that synergies 
among states are not taken into account (the DSUR below will correct for that). By 
synergies I mean special finks between states: for instance, many people working in 
Washington DC five in Virginia or Maryland, where they can find better schools for 
their children and cheaper accommodations. Moreover, the coefficient of adjustment 
(a) is negative and significant, thus supporting the cointegration hypothesis and 
indicating the presence of lags in the response of consumption to income and wealth. 
Table 3.14 reestimates the long-run coefficients, including seasonal dummies.
Mean Group Estimate Summary P i 0 2 a
(without seasonal dummies)
MG .76 (13.51) .20 (5.18) -.72 (-12.03)
No. of states with correct sign 50 44 51
No. of states with correct sign and significant coefficients 38 22 35
(with seasonal dummies)
MG .87 (10.21) .16 (3.0) -.30 (11.59)
No. of states with correct sign 49 37 51
No. of states with correct sign and significant coefficients 37 19 48
Table 3.6: Mean Group Estimates
Table 3.6 summarizes the main findings of the MG estimation (Tables 3.13 and
!
35
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3.14). fit is the coefficient of the log of real labour income, /52 is the coefficient of real 
housing prices, and a  is the adjustment coefficient.10 The first row of the table shows 
the MG estimator. The housing price elasticity is 0.20 and is very significant. The 
value of all MG elasticities decreases when seasonal dummies are introduced, leading 
to a value of the housing price elasticity of 0.16. The table also shows how many 
states have coefficients with the correct sign and are significant. The coefficient on 
housing prices seems to be significantly less frequent, however at least more than 
half of the coefficients that have the correct sign are significant.
By looking at the short-run results, the significance of the estimates shows that 
consumption responds also to current period changes in labour income and wealth 
(available from the author under request).
Pooled M ean Group Estimator
The PMG developed by Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999) is an intermediate estimator 
between the MG estimator described above and a pooled estimator (fixed or random 
effects estimator), where coefficients and error variances are constrained to be the 
same while the intercepts are allowed to differ across groups. It allows the intercepts, 
short-run coefficients and error variances to differ across groups, but the long-run 
coefficients are restricted to be identical among groups.
I use the MG estimates as initial estimates of the long-run parameters for the 
pooled maximum likelihood function and the Newton-Raphson algorithm since it 
considers the first and the second derivative of the log-likelihood function.
Table 3.7 illustrates the results. The housing price elasticities vary from 0.19 to 
0.22 depending on the lag structure chosen when seasonal dummies are not included. 
If included, the elasticity ranges from 0.19 to 0.20.
10A value of -1.00 is sometimes imposed for in Tables 3.13 and 3.14 to maintain enough degrees 
of freedom.
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ARDL Seasonal Dummies Pooled Mean Group Restricted DSUR
SBC no .224(19.680)
SBC yes .195(11.797)
1,1,1 no .213(16.711)
1,1,1 yes .191(10.829)
0,3,3 no .186(19.093)
0,3,3 yes .208(29.181)
31ags31eads no .166(34.21)
31ags31eads yes .186(51.00)
Table 3.7: Pooled Estimates of the Long-Run Housing Price Elasticity
Dynam ic Seem ingly Unrelated Regression (D SU R ) Estim ator
Following Mark, Ogaki and Sul (2003) I consider N  cointegrating regressions where 
N  is fixed. Each equation has a triangular representation,
Vit =  XitPi +  UH (3.12)
A xu  =  ea (3.13)
A problem can arise in equation 3.12, since a correlation exists between the 
equilibrium error of equation i and leads and lags of first differences of the regressors 
of all other equations j  =  1, ...,iV. Therefore I need to adjust for possible spillover 
effects among states by including leads and lags not only of A x \t  but also leads and 
lags of A x 2t through A x m  (z[) •
To purge endogeneity I project ua on zt\
u = z'f.8 4- ut (3.14)
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where z't =  (z’lt, . . . , z'Nt) , 2  =  1, N  and z'it =  (&x'it+p, ..., AxJt_p)  .
Substituting the projection of uu into equation 3.12 gives:
Vit =  x'uPi +  z[8 i +  uu (3.15)
I then apply SUR to the above equation. This is the representation of the DSUR. 
This model can be used in small to moderate systems where the number of time 
periods, T, is substantially larger than the number of equations, N  - as it is in this 
case. The model is estimated using the asymptotically efficient, feasible generalized 
least-squares algorithm.
The main attraction of the DSUR is that it takes into account the long-run cross- 
sectional dependence in the equilibrium errors in estimation and is asymptotically 
efficient. To test for cross-sectional dependence I estimate the innovation covariance 
matrix of the consumption function. The last row of Table 3.8 shows whether the 
off-diagonal elements in the innovation covariance matrix can be restricted to zero 
using the Breusch and Pagan test of independence of the residuals. Clearly the null 
is rejected.
Table 3.8 shows the elasticities of labour income and housing prices with or 
without seasonal dummies included. Most of the housing price elasticities are signif­
icantly different from zero and differ quite a lot among states. The average is 0.23 
(0.17) when seasonal dummies are (are not) included.
In addition, I also calculate a restricted DSUR by assuming that (3i = /?2 =  
and stack the equation together:
yt = x t/3 + ut (3.16)
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The results are shown in last column of Table 3.7. The elasticity ranges between 
0.17 and 0.19 depending on whether seasonal dummies are included.
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State
(1) (2)
lags
leads
Pi 02 R 2 lags
leads
Pi P2 R 2
Alabama 3,3 .777(19.37) .477(11.97) .63 3,3 .795(23.64) .546(14.80) .84
Alaska 3,3 .092(1.69) .180(6.10) .40 3,3 .100(2.55) .178(8.17) .69
Arizona 3,3 .248(2.99) .352(5.90) .37 3,3 .159(2.29) .318(6.27) .65
Arkansas 3,3 .545(10.46) ,034(.68) .47 3,3 .615(15.04) .130(3.35) .77
California 3,3 .473(3.09) -,245(-5.92) .50 3,3 .423(3.62) -,245(-8.05) .74
Colorado 3,3 1.016(16.19) -.197(-5.17) .53 3,3 1.001(19.12) -,160(-5.21) .76
Connecticut 3,3 .663(12.55) .437(16.33) .81 3,3 .573(12.61) .468(20.30) .91
Delaware 3,3 .380(3.31) .337(5.33) .64 3,3 .213(2.42) .460(9.68) .77
DC 3,3 -.080(-1.65) .037(1.18) .46 3,3 -.089(-1.90) .037(1.26) .49
Florida 3,3 .694(14.97) .709(5.07) .70 3,3 .746(24.36) .885(9.12) .88
Georgia 3,3 .576(13.23) .528(5.46) .54 3,3 .541(13.98) .585(6.87) .77
Hawaii 3,3 .067(.66) .583(15.74) .75 3,3 ,074(.90) .550(18.26) .89
Idaho 3,3 .759(8.22) .443(8.10) .43 3,3 .707(8.80) .383(8.16) .61
Illinois 3,3 .470(3.63) .099(1.42) .42 3,3 .306(3.39) .218(4.41) .77
Indiana 3,3 .401(6.04) .412(7.71) .57 3,3 .408(8.21) .483(11.81) .81
Iowa 3,3 .822(16.91) .029(1.15) .56 3,3 .834(22.50) .062(3.34) .83
Kansas 3,3 1.10(10.66) .310(5.28) .41 3,3 1.162(15.09) .373(8.63) .77
Kentucky 3,3 1.446(33.96) -.173(-3.70) .84 3,3 1.420(43.49) -.095(-2.29) .95
Louisiana 3,3 .604(8.75) .293(8.90) .50 3,3 .600(12.30) .309(13.30) .78
Maine 3,3 .992(11.37) .036(.88) .62 3,3 .922(12.51) .042(1.30) .84
Maryland 3,3 1.289(14.97) -.989(-11.68) .52 3,3 1.163(18.08) -.813(-13.59) .80
Massachusetts 3,3 .736(8.96) .130(3.96) .77 3,3 .704(13.94) .142(7.14) .92
Michigan 3,3 1.445(18.65) -.276(-5.50) .70 3,3 1.410(24.42) -,274(-7.77) .88
Minnesota 3,3 .551(12.59) .490(6.38) .43 3,3 .609(19.64) .772(14.45) .87
Mississippi 3,3 .648(16.93) .522(16.04) .54 3,3 .733(23.63) .607(21.07) .75
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Missouri 3,3 .838(15.64) .006(.ll) .57 3,3 .815(18.13) .043(.90) .81
Montana 3,3 .672(5.57) .234(6.19) .42 3,3 .624(5.52) .282(8.07) .58
Nebraska 3,3 .784(15.05) .326(8.35) .47 3,3 .858(21.36) .462(14.79) .80
Nevada 3,3 -.070(-.57) .161(1.77) .17 3,3 -.094(-.87) .315(4.04) .49
New Hampshire 3,3 1.046(17.64) .202(6.01) .76 3,3 .939(23.63) .232(11.61) .90
New Jersey 3,3 -.004(-.04) .265(5.67) .50 3,3 -,080(-l.ll) .308(9.83) .78
New Mexico 3,3 .742(10.44) .755(15.99) .52 3,3 .757(12.89) .804(20.28) .79
New York 3,3 .475(4.60) .076(1.71) .48 3,3 .421(5.66) .105(3.47) .75
North Carolina 3,3 1.080(23.34) -.041(-.44) .76 3,3 1.055(29.60) .055(.78) .92
North Dakota 3,3 1.108(15.15) .108(3.39) .56 3,3 1.202(19.59) .126(4.65) .77
Ohio 3,3 1.053(11.59) .060(1.30) .58 3,3 .995(14.79) .074(2.27) .83
Oklahoma 3,3 -.044(-.52) -.085(3.39) .18 3,3 .032(.45) .099(4.60) .43
Oregon 3,3 1.580(12.18) -.106(-2.23) .37 3,3 1.467(13.19) -.046(-1.13) .68
Pennsylvania 3,3 .751(9.05) .243(5.68) .62 3,3 .587(8.98) .330(10.67) .82
Rhode Island 3,3 .104(1.31) .313(10.94) .59 3,3 ,014(.19) .335(12.11) .81
South Carolina 3,3 .864(29.71) .072(1.07) .80 3,3 .872(42.77) .148(3.01) .94
South Dakota 3,3 .940(16.81) -.143(-2.94) .63 3,3 .933(20.30) -.137(-3.58) .83
Tennessee 3,3 1.278(46.76) .171(3.58) .86 3,3 1.265(68.64) .211(6.18) .97
Texas 3,3 .982(11.71) .393(10.79) .35 3,3 1.102(15.64) .444(14.42) .77
Utah 3,3 .232(3.29) .213(7.82) .49 3,3 .241(4.18) .255(11.20) .78
Vermont 3,3 .718(8.46) .203(3.60) .55 3,3 .670(8.39) .182(3.37) .76
Virginia 3,3 .492(9.56) .198(3.18) .58 3,3 .503(12.05) .159(3.05) .85
Washington 3,3 .971(10.62) .068(1.36) .68 3,3 .750(11.28) .179(4.73) .94
West Virginia 3,3 -.079(-1.24) .000(.01) .12 3,3 -.026(-.48) .002(.09) .26
Wisconsin 3,3 .373(4.44) .092(2.09) .27 3,3 .371(5.73) .157(4.50) .71
Wyoming 3,3 -.76(-4.83) .483(9.63) .59 3,3 -.791 (-5.66) .503(10.84) .63
Seasonal Dummies no yes ■j
B-P test independence chi2(1275) =  30733.553 chi2(1275) =  11066.492 .81
of residuals p-value=0.000 p-value=0.000
Average 3,3 0.644(10.67) 0.173(4.17) 3,3 0.620(13.72) 0.227(6.27)
Table 3.8: Unrestricted DSUR Estimates
A ging o f Population and Homeownership
The empirical evidence on the effects of an aging population on consumption and 
wealth is not clear cut. Venti and Wise (1991, 2001, 2002), McFadden (1994a, 
1994b), Hoynes and McFadden (1997), Mankiw and Weil (1989), Hurd (1997), and 
Bosworth et al. (1991) studied the effect of changes in the housing equity of the aged 
on consumption and wealth and came to different conclusions. It is not clear whether
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demographic characteristics have a positive or negative effect on consumption. In 
the same vein, it is not clear whether increases (decreases) in elderly home equity 
arising from capital gains (losses) are translated into consumption. In the model used 
here the differences among housing price coefficients imply that different behaviour 
exists among states. There are two variables that can potentially explain these 
differences: different rates of aging of population and homeownership among states. 
The percentage of the population age 65 and older rose sharply after 1975 and will 
continue to rise for the next forty years. Table 3.15 illustrates the proportion of 
population aged 45 years or more (and 65 years or more). There appears to be a 
pattern: States with negative or insignificant housing coefficients are states with a 
relatively low proportion of households with heads aged 45 years or more. This is 
the case of California, Alaska, Colorado and Georgia (among others).
The second factor that could explain the difference in coefficients is homeown­
ership rates in each state. The greater the proportion of households who are home­
owners, the more the wealth effect dominates at the aggregate level11. Table 3.16 
shows homeownership rates for 1986, 1990 and 1996. States with lower homeown­
ership rates are the states with negative or insignificant housing price coefficients, 
including DC, Illinois, Massachusetts, and Nevada.
In what follows, I try to give further evidence on the changes in consumption 
after retirement and the possible effects on consumption of converting housing equity 
into liquid assets. To this end, I include the proportion of population aged 45 or 
older in the long-run relationship to control for aging population and the results 
are shown in Tables 3.17 and 3.18 using both Mean Group and DSUR estimations, 
respectively. /?3 is the coefficient of the aging variable that happens to be significant 
for at least half of the states. Housing coefficients, however, still differ widely among
11 The homeownership rate at the US was 68 percent in the first quarter of 2003, an increase of 
4 percentage points from 1993 due basically to the affluent baby boomers and the entrance in the 
market of minority middle class (immigrants). New finance alternatives have allowed low-wealth 
households to qualify for loans to become homeowners.
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states. Consequently, I conclude that after controlling for different rates of aging 
populations, there are big disparities in the response of consumption to housing 
prices. Moreover, it is not possible to shed more light on the earlier discussions in 
the literature about the sign of the demographic impact on consumption via housing 
wealth. Around half of the significant coefficients of the aging population variable 
are positive and the other half are negative.
3.5 Compare and Contrast
As mentioned in the introduction, Case et al. (2001) follow a roughly similar pro­
cedure. They estimate regressions relating consumption to income, stock wealth 
and housing wealth for a panel of the 50 US states and the District of Columbia. 
They deflate all variables by the national GDP deflator and test for unit roots in the 
time series, rejecting the hypothesis of unit roots in the data for most of the series. 
They use three different specifications including fixed effects and adding a serial 
correlation correction and a lagged dependent variable and estimate the regression 
in differences12. The estimated effect of housing market wealth on consumption in 
their work ranges from 0.05 to 0.09.
Pesaran and Smith (1995) show that fixed effects, instrumental variables or Gen­
eralized Method of Moments estimators can be inconsistent and produce misleading 
estimates of the average values of the parameters in dynamic panel data models 
when T  is large and the slope coefficients are not identical, as is usually the case. 
Therefore a more suitable estimator that imposes weaker homogeneity restrictions 
will be the PMG presented in an earlier section.
The use of constructed housing wealth and housing prices arise as competing 
proxies. As mentioned earlier, housing prices are used in this chapter because I
12The use of differences avoids the pitfall of spurious correlation due to common trending series, 
however it tends to lead to the omission of the long-run relationship that may exist among levels 
of these variables.
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assume that the majority of the change in housing wealth is caused by housing 
price changes. However, it is worth checking whether the two variables are highly 
correlated. To this end, Table 3.9 shows a correlation matrix among housing wealth 
and its components - housing prices, number of households and homeownership 
rates. The correlation between changes of housing wealth and housing prices is 0.89. 
In addition, I estimate a linear regression corrected for first-order serially-correlated 
residuals using the Cochrane-Orcutt transformed regression estimator. A coefficient 
of unity is expected if housing prices are a good proxy of the evolution of housing 
wealth. The results are shown in Table 3.10. The housing prices coefficient is unity, 
hence I can conclude that I am justified in using housing prices as a proxy of housing 
wealth.
dwealth dhpm dhh dho
dwealth 1.0000
dhpm .8928 1.0000
dhh .3127 1.223 1.0000
dho .4133 0.0037 .0459 1.0000
Table 3.9: Wealth Structure
A In wealth coefficient t-student
A In hpm 1.015 98.89
constant .002 9.75
DW-Statistic 1.97
F-Statistic 9778.24
R2 .79
Table 3.10: Wealth Regression
Using net wealth takes into account both accumulated savings and capital gains. 
In contrast, using housing prices tests for capital gains only. A major part of variance 
in housing wealth is related to valuation changes that correlate with interest rates 
and income expectations. Capital gains due to real state wealth prices contain 
important forward-looking aspects. Net wealth is composed by financial savings,
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amortization of loans and/or capital gains. It is therefore interesting to see whether 
the results change when housing wealth is used instead of housing prices.
In order to make a comparison with Case at al. (2001) I reestimate my model 
using housing wealth instead of housing prices (although I do not include stock 
market wealth since stock market indexes are nationally driven). Following Case 
et al. (2001) I impute the aggregate value of owner-occupied housing to proxy for 
housing wealth as follows:
Wu =  RitNitHPitWio (3.17)
where
Wjt=aggregate value of owner-occupied housing in state i in quarter t 
ilit=homeownership rate in state i in quarter t 
jVjt=number of households in state i in quarter t
i7Pif=quarterly conventional mortgage home price index for state i in quarter t 
Wio=median house value for state i in the base year 1990 
(See the Appendix for a detailed description of the data)
I test housing wealth for unit roots and cannot reject the null hypothesis of unit 
root (footnote of Table 3.4). I then test for cointegration between real retail sales, 
real labour income and real housing wealth and can reject the null of hypothesis of no 
cointegration (last two columns of Table 3.5). In this specification, housing wealth 
directly effects consumption through its market value, which provides a source of 
purchasing power to cope with fluctuations in income.
Table 3.11 shows the PMG housing wealth estimates of the cointegrating relation, 
the estimated elasticity ranges from 0.15 to 0.21 depending on whether seasonal 
dummies are included. These findings are very similar to the estimated effect of 
housing prices on consumption in the previous section.
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ARDL Seasonal Dummies Pooled Mean Group
SBC no .200(24.03)
SBC yes .165(12.01)
1,1,1 no .212(20.41)
1,1,1 yes .185(12.52)
0,3,3 no .202(17.226)
0,3,3 yes .153(25.99)
Table 3.11: Pooled Estimates of the Long-Run Housing Wealth Elasticity
In sum, these results give support to my previous findings and imply that the 
estimated elasticity of housing wealth is more than twice the estimated elasticity in 
Case et al. (2001).
3.6 Conclusion
I have analysed the effect of housing prices on consumption using variables sug­
gested by the life-cycle model. Since housing prices are locally driven I study the 
housing wealth effect using state level data for the 50 US states and the District 
of Columbia. I found unit roots in housing prices and a cointegrating relation­
ship between consumption, income and housing wealth at the state level. Due to 
the considerable heterogeneity in state level behaviour, fixed effects estimators that 
constrain intercepts, short-run coefficients and error variances lead to misleading 
inferences. I therefore use three different estimation methods that allow for het­
erogeneity among states and calculate the elasticity of housing prices. I find that 
differences in the aging of populations and homeownership play a role in the link 
between consumption and housing prices, although they do not explain the different 
response of consumption to housing prices among states. I find evidence of a strong 
housing wealth effect with elasticities ranging from 0.15 to 0.23.
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3.7 A ppendix
3 .7 .1  U S  S ta tes  and  R egions
State State Code Census Regions CPI Index
Alabama AL South South:Urban:All Items, NSA
Alaska AK West West: Urban: All Items, NSA
Arizona AZ West West: Urban: All Items, NSA
Arkansas AR South South:Urban:All Items, NSA
California CA West Los Angeles-Riverside-Orange: All Items, NSA
Colorado CO West West: Urban: All Items, NSA
Connecticut CT Northeast NY-NJ,NY-CT-PA: All Items, NSA
Delaware DE South Phila-Wilmington-Alt City: All Items, NSA
District of Columbia DC South South:Urban:All Items, NSA
Florida FL South South:Urban:All Items, NSA
Georgia GA South Atlanta, GA: All Items, NSA
Hawaii HI West West: Urban: All Items, NSA
Idaho ID West West: Urban: All Items, NSA
Illinois IL Midwest Chicago-Gary-Kenosha, IL-IN-WI:A11 Items, NSA
Indiana IN Midwest Chicago-Gary-Kenosha, IL-IN-WI:A11 Items, NSA
Iowa IA Midwest Midwest: Urban: All Items, NSA
Kansas KS Midwest Midwest: Urban: All Items, NSA
Kentucky KY South South:Urban:All Items, NSA
Louisiana LA South South:Urban:All Items, NSA
Maine ME Northeast Northeast: Urban: All Items, NSA
Maryland MD South PhilarWilmington-Alt City: All Items, NSA
Massachusetts MA Northeast Boston-Brockton-Nashua: All Items, NSA
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(continued) State Code Census Regions CPI Index
Michigan MI Midwest Detroit-Ann Arbor-Flint, MI: All Items, NSA
Minnesota MN Midwest Midwest: Urban: All Items, NSA
Mississippi MS South South:Urban:All Items, NSA
Missouri MO Midwest Midwest: Urban: All Items, NSA
Montana MT West West: Urban: All Items, NSA
Nebraska NE Midwest Midwest: Urban: All Items, NSA
Nevada NV West West: Urban: All Items, NSA
New Hampshire NH Northeast Boston-Brockton-Nashua: All Items, NSA
New Jersey NJ Northeast NY-NJ,NY-CT-PA: All Items, NSA
New Mexico NM West West: Urban: All Items, NSA
New York NY Northeast NY-NJ,NY-CT-PA: All Items, NSA
North Carolina NC South South:Urban:AIl Items, NSA
North Dakota ND Midwest Midwest: Urban: All Items, NSA
Ohio OH Midwest Cleveland-Akron, OH: All Items, NSA
Oklahoma OK South South:Urban:All Items, NSA
Oregon OR West West: Urban: All Items, NSA
Pennsylvania PA Northeast Phila-Wilmington-Alt City: All Items, NSA
Rhode Island RI Northeast Northeast: Urban: All Items, NSA
South Carolina SC South South:Urban:All Items, NSA
South Dakota SD Midwest Midwest: Urban: All Items, NSA
Tennessee TN South South:Urban:All Items, NSA
Texas TX South Dallas-Fort Worth, TX: All Items, NSA
Utah UT West West: Urban: All Items, NSA
Vermont VT Northeast Northeast: Urban: All Items, NSA
Virginia VA South South:Urban:All Items, NSA
Washington WA West Seattle-TacomarBremerton: All Items, NSA
West Virginia WV South South:Urban:All Items, NSA
Wisconsin WI Midwest Chicago-Gary-Kenosha, IL-IN-WLAll Items, NSA
Wyoming WY West West: Urban: All Items, NSA
Table 3.12: State Consumer Prices’ Sources
3 .7 .2  D a ta  Sources
The panel data used is a balanced panel spanning from 1975:1 to 1996:4 for 50 US 
states and the District of Columbia.
R eal p e r  C ap ita  R eta il Sales
This is my proxy for Real per Capita Consumption. I construct the series from:
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•  Monthly Retail Sales for the period 1978:01-1996:12 for 20 states (CA, FL, 
GA, IL, IN, LA, MA, MD, MI, MN, MO, NC, NJ, NY, OH, PA, TN, TX, VA, 
WI) from the US Census Bureau (please note that the monthly retail sales 
series have been discontinued)
•  Monthly Retail Sales for the period 1987:01-1996:12 for 7 states (AZ-CO-CT- 
DE-KS-KY-WA) from the US Census Bureau and partial interpolation using 
the Chow-Lin Method for the period 1975:1-1987:4.
• For the rest of the 23 states full interpolation was computed.
The series’ used by the Chow-Lin Method in order to calculate the interpolations 
are the Monthly Retail Sales from 1978:01-1996:12 for 9 Census Divisions from the 
US Census Bureau and the Annual Retail Sales from 1963-1996 from the Sales and 
Marketing Management magazine for 50 states.
The series is deflated by the calculated state CPI described below and made per 
capita using the interpolated state population estimates.
Real Housing Prices
Real housing prices were calculated from the Quarterly Conventional Mortgage 
Home Price Index (CMHPI) by Freddie Mac. They were deflated by the calculated 
state CPI described below.
The CMHPI has been calculated since 1975 and uses a statistical method based 
entirely on ’’repeat transactions”. Any time a house’s value is observed twice over 
time (via either a sale or an appraisal), the change in the price contributes one 
observation of house price growth over that time period. The index is defined to be 
the statistically determined set of values that most closely fits many such repeated 
observations. Mathematically, the officially published index is a geometric repeat- 
sales index with a Goetzmann-like transformation.
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The computation of the index is based on mortgages that were purchased or 
securitized by Freddie Mac or Fannie Mae since January 1975. These mortgages 
are ’’conventional” in their financing: they are not insured or guaranteed by any 
federal government agency such as the Federal Housing Administration or Veterans 
Administration. Although not specified in the name, the index is based on mortgages 
for single unit residential houses only; it does not reflect condominiums, multi-family 
or commercial properties. Finally, the mortgages are ’’conforming”: at the time of 
purchase they met Freddie Mac or Fannie Mae underwriting standards, and they 
did not exceed the allowable loan limit set for the two companies. The conforming 
loan limit is revised each year based on a Federal Housing Finance Board survey.
A more technical description of the method can be found in Stephens et al. 
(1995) and Wang and Zorn (1997). Since none of the papers describe any change 
in methodology during the period, an increase in sample size could explain the 
reduction in high frequency fluctuations after the early 1980s that is observed in 
Figures 3.4-3.7.
Real per Capita Labour Income
Real per capita labour income was calculated from the quarterly labour income by 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The series is deflated by the calculated state 
CPI described below and made per capita using the interpolated state population 
estimates.
State Consumer Prices
State CPI was calculated by matching monthly CPIs of the 4 Census Regions by 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics and monthly or quarterly CPIs for 26 Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas (MSAs) and Primary Metropolitan Statistical Areas (PMSAs) and 
Cities, with the closest state. The CPIs used are listed in Table 3.12.
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P o p u la tio n  E stim ates
State Population Estimates were interpolated from annual resident population esti­
mates by the US Census Bureau. The Chow-Lin method used Monthly US Popula­
tion Estimates by the US Census Bureau.
R eal p e r  C ap ita  H ousing W ealth
Real per capita housing wealth was calculated following Case et al. (2001). Apart 
from the housing prices describe above, I used:
H om eow nership  R a tes  State Quarterly Homeownership Rates were interpo­
lated from Annual Homeownership Rates by the Housing Vacancies and Homeown­
ership, Annual Statistics of the US Census Bureau, Table 13. The Chow-Lin method 
used the quarterly US Homeownership Rates by the US Census Bureau, Table 5.
T otal N u m b er o f H ouseholds State Quarterly Estimates of Total Households 
were interpolated from the State Intercensal Estimates of Total Households by the 
US Census Bureau. The Chow-Lin method used the Quarterly Estimates of Total 
Households for the US by the US Census Bureau, Series H -lll .
H ouse M edian  Value Median house value from the 1990 Census of Population 
and Housing, US Bureau of the Census.
The series is deflated by the calculated state CPI described below and made per 
capita using the interpolated state population estimates.
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State
MG Estimator
AR D L P i @2 a R 2
Alabama 2,0,0 .820(12.01) .475(4.43) -1.00(NA) .43
Alaska 0,0,0 .076(.35) .247(1.91) -.462(-4.58) .39
Arizona 0,0,2 .014(.047) .051(.204) -.440(-3.70) .42
Arkansas 0,0,0 .831(5.18) .358(1.88) -.622(-4.57) .50
California 2,0,0 1.259(1.71) -.248(-1.40) -.378(-3.90) .48
Colorado 2,0,1 1.030(9.72) -.107(-1.38) -1.00(NA) .34
Connecticut 2,1,0 .633(4.436) .421(4.501) -.663(-4.718) .51
Delaware 2,1,0 .595(1.28) .266(.91) -.406(-3.26) .56
DC 2,1,0 .056(.22) -.184(-.92) -,161(-3.45) .38
Florida 2,1,0 .732(7.03) .499(1.39) -.549(-4.58) .55
Georgia 0,0,0 .662(4.78) .394(.94) -.488(-3.77) .55
Hawaii 3,2,0 .122(.48) .546(6.06) -1.00(NA) .39
Idaho 2,0,0 1.022(3.02) .612(2.68) -,354(-3.58) .30
Illinois 0,0,0 .286(1.00) .247(1.26) -.648(-4.50) .70
Indiana 2,0,0 .618(6.14) .511(4.89) -1.00(NA) .49
Iowa 0,0,0 .987(5.39) .093(.76) -.489(-4.15) .47
Kansas 0,0,0 1.096(7.57) .300(3.16) -1.00(NA) .52
Kentucky 2,0,0 1.419(20.34) -.026(-.22) -1.00(NA) .50
Louisiana 0,0,0 .600(6.07) .306(6.23) -1.00(NA) .47
Maine 2,2,1 1.049(6.87) .069(.78) -1.00(NA) .45
Maryland 2,0,0 1.232(3.90) -.821(-2.51) -.497(-4.00) .58
Massachusetts 2,1,0 .864(5.56) .107(1.57) -1.00(NA) .58
Michigan 3,1,0 1.486(13.58) -.239(-2.37) -1.105(-6.51) .63
(continued on next page)
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Minnesota 2,0,0 .689(8.55) .690(3.77) -1.00(NA) .56
Mississippi 2,1,0 .766(6.34) .651(5.38) -.625(-4.96) .44
Missouri 2,0,0 .875(6.16) .023(.ll) -.568(-4.24) .49
Montana 0,0,0 .963(2.93) .247(2.13) -.447(-5.08) .22
Nebraska 3,0,0 .903(9.20) .352(3.45) -1.00(NA) .45
Nevada 0,0,0 .440(.74) .697(1.49) -.329(-3.26) .32
New Hampshire 3,0,0 1.053(10.66) .219(3.20) -1.00(NA) .55
New Jersey 0,0,0 .213(.72) .278(1.82) -.571(-4.09) .58
New Mexico 0,0,0 .695(2.71) .444(2.22) -.503(-3.68) .30
New York 2,0,1 .438(1.16) .109(.59) -.425(-3.47) .58
North Carolina 3,2,0 1.100(13.77) .029(.14) -1.00(NA) .50
North Dakota 2,0,0 1.447(5.97) .261(1.91) -.493(-4.60) .48
Ohio 0,0,0 1.326(7.203) .044(.36) -.726(-5.31) .57
Oklahoma 2,0,0 -.180(-.39) .083(.67) -.305(-3.02) .34
Oregon 3,0,1 .888(1.70) .229(.951) -.303(-3.19) .40
Pennsylvania 2,1,0 1.078(2.83) .048(.20) -.495(-3.56) .60
Rhode Island 0,0,0 .512(.72) .008(.022) -.246(-2.12) .35
South Carolina 2,0,0 .913(20.14) .158(1.11) -,105(-6.16) .69
South Dakota 1,0,0 1.142(3.98) .026(.08) -.319(-3.34) .41
Tennessee 2,0,0 1.325(51.80) .201(3.26) -1.944(-9.39) .70
Texas 2,0,0 1.019(7.91) .418(7.43) -1.109(-6.91) .63
Utah 0,1,0 .486(4.74) .315(5.52) -1.00(NA) .36
Vermont 1,0,0 1.153(2.27) -.337(-.78) -.322(-2.99) .41
Virginia 2,0,0 .531(4.88) .215(1.46) -1.00(NA) .54
Washington 2,0,1 .710(11.90) .235(7.20) -2.43(-11.86) .76
West Virginia 0,0,1 .284(.77) .093(.57) -.175(-2.35) .45
Wisconsin 2,0,0 .468(3.56) .246(2.49) -1.00(NA) .54
Wyoming 3,0,0 .240(.18) .530(1.58) -.13(-2.48) .06
Seasoned Dummies no
Average (MG) .764(13.506) .204(5.183) -.721(-12.03)
Table 3.13: Mean Group Estimation without Seasonal Dummies
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State
MG Estimator
AR D L Pi 02 a R 2
Alabama 3,0,0 .870(7.89) .538(3.07) -.298(-4.07) .87
Alaska 1,0,3 .062(.24) .270(1.91) -.217(-3.64) .84
Arizona 2,0,2 -.027(-.08) -.002(-.01) -.257(-3.33) .74
Arkansas 3,0,0 .856(5.06) .380(1.94) -.302(-3.99) .88
California 2,1,0 3.682(1.02) -.898(-1.03) -.051(-1.05) .89
Colorado 1,1,0 1.099(5.97) -,098(-.74) -.314(-3.86) .81
Connecticut 2,1,0 .669(4.57) .408(4.31) -.351(-4.033) .86
Delaware 2,1,0 .812(1.56) .108(.33) -.250(-2.91) .84
DC 2,0,3 .077(.36) -.159(-.95) -.128(-3.99) .72
Florida 2,0,1 .637(5.94) .073(.19) -.345(-4.62) .84
Georgia 1,0,1 .619(2.61) -.132(-.16) -.167(-2.00) .85
Hawaii 3,0,0 .729(1.03) .307(1.24) -.179(-2.32) .85
Idaho 2,0,2 1.242(2.73) .830(2.52) -.142(-2.60) .81
Illinois 2,0,0 .340(.92) .116(.45) -.271(-3.02) .91
Indiana 2,0,0 .618(4.34) .501(3.50) -.386(-4.47) .86
Iowa 3,0,0 1.129(5.19) .201(1.39) -.202(-3.45) .89
Kansas 3,0,0 .988(6.24) .251(2.56) -.496(-4.88) .88
Kentucky 2,0,0 1.481(14.87) -.058(-.37) -.347(-4.53) .89
Louisiana 2,0,2 .681(4.57) .344(4.88) -.373(-3.67) .87
Maine 3,0,0 1.124(4.25) -.058(-.38) -.343(-4.28) .86
Maryland 2,0,0 1.009(1.91) -.581(-1.04) -.157(-2.22) .89
Massachusetts 3,0,0 .956(4.26) .039(.37) -.381(-3.76) .89
Michigan 3,0,0 1.483(9.52) -.213(-1.54) -.416(-5.41) .89
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Minnesota 1,0,2 .647(9.60) .695(4.70) -.589(-5.35) .91
Mississippi 2,1,0 .611(3.93) .495(3.24) -,232(-3.25) .87
Missouri 2,2,0 .818(4.31) -.238(-.80) -.235(-2.93) .85
Montana 2,0,3 1.369(3.84) .256(2.55) -.267(-4.81) .80
Nebraska 3,0,0 .740(3.29) .253(1.13) -.222(-2.92) .89
Nevada 1,0,0 1.014(1.10) 1.135(1.56) -.114(-2.22) .84
New Hampshire 3,0,0 1.068(12.62) .229(4.12) -.621(-6.58) .89
New Jersey 1,0,1 .062(.16) .321(1.63) -.268(-2.84) .85
New Mexico 2,0,0 .687(1.87) .320(1.06) -.175(-2.42) .82
New York 3,1,0 .280(.41) .070(.21) -.121 (-1.77) .89
North Carolina 1,0,0 .987(6.94) -.159(-.42) -.257(-3.24) .91
North Dakota 3,0,0 1.263(4.60) .303(1.84) -.201(-4.04) .89
Ohio 3,1,0 1.122(3.43) .084(.44) -.240(-2.67) .89
Oklahoma 3,1,2 .077(.23) .130(1.46) -.202(-3.83) .86
Oregon 1,1,1 1.333(1.92) .251(.87) -.124(-2.53) .85
Pennsylvania 1,0,0 1.261(3.46) -.105(-.45) -.247(-3.79) .93
Rhode Island 1,0,0 1.773(.49) -1.008(-.42) -.041(-.63) .84
South Carolina 1,1,0 .925(17.71) .123(.76) -.494(-4.93) .91
South Dakota 3,0,3 1.366(3.90) .600(1.35) -.135(-2.84) .87
Tennessee 2,0,0 1.338(35.31) .240(2.60) -.736(-8.19) .90
Texas 1,0,0 1.162(8.15) .488(7.24) -.506(-6.00) .89
Utah 1,1,0 .555(2.61) .271(2.30) -.235(-3.29) .85
Vermont 3,0,0 1.065(1.85) -.228(-.47) -.146(-2.48) .83
Virginia 3,0,0 .572(4.97) .165(1.06) -.548(-5.60) .85
Washington 2,2,0 .866(9.85) .139(2.95) -1.00(NA) .91
West Virginia 2,0,0 ,105(.37) .038(.28) -.127(-2.88) .81
Wisconsin 2,0,0 .498(2.67) .277(2.01) -.411 (-3.86) .85
Wyoming 0,0,0 -,441(-.46) .596(2.36) -.106(-3.14) .66
Seasonal Dummies yes
Average (MG) .868(10.21) .155(2.97) -.294(11.589)
Table 3.14: Mean Group Estimation with Seasonal Dummies
CHAPTER 3. REAL EFFECTS OF REGIONAL HOUSE PRICES
State 45+ 65+
1975 1986 1996 1975 1986 1996
Alabama 30.15 31.28 34.27 10.44 12.29 13.09
Alaska 16.51 17.53 25.28 2.34 3.21 5.12
Arizona 29.20 30.16 32.75 9.99 12.40 13.38
Arkansas 32.93 33.41 35.53 12.76 14.46 14.47
California 29.75 27.96 29.32 9.72 10.54 11.07
Colorado 26.30 26.33 31.78 8.30 9.06 10.14
Connecticut 32.66 32.97 35.33 10.49 13.01 14.36
Delaware 29.02 30.66 33.10 8.63 11.46 12.86
District of Columbia 30.86 30.37 34.60 10.26 12.01 13.90
Florida 37.70 38.02 39.08 15.88 17.86 18.55
Georgia 27.30 27.49 29.95 8.67 9.87 9.98
Hawaii 25.58 27.66 33.48 6.63 9.92 12.96
Idaho 28.32 28.09 31.53 9.57 11.22 11.43
Illinois 31.08 30.68 32.65 10.36 12.06 12.55
Indiana 29.78 30.81 33.41 9.98 11.98 12.67
Iowa 32.74 33.44 36.03 12.71 14.82 15.23
Kansas 32.64 31.63 33.46 12.57 13.53 13.70
Kentucky 30.28 30.68 34.10 10.76 12.04 12.64
Louisiana 27.48 27.57 31.53 9.20 10.13 11.48
Maine 31.96 31.87 35.39 11.89 13.21 13.97
Maryland 28.80 29.61 32.14 8.35 10.50 11.44
Massachusetts 32.86 32.01 34.29 11.77 13.36 14.14
Michigan 28.89 29.95 32.92 9.02 11.33 12.47
Minnesota 29.97 29.86 32.24 11.23 12.44 12.45
Mississippi 29.11 29.37 31.99 10.79 11.94 12.35
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Missouri 32.99 32.74 34.39 12.57 13.70 13.89
Montana 29.80 30.36 35.69 10.07 12.16 13.22
Nebraska 31.96 31.65 33.83 12.59 13.77 13.92
Nevada 27.98 29.64 33.00 7.27 10.03 11.51
New Hampshire 30.24 29.26 31.80 10.87 11.43 12.08
New Jersey 33.22 33.28 34.93 10.53 12.76 13.73
New Mexico 25.70 27.25 31.24 7.96 9.78 11.13
New York 33.31 32.64 34.30 11.43 12.78 13.35
North Carolina 28.90 30.57 33.49 9.07 11.45 12.60
North Dakota 30.54 30.18 34.22 11.50 13.10 14.54
Ohio 30.75 31.66 34.23 9.99 12.24 13.43
Oklahoma 32.29 31.32 34.62 12.23 12.44 13.57
Oregon 31.35 31.32 35.22 11.21 13.31 13.45
Pennsylvania 34.81 35.05 37.33 11.66 14.62 15.91
Rhode Island 34.77 33.58 35.06 12.18 14.55 15.78
South Carolina 26.87 28.67 33.03 8.14 10.53 12.10
South Dakota 32.19 31.76 33.79 12.56 14.10 14.47
Tennessee 30.49 31.52 34.27 10.52 12.24 12.59
Texas 27.93 26.58 29.40 9.41 9.44 10.19
Utah 23.28 22.00 24.81 7.44 8.03 8.80
Vermont 29.57 29.25 33.56 11.03 11.80 12.23
Virginia 28.38 28.94 32.09 8.59 10.33 11.23
Washington 29.80 29.29 32.18 10.18 11.62 11.63
West Virginia 33.29 33.88 38.37 11.70 13.66 15.23
Wisconsin 30.79 31.11 33.56 11.22 13.05 13.30
Wyoming 27.24 26.45 32.81 8.83 8.56 11.23
Mean 30.01 30.18 33.28 10.26 11.88 12.77
Variance 10.77 9.98 6.50 4.30 4.79 4.07
Highest 37.7 38.02 39.08 15.88 17.86 18.55
Lowest 16.51 17.53 24.81 2.34 3.21 5.12
Table 3.15: Aging Population
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State 1986 1990 1996
Alabama 70.3 68.4 71
Alaska 61.5 58.4 62.9
Arizona 62.5 64.5 62
Arkansas 67.5 67.8 66.6
California 53.8 53.8 55
Colorado 63.7 59 64.5
Connecticut 68.1 67.9 69
Delaware 71 67.7 71.5
District of Columbia 34.6 36.4 40.4
Florida 66.5 65.1 67.1
Georgia 62.4 64.3 69.3
Hawaii 50.9 55.5 50.6
Idaho 69.8 69.4 71.4
Illinois 60.9 63 68.2
Indiana 67.6 67 74.2
Iowa 69.2 70.7 72.8
Kansas 66.4 69 67.5
Kentucky 68.1 65.8 73.2
Louisiana 70.4 67.8 64.9
Maine 74 74.2 76.5
Maryland 62.8 64.9 66.9
Massachusetts 60.3 58.6 61.7
Michigan 70.9 72.3 73.3
Minnesota 68 68 75.4
Mississippi 70.4 69.4 73
Missouri 67.8 64 70.2
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(continued) 1986 1990 1996
Montana 64.4 69.1 68.6
Nebraska 68.3 67.3 66.8
Nevada 54.5 55.8 61.1
New Hampshire 64.8 65 65
New Jersey 63.3 65 64.6
New Mexico 67.8 68.6 67.1
New York 51.3 53.3 52.7
North Carolina 68.2 69 70.4
North Dakota 69.2 67.2 68.2
Ohio 68.2 68.7 69.2
Oklahoma 69.7 70.3 68.4
Oregon 63.9 64.4 63.1
Pennsylvania 72.3 73.8 71.7
Rhode Island 62.2 58.5 56.6
South Carolina 70.3 71.4 72.9
South Dakota 65.9 66.2 67.8
Tennessee 67.4 68.3 68.8
Texas 61 59.7 61.8
Utah 68 70.1 72.7
Vermont 69.8 72.6 70.3
Virginia 68.2 69.8 68.5
Washington 65.1 61.8 63.1
West Virginia 76.4 72 74.3
Wisconsin 66.5 68.3 68.2
Wyoming 72 68.9 68
Mean 65.5 65.5 66.8
Variance 47.1 42.9 44.7
Highest 76.4 74.2 76.5
Lowest 34.6 36.4 40.4
Table 3.16: Homeownership Rates
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State
MG Estimator
ARD L P i h @3 a R 2
Alabama 2,0,0,3 0.129(0.33) 0.465(1.06) 1.722(1.45) -0.530(-3.62) 0.72
Alaska 3,0,0,2 -0.508(-2.30) 0.422(4.66) 0.749(4.73) -0.703(-5.67) 0.70
Arizona 0,0,0,0 0.726(3.29) 0.289(1.93) -0.330(-0.65) - 0.44
Arkansas 2,0,1,3 -0.591(-1.23) 0.550(1.96) 6.497(3.36) -0.604(-3.57) 0.76
California 1,0,2,2 0.813(3.27) -0.038(-0.62) 0.314(0.79) -1.258(-11.08) 0.66
Colorado 0,0,1,3 2.617(4.84) -0.064(-0.81) -0.768(-1.84) - 0.74
Connecticut 3,0,0,3 1.612(2.82) 0.021(0.09) -3.538(-1.84) -0.698(-4.49) 0.73
Delaware 3,0,0,3 3.223(3.30) -0.548(-1.40) -5.215(-3.17) -0.537(-2.82) 0.77
DC 3,0,0,3 0.185(0.86) -0.193(-1.39) -1.611(-3.29) -0.341(-3.58) 0.61
Florida 1,0,0,2 1.049(13.55) 0.873(3.50) 1.175(2.46) -1.263(-10.70) 0.63
Georgia 2,3,0,3 -0.164(-0.21) 0.749(0.76) 2.495(1.48) -0.356(-1.96) 0.73
Hawaii 2,0,0,3 1.687(2.91) -0.106(-0.62) -0.173(-0.36) -0.596(-3.48) 0.73
Idaho 3,0,1,3 -1.358(-1.79) 1.488(9.28) 3.607(2.68) -0.754(-5.12) 0.69
Illinois 3,0,0,3 1.246(8.02) 0.066(0.64) -3.135(-11.62) -1.902(-6.02) 0.88
Indiana 2,0,0,3 0.362(0.72) 0.391(1.09) 0.416(0.30) -0.663(-3.31) 0.70
Iowa 3,0,1,3 0.365(1.57) 0.648(7.69) 0.979(1.24) -1.269(-5.58) 0.82
Kansas 0,0,0,3 1.102(3.26) 0.287(1.20) -1.106(-1.27) - 0.63
Kentucky 2,0,0,3 0.735(1.44) 0.440(0.97) 1.009(0.75) -0.577(-3.74) 0.78
Louisiana 3,0,0,3 0.589(1.51) 0.350(3.43) 0.178(0.23) -0.741(-3.95) 0.76
Maine 3,0,0,3 1.320(1.77) -0.113(-0.43) -1.525(-1.71) -0.831 (-4.16) 0.75
Maryland 3,0,0,3 1.694(6.78) -0.770(-4.07) -1.670(-2.66) -0.823(-3.93) 0.81
Massachusetts 3,0,3,2 1.099(5.35) 0.010(0.12) -0.446(-0.91) -1.817(-7.39) 0.85
(continued on next page)
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Michigan 3,2,0,2 1.473(26.60) 0.021(0.44) -0.427(-2.58) -2.464(-11.69) 0.89
Minnesota 3,0,0,3 0.360(2.73) 0.208(0.62) 0.819(1.31) -1.069(-4.45) 0.79
Mississippi 2,0,1,3 1.347(2.10) 0.813(3.12) -2.777(-1.26) -0.513(-4.22) 0.69
Missouri 0,0,0,3 0.823(4.07) -0.001(-0.05) -1.156(-1.27) - 0.68
Montana 3,0,0,3 1.391(1.79) 0.390(2.80) -0.591(-0.77) -0.516(-3.44) 0.63
Nebraska 2,0,0,3 -0.196(-0.37) 0.435(1.13) 1.488(0.73) -0.640(-4.09) 0.77
Nevada 2,0,0,3 -5.005(-1.57) 0.803(0.74) 6.852(1.62) -0.222(-2.17) 0.65
New Hampshire 3,1,0,3 0.947(3.49) 0.160(1.29) -0.844(-1.22) -1.383(-6.65) 0.81
New Jersey 3,2,1,2 -0.144(-0.68) 0.403(5.32) 0.707(1.10) -1.954(-7.40) 0.82
New Mexico 2,0,0,3 1.293(0.96) 0.782(3.87) -0.523(-0.35) -0.458(-2.74) 0.70
New York 3,0,0,2 0.279(1.02) 0.292(2.78) 0.943(1.11) -1.641(-6.13) 0.72
North Carolina 2,0,0,3 0.594(1.02) 0.736(1.22) 0.135(0.10) -0.551(-2.89) 0.73
North Dakota 2,2,0,3 1.980(1.59) 0.535(2.84) -2.116(-0.93) -0.489(-3.80) 0.74
Ohio 2,0,0,3 0.582(1.44) -0.120(-0.37) 1.800(1.61) -0.609(-3.18) 0.80
Oklahoma 3,0,0,3 -1.750(-1.28) 0.822(2.55) 3.209(1.55) -0.297(-3.28) 0.65
Oregon 3,0,0,3 -0.019(-0.06) 0.318(6.62) 0.978(1.52) -1434(-5.20) 0.81
Pennsylvania 2,0,0,3 -0.760(-0.13) 0.009(0.00) -1.465(-0.12) -0.141(-0.71) 0.74
Rhode Island 2,0,0,0 0.795(1.05) -0.276(-0.78) -4.895(-1.73) -0.387(-2.47) 0.38
South Carolina 3,0,0,3 0.716(4.57) 0.449(1.50) 0.391(1.62) -1.015(-4.49) 0.83
South Dakota 3,0,2,3 0.395(2.78) 0.521(4.06) 1.020(1.02) -1.445(-5.77) 0.81
Tennessee 3,1,0,2 1.002(17.93) 0.423(8.15) 1.321(6.14) -2.627(-13.05) 0.89
Texas 3,0,1,3 -0.026(-0.10) 0.099(1.53) 1.087(3.04) -1.512(-5.66) 0.82
Utah 0,0,0,3 0.132(0.28) .248(3.80) 0.751(1.03) - 0.71
Vermont 2,0,3,3 1.391(1.71) -0.521(-1.55) -1.958(-1.97) -0.449(-2.87) 0.76
Virginia 3,0,0,2 0.934(4.99) 0.054(0.38) 0.179(0.59) -1.362(-6.84) 0.78
Washington 3,0,0,3 0.721(9.33) 0.248(5.20) -0.234(-1.42) -2.289(-8.05) 0.86
West Virginia 3,0,0,3 -1.338(-1.42) 0.457(2.14) 1.998(1.30) -0.223(-2.90) 0.69
Wisconsin 3,0,0,2 0.734(2.87) -0.078(-0.38) 1.200(1.07) -1.283(-5.27) 0.74
Wyoming 3,0,0,3 -1.293(-1.47) 1.202(4.08) 0.649(1.15) -0.207(-3.74) 0.50
Seasonal Dummies no
Table 3.17: Mean Group Estimation controlling for Aging Population
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State lags
leads
P i @2 Pz R 2
Alabama 3,3 0.318(2.12) 0.236(1.55) 2.010(3.97) 0.78
Alaska 3,3 -0.685(-3.92) 0.391(6.33) 0.896(8.54) 0.73
Arizona 3,3 0.888(7.62) -0.025(-0.22) -1.411(-3.70) 0.51
Arkansas 3,3 0.038(0.20) -0.146(-1.57) 2.900(3.47) 0.68
California 3,3 1.091(5.29) 0.094(1,55) -0.012(-0.03) 0.75
Colorado 3,3 2.882(8.88) -0.239(-4.34) -0.860(-2.91) 0.77
Connecticut 3,3 1.781(7.34) 0.034(0.34) -3.727(-4.50) 0.84
Delaware 3,3 2.849(7.21) -0.266(-2.03) -3.375(-4.40) 0.84
DC 3,3 -0.059(-0.69) -0.008(-0.18) -1.382(-5.60) 0.56
Florida 3,3 0.985(11.33) 1.265(6.10) 0.858(1.78) 0.75
Georgia 3,3 0.865(7.76) 0.721(4.20) 1.549(3.97) 0.82
Hawaii 3,3 2.314(6.28) -0.201(-1.79) 0.285(0.92) 0.86
Idaho 3,3 -3.893(-7.43) 1.757(18.07) 7.625(8.26) 0.81
Illinois 3,3 1.801(5.04) -0.262(-1.37) -3.962(-7.14) 0.82
Indiana 3,3 0.183(0.88) 0.505(2.98) 1.000(1.66) 0.68
Iowa 3,3 1.080(7.05) 0.914(10.67) -1.780(-3.16) 0.76
Kansas 3,3 1.585(8.18) 0.118(0.83) -1.123(-1.81) 0.66
Kentucky 3,3 1.220(5.93) 0.611(3.58) 0.508(0.88) 0.89
Louisiana 3,3 -0.070(-0.21) 0.507(5.05) 1.320(2.30) 0.57
Maine 3,3 0.328(0.80) 0.238(1.66) -1.000(-1.95) 0.66
Maryland 3,3 1.699(12.79) -0.854(-9.71) -1.293(-3.22) 0.68
Massachusetts 3,3 1.190(5.97) 0.019(0.22) -0.762(-1.29) 0.78
Michigan 3,3 1.095(11.19) 0.449(6.29) -0.164(-0.55) 0.86
Minnesota 3,3 0.399(5.04) -0.078(-0.41) 1.037(2.26) 0.67
(continued on next page)
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Mississippi 3,3 2.273(8.63) 0.733(7.27) -6.235(-6.71) 0.72
Missouri 3,3 1.181(11.68) 0.036(0.35) -1.156(-2.10) 0.75
Montana 3,3 -0.437(-1.35) 0.755(13.03) 0.760(2.28) 0.75
Nebraska 3,3 0.799(5.97) 1.012(9.76) -1.322(-2.37) 0.75
Nevada 3,3 -3.331(-6.34) 0.421(1.73) 4.138(5.90) 0.45
New Hampshire 3,3 1.154(5.79) 0.006(0.06) -2.017(-3.61) 0.80
New Jersey 3,3 -0.110(-0.45) 0.365(4.20) -0.245(-0.30) 0.69
New Mexico 3,3 2.894(9.68) 0.452(7.72) -1.964(-5.38) 0.76
New York 3,3 0.845(3.71) 0.169(2.17) 0.310(0.45) 0.69
North Carolina 3,3 1.420(8.04) 0.123(0.73) -0.829(-1.65) 0.83
North Dakota 3,3 1.319(2.78) 0.441(5.29) -0.990(-1.09) 0.69
Ohio 3,3 -0.172(-0.81) 0.707(3.91) 1.977(4.26) 0.79
Oklahoma 3,3 -2.283(-5.05) 0.292(3.98) 4.084(6.10) 0.49
Oregon 3,3 0.288(1.08) 0.473(10.92) -0.634(-1.13) 0.70
Pennsylvania 3,3 1.025(3.44) 0.335(3.49) 0.200(0.26) 0.76
Rhode Island 3,3 0.953(6.54) -0.161(-3.31) -4.852(-8.91) 0.81
South Carolina 3,3 0.746(7.13) 0.393(2.11) 0.593(2.96) 0.89
South Dakota 3,3 0.426(3.63) 0.612(6.86) 1.008(1.26) 0.76
Tennessee 3,3 1.064(10.42) 0.388(5.26) 1.449(3.05) 0.92
Texas 3,3 0.408(1.86) 0.047(0.74) 0.503(1.57) 0.43
Utah 3,3 1.219(4.36) 0.052(1.27) -0.513(-1.19) 0.71
Vermont 3,3 1.948(6.59) -0.336(-2.50) -2.547(-5.97) 0.78
Virginia 3,3 0.837(5.95) -0.003(-0.03) 0.537(1.60) 0.73
Washington 3,3 1.161(7.13) 0.184(2.66) -0.882(-2.90) 0.82
West Virginia 3,3 -1.413(-5.88) 0.469(5.69) 1.879(4.38) 0.41
Wisconsin 3,3 0.627(2.99) -0.706(-2.32) 3.852(2.96) 0.58
Wyoming 3,3 -1.764(-5.00) 1.042(8.31) 0.529(2.22) 0.70
Seasonal Dummies no
B-P test independence chi2(1275) =  23897.822
of residuals p-value=0.000
Table 3.18: Unrestricted DSUR Estimates controlling for Aging Population
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Figure 3.5: Log of State Real Housing Prices in the Midwest Region
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Figure 3.6: Log of State Real Housing Prices in the South Region
Figure 3.7: Log of State Real Housing Prices in the West Region
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Figure 3.8: Log of Real Housing Prices in all States
Extensions
From the evidence of Chapter 1 and 2, three extensions of this thesis would be of 
interest:
1. Further microeconometric work on endogenous switching models could be un­
dertaken. In particular, a natural extension would be to use the same frame­
work of chapter 1 (Multiperiod Mutinomial Probit (MPMNP) models with 
Autocorrelated Errors and Unobserved Heterogeneity) to estimate the discrete 
part of the endogenous switching model and calculate suitable Mills ratios for 
the continuous part of the model of Chapter 2. To the best of my knowledge, 
the Mills ratios for the MPMNP model have not been figured out. Since they 
do not have a closed form solution, the way to proceed in this case would 
be to use computer simulation techniques to evaluate these formulae. This is 
the objective of a companion paper, joint with Vassilis Hajivassiliou, which is 
currently in process.
2. Given the results in Chapter 2, where some differences emerged between the 
results using the asset-based and credit card splits to measure liquidity con­
strained households, it might be a good idea to use the Multiple Indicators 
and Multiple Causes (MIMIC) model of Joreskog and Goldberger (1975) in 
order to obtain a unique indicator for liquidity constraints.
3. One missing element in this thesis is an explicit test for the importance of
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taxation in asset portfolio decisions. I had to abstract taxes from the model 
because the SHIW does not have such information. If this information should 
become available for a number of waves of the dataset, it would be a very 
valuable input for advancing the proposed asset participation model.
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